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Abstract 
 
Since the end of the Sino-Soviet Split in 1986, the complex and multidimensional 
relationship between Moscow and Beijing has undergone considerable changes. Recent 
developments testify to the gradual improvement of cross-national political, economic and 
security-related relations. Yet, the significance of Sino-Russian geopolitical and geo-
economic rapprochement is often questioned by scholars, who rather stress its tactical raison 
d’être. The aim of this thesis is to identify the driving forces underlying the improvement of 
Sino-Russian relationship these last twenty years, and to conclude on the (strategic or tactical) 
nature of Sino-Russian cooperation.  
To that end, I will review the literature dealing with cooperation theories. I will 
distinguish power-based, interest-based and identity-based approaches, each of them 
providing explanatory and predictive arguments of interstate cooperative behaviours. I will 
show that only some paradigms sustain a first confrontation with empirical observations. Then, 
I will design a theoretical framework based on a liberal-constructivist understanding of 
cooperation enabling me to distinguish strategic convergence from tactical alignment. I will 
posit as hypothesis that strategic convergence, unlike tactical alignment, requires a three-
directional dynamics of collective identity formation. This process develops horizontally 
through the identification of a broader mutuality of interests, whereby states accept eschewing 
individualistic and relativistic gains in order to maximise absolute gains and positive 
reciprocities; it develops transversally through the socio-cognitive development of shared 
normative understandings conducive to the emergence of a peculiar sense of “we-ness”; and it 
develops vertically through the internalisation of these understandings in states’ polities and 
economic organisation, and their gradual isomorphisation.  
I will subsequently conduct an empirical research on Sino-Russian tri-directional 
collective identity formation since 1986. I will first investigate the endogenous forces of Sino-
Russian cooperation, and highlight the causative mechanisms conducive to growing 
similarities in Russia and China’s intrinsic identities and objective interests. I will thereby 
demonstrate Sino-Russian convergence in polity and state-business relationship. Then, I will 
research quantitatively and qualitatively Sino-Russian transversal collective identity 
formation by assessing ideational convergence. I will show that Russia and China do share a 
common vision of a new world order, oscillating between revisionism, conservatism and 
compliance. Russia and China’s foreign policy alignment in multilateral fora is one of the 
most flagrant manifestations of Sino-Russian enhanced cooperation, but other forms of 
alignments, e.g. in semiotics, also indicate transversal collective identity formation. Finally, I 
will research to what extent Sino-Russian interest-interdependence grew in the past years in a 
very distinctive manner. Russia and China developed a far-reaching mutuality of interests, 
which translated in particular into higher mutual trade and geo-economic interdependence. 
Despite persisting ambiguities, the study of the three-directional construction of Sino-Russian 
collective identity reveals that Sino-Russian rapprochement is less driven by tactical 
calculations than strategic convergence. The implications thereof are of paramount 
importance, as China carries on its “peaceful rise” and Russia “rises from its knees”. 
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Resümee 
 
Seit dem Ende des chinesisch-sowjetischen Zerwürfnisses im Jahr 1986 hat das 
Verhältnis zwischen Moskau und Peking einen beträchtlichen Wandel erlebt. 
Neuentwicklungen bezeugen die graduelle Verbesserung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und 
sicherheitsbezogenen zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen. Oft wird jedoch die Bedeutung von 
der sinorussischen geopolitischen und geoökonomischen Annäherung in Frage gestellt und als 
rein taktisch betrachtet. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die zugrunde liegenden Triebkräfte der 
sinorussischen Kooperation festzulegen, und eine schlüssige Antwort auf deren strategisches 
beziehungsweise taktisches Wesen zu ziehen.  
Zu diesem Zweck wird ein analytischer Überblick über die einschlägigen 
Kooperationstheorien gegeben. Unterschiedliche Theorien, deren Paradigmen auf Macht, 
Interessen beziehungsweise Identitäten bezogen sind, liefern wissenschaftlich-überzeugende 
Erklärungen für zwischenstaatliche Kooperationen. Deren Aussagekraft hält aber nicht 
gleichmässig einer ersten Gegenüberstellung mit empirischen Fakten stand. Deshalb wird ein 
theoretisches Gerüst erstellt, das einem liberal-konstruktivisten Verständnis der Kooperation 
entstammt, und gleichzeitig erlaubt eine deutliche und spezifische Definition des Konzepts 
der strategischer Konvergenz in internationaler Beziehungen zu zeichnen. In diesem 
Zusammenhang ergibt sich die Hypothese, dass strategische Konvergenz sich durch den drei-
direktionale Prozess der Kollektividentitätsbildung erklären und ausmessen lässt. Horizontal 
entwickelt sich der Prozess durch die Identifizierung von einer breiteren Interessenmutualität, 
wonach Staaten es annehmen, von potenziellen individualistischen und relativistischen 
Gewinnen Abstand zu nehmen, und stattdessen absolute Erträge und positive Reziprozitäten 
maximieren. Transversal entwickelt er sich durch die soziokognitive Entwicklung von 
normativen Gegenverständnissen, die der kollektiven Wahrnehmung der Gemeinschaft 
förderlich ist. Vertikal entwickelt es sich durch die Internalisierung von diesen 
Gegenverständnissen in die soziopolitische Organisation der Staaten und deren Gemeinwesen, 
was schlussendlich zu deren Isomorphisation beiträgt.  
Ein praktisches Anwendungsfeld findet dieses theoretische Gerüst in der Analyse der 
sinorussischen Kollektividentitätsbildung seit 1986. Im ersten Teil der empirischen Analyse 
werden die endogenen (vertikalen) Triebkräfte der Kooperation zwischen China und Russland 
anhand vergleichender Politikwissenschaft erforscht, und die ursächlichen  Mechanismen 
identifiziert, die zu wachsenden Ähnlichkeiten in russischen und chinesischen intrinsischen 
Identitäten und objektiven Interessen führen. Sinorussische Konvergenz in soziopolitischer 
Organisation des Staates und der Ökonomie stellt eine treibende Kraft für die Entwicklung 
gemeinsamer Wahrnehmungen dar. Im zweiten Teil wird die transversale 
Kollektividentitätsbildung quantitativ und qualitativ durch das Studium der 
Ideenbildungskonvergenz dem ‚anderen‘ gegenüber ausgemessen. Es wird demonstriert, dass 
China und Russland eine gemeinsame Wahrnehmung von einer Neuweltordnung teilen, die 
sich oszillierend auf Revisionismus, Konservatismus und Compliance bezieht. Die graduelle 
Angleichung der russischen und chinesischen Aussenpolitik in multilateralen Foren ist eine 
klare Darstellung dieser transversalen Konvergenz, obschon weitere Angleichungsformen, 
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nämlich in der Semiotik, die Bildung einer Gegenwissensgemeinschaft andeuten. Im dritten 
Teil wird erforscht, inwiefern die sinorussische Interesseninterdependenz in den letzten 
zwanzig Jahren auf eine eigenartige Weise zugenommen hat. Russland und China haben 
tatsächlich eine weitreichende Interessenmutualität entwickelt, die sich insbesondere in einer 
hohen Handelsinterdependenz resultiert. Trotz hartnäckigen Ambiguitäten, die die 
Komplexität und Multidimensionalität des Kollektividentitätsbildungsprozesses illustrieren, 
enthüllt diese drei-direktionale Kollektividentitätsforschung, dass das sinorussische Verhältnis 
eher von einer strategischen Logik als einer taktischen Ausrechnung angetrieben ist.  Die 
Schlussfolgerung solcher strategischen Dynamik ist von höchster Bedeutung für die 
Weiterstudium der internationalen Beziehungen, da China weiter seinen „friedlichen 
Aufstieg“ verfolgt, und Russland an Macht gewinnt.  
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Résumé 
 
Depuis la fin de la rupture sino-soviétique en 1986, les relations entre Moscou et 
Pékin ont considérablement évolué. Complexes, variables et multidimensionnelles, elles se 
sont progressivement améliorées au cours des années 1990 et 2000, sur les plans politique, 
économique et sécuritaire. L’interprétation de ce rapprochement géostratégique et 
géoéconomique est néanmoins régulièrement remise en question par des analystes, qui 
soulignent le caractère tactique d’un tel processus. L’objectif de ce mémoire de master est 
d’identifier les forces sous-jacentes ayant conduit au rapprochement entre la Chine et la 
Russie, et de conclure quant à la réelle nature, stratégique ou tactique, du processus.  
Dans une première partie, Les différentes théories de coopération internationale ayant 
force explicative et prédictive seront étudiées. Nous verrons que celles-ci sont fondées sur 
l’étude systémique des rapports de force, l’analyse des intérêts, ou l’identification des 
identités. Une première confrontation aux données empiriques conduira à sélectionner les 
paradigmes, les plus pertinents. Leur combinaison composera le socle théorique, libéral et 
constructiviste, qui permettra de caractériser et de mesurer le phénomène de convergence 
stratégique en relations internationales, et de le différencier de celui d’alignement tactique. 
L’hypothèse retenue consistera à penser la convergence stratégique en termes de formation 
tri-directionnelle de l’identité collective. Horizontalement, cela implique que l’identité 
collective se développe en relation étroite avec l’identification d’une plus large mutualité 
d’intérêts, pour laquelle les états acceptent de maximiser des gains absolus et des réciprocités 
positives au détriment de bénéfices relatifs. Transversalement, cela implique que l’identité 
collective se renforce par la construction sociocognitive de concepts intersubjectifs partagés, 
qui favorisent l’émergence du sens d’appartenance à une communauté distincte. 
Verticalement enfin, cela implique que l’identité collective se développe par l’internalisation 
de ces concepts intersubjectifs partagés au sein des systèmes sociopolitiques et économiques, 
menant peu à peu à leur isomorphisme. 
Dans une deuxième partie, une recherche empirique sera conduite afin d’analyser les 
forces endogènes, vecteurs de coopération sino-russe, puis les mécanismes causaux 
conduisant à une harmonisation des identités intrinsèques et des intérêts objectifs chinois et 
russes ; la convergence des systèmes sociopolitiques et économiques russes et chinois 
apparaîtra comme une force importante favorisant la construction verticale d’identité 
collective. Ensuite, la formation transversale d’identité collective sera examinée par une 
évaluation quantitative et qualitative du degré de convergence idéationnelle sino-russe. Il 
apparaîtra que la Chine et la Russie partage une vision commune de l’ordre mondial, qui 
oscille entre révisionnisme, conservatisme et  observance. L’alignement des politiques 
étrangères russe et chinoise est l’une des manifestations les plus évidentes du rapprochement 
normatif sino-russe ; mais d’autres formes d’alignements, notamment sémiotiques, suggèrent 
la construction d’une communauté de savoirs mutuels, lesquels constituent un pilier dans la 
formation de l’identité collective. Pour finir, une analyse approfondie des interdépendances 
sino-russes sera entreprise ; elle révélera que la Chine et la Russie ont peu à peu développé 
une mutualité d’intérêts couvrant un spectre très large de coopération, notamment 
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commerciale et géoéconomique. Malgré la persistance d’ambivalences importantes, qui 
d’ailleurs illustrent le fait que la formation d’identités collectives n’est pas un processus 
monolithique et homogène, l’étude de la formation tri-directionnelle de l’identité collective 
sino-russe révèle en définitive que le rapprochement entre la Chine et la Russie dérive moins 
d’une logique tactique que d’une dynamique de convergence stratégique. Dans un proche 
avenir, au fur et à mesure que la Chine et la Russie poursuivront leur ascension respective, les 
implications d’un tel processus revêtiront une signification essentielle dans la construction ou 
le maintien de l’ordre mondial.     
 
 
 
 ix
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank all the people who have helped and inspired me during my postgraduate 
studies.  
 
I especially would like to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Markus Kornprobst for his 
invaluable support and guidance throughout my research. His patience, rigor, vast knowledge 
and perpetual energy enabled me to develop a meaningful understanding of the researcher’s 
missions, and encouraged me to act as such in writing the master’s thesis. I equally owe my 
deepest gratitude to Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, who was abundantly helpful and 
available. She shared with me her most state-of-the-art expertise and research insights, and 
enlightened my understanding of contemporary China. I am furthermore greatly indebted to 
Prof. Michel Cullin, who first brought me into the world of research, and involved me as a 
colleague in his manifold projects. I thank him heartily for his unflagging trust and kindness. I 
finally would like to thank Prof. Gerhard Mangott for sharing his most informed knowledge 
and personal views on contemporary Russia, and giving critical inputs.  
 
I am thankful to the Vienna Diplomatic Academy, an outstanding institution where I could 
confront my ideas with experts and friends, and build my own understanding of international 
relations. I am also obliged to the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe, and 
especially H.E. Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, and my former colleagues Dagmar Moroseck and Petra 
Schuh-Leitner, who supported my intellectual curiosity and my professional ambitions.   
 
Most importantly, I thank my wife, Ivana Milakovic, who stood beside me and encouraged 
me ceaselessly throughout my studies. She is an unconditional source of inspiration, rendering 
(my social) reality utmostly beautiful. I am also greatly indebted to my parents, Margrit and 
Jean-Pierre Marciacq, for their valuable support and patience, as well as their contribution in 
passing me down their curiosity and critical thinking. I finally thank my sister, brothers, in-
laws, and wider family for their sincere interest in what I am doing. 
 
Last but not least, I am very thankful to all of my friends, who participated in various manners 
in this adventure. Thanks, then, to Kalin, Martina, David, Martine, Paulo, only to mention 
some of them. 
 x
 
 
 
 xi
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................................III 
RESÜMEE.............................................................................................................................................V 
RÉSUMÉ.............................................................................................................................................VII 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................................. IX 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................... XI 
TABLE OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................................XII 
TABLE OF ANNEXES....................................................................................................................XIII 
1. THE RESEARCH QUESTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE................................ - 15 - 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES & LITERATURE REVIEW.................................... - 25 - 
2.1. POWER-BASED EXPLANATIONS OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION......................................................... - 26 - 
2.1.1. Balance of power theory ..............................................................................................................- 27 - 
2.1.2. Hegemonic stability theory...........................................................................................................- 32 - 
2.1.3. Dependency theory .......................................................................................................................- 33 - 
2.2. INTEREST-BASED EXPLANATIONS OF BILATERAL INTERSTATE COOPERATION .................................. - 35 - 
2.2.1. Classical liberal arguments .........................................................................................................- 36 - 
2.2.2. Ideological solidarity argument...................................................................................................- 39 - 
2.2.3. Neoliberal argument.....................................................................................................................- 40 - 
2.3. IDENTITY-BASED APPROACH OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION............................................................. - 45 - 
2.3.1. Conceptual definitions..................................................................................................................- 46 - 
2.3.2. Constructivist understanding of interactions...............................................................................- 50 - 
2.3.3. Constructivist understanding of interstate cooperation ..............................................................- 52 - 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN - HYPOTHESIS & METHODOLOGY ........................................ - 57 - 
3.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, HYPOTHESIS AND DEFINITIONS .......................................................... - 57 - 
3.2. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................. - 63 - 
4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH.................................................................................................... - 67 - 
4.1. SINO-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN POLITY AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ............................................ - 67 - 
4.1.1. Definitions: Liberal and illiberal democracies ...........................................................................- 68 - 
4.1.2. Divergences in initial circumstances and strategic choices........................................................- 71 - 
4.1.3. Convergence in the ideological reframing of transformation.....................................................- 76 - 
4.1.4. Convergence in horizontal power concentration ........................................................................- 78 - 
4.1.5. Convergence in vertical power concentration.............................................................................- 84 - 
4.1.6. Convergence in state-business relationships...............................................................................- 87 - 
4.1.7. Interactions, convergence and collective identity formation ......................................................- 92 - 
4.2. SINO-RUSSIAN IDEATIONAL CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ....................................... - 94 - 
4.2.1. Methodology .................................................................................................................................- 94 - 
4.2.2. Sino-Russian normative convergence in semiotics......................................................................- 96 - 
4.2.3. Sino-Russian convergence in foreign policy............................................................................. - 103 - 
4.2.4. Ideational convergence and collective identity formation ....................................................... - 109 - 
4.3. SINO-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS.............................- 113 - 
4.3.1. Sino-Russian trade pattern and economic interdependence .................................................... - 115 - 
4.3.2. Sino-Russian focal shift towards a mutuality of interests in bilateral and regional geo-economics - 
124 - 
5. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................... - 135 - 
ANNEXES...................................................................................................................................... - 141 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... - 164 - 
 xii
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1: From normalisation to multidimensional cooperation (1986-2009) ....................- 21 - 
 
Figure 2: Different approaches on cooperation theory ........................................................- 26 - 
 
Figure 3: Determinants of strategic convergence, tactical alignment and rivalry ...............- 63 - 
 
Figure 4: China and Russia's GDP (PPP) 1992-2007 ..........................................................- 76 - 
 
Figure 5: China and Russia's GDP growth 1989-2007 ........................................................- 76 - 
 
Figure 6: Civil liberties and political rights in Russia and China ........................................- 83 - 
 
Figure 7: Degree of convergence in horizontal power concentration based on political rights 
and civil liberties’ variables .................................................................................................- 84 - 
 
Figure 8: Russia, China and US voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly (86-08) - 106 - 
 
Figure 9: Sino-Russian Trade 1992-2007 ..........................................................................- 116 - 
 
Figure 10: Russia and China 's Main Trade Partners (volumes, 2007)..............................- 117 - 
 
Figure 11: Comparative evolution of Sino-Russian trade (2000-2007).............................- 118 - 
 
Figure 12: Evolution of Russia and China's respective trade shares .................................- 121 - 
 
Figure 13: Trade Asymmetry and Trade Interdependence ................................................- 122 - 
 
Figure 14: Comparative evolution of trade dependence of relevant dyadic trade partners 
(Baribieri’s Method) ..........................................................................................................- 123 - 
 
Figure 15: China’s energy balance (TPES, 2006)..............................................................- 126 - 
 
Figure 16: China's domestic production and consumption of crude oil.............................- 127 - 
 
Figure 17: China’s Oil Suppliers .......................................................................................- 127 - 
 
Figure 18: Siberian oil reserves .........................................................................................- 129 - 
 
 xiii
Table of Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Ups and downs in Sino-Soviet Cold-War “red” friendship............................... - 141 - 
 
Annex 2: China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order ............................ - 142 - 
 
Annex 3: Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Russian Federation ................................................................. - 147 - 
 
Annex 4: Compared Voting behaviour of relevant dyads in the UN General Assembly.. - 154 - 
 
Annex 5: Russia and China’s vetoes in the UN Security Council (1986-2008) ............... - 155 - 
 
Annex 6:Sino-Russian Bilateral Trade .............................................................................. - 156 - 
 
Annex 7: Russia and China’s main trade partners............................................................. - 157 - 
 
Annex 8: Calculating the Trade Interdependence variable ............................................... - 158 - 
 
Annex 9: Sino-Russian trade interdependence..............................................................- - 159 - - 
 
Annex 10: Trade interdependence of relevant dyads ....................................................- - 159 - - 
 
Annex 11: China’s Civil Nuclear Sector .......................................................................- - 161 - - 
 
Annex 12: Relevant Pipeline Projects ...........................................................................- - 162 - - 
 
Annex 13: The ESPO oil-pipeline .................................................................................- - 163 - - 
 
 xiv
 
 
 - 15 -
1. The Research Question in Historical 
Perspective 
 
 
Russia and China are sometimes presented as eternal foes, whose geographical 
proximity, historical distrust and lust for relative power necessarily undermine prospects for 
dyadic rapprochement. These last twenty years, however, Sino-Russian relations changed 
considerably. Once rivals, Russia and China came to see each other as friends, and enshrined 
their fledgling friendly sentiments in a number of political declarations and bilateral treaties. 
The process that led to the emergence of this newly-found friendship is complex, uneven, and 
multidimensional.  
 
Sino-Russian enmity is ancient and deep-rooted in history. It can be traced back to the 
300-year “Mongol Yoke” period and the “Unequal Treaties”, which ceded parts of the 
Chinese Outer Mongolia to Russia as a result of the Second Opium War. 1 In the beginning of 
the 20th century, with the rise of Communism in both countries, the world could have 
expected a tightening of Sino-Russian ties. 2 But ideological solidarity did not materialise in a 
lasting alliance. In the aftermath of the collapse of the last Chinese Qing Dynasty, the 
Comintern did help the anti-imperialist revolutions that broke out in China. But among the 
two protagonists vying with each other in addition to fighting against the imperial powers, 
Vladimir Lenin did not choose to privilege the newly-found Chinese Communist Party. On 
the contrary, he advocated a United Front bringing together the Kuomintang and the 
Communists. In praxis, this meant that the Kuomintang actually received most of Russia’s 
support, including special advisors as Mikhail Borodin, financial aid and military equipment, 
to the Communists’ utter despair. 3 During the Chinese civil war (1945-1949), the ambiguous 
role played by Joseph Stalin’s Russia further cast suspicion among the Chinese Communists 
about the true motives of their Red Brothers. 4 And later on, major ideological divergences 
                                                 
 
1 The unequal treaties refer here to the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860) and Tarbagatai (1864). See Bobo 
Lo, Axis of Convergence: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (London: Chatham House, 2008) pp. 17-37 
2 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 by young intellectuals as an anti-imperial 
movement supporting Chinese unity against foreign imperialist influences and domestic warlordism. Its 
foundation echoed the vanguard-role played by the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Communist Party in leading 
the October 1917 Revolutions and denouncing the imperialistic dominance of capitalist nations in Europe.  
3 The Comintern also provided ideological and party-organisation advice and helped restructure the KMT party 
along Leninist lines in the 1920s. The Soviet Union’s support to the CCP only superseded that to the KMT after 
the end of the First United Front in 1927-1928. For more details, see John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese 
Revolution 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row, 1986) pp. 204-240 
4 Already in 1942, Mao Zedong declared that the revolution in China had to be organised according to Chinese 
needs, and that the CCP would no longer be part of the Comintern. Stalin and Mao disagreed on ideological 
understanding of Marxism. The former criticised the latter scornfully for his plan of establishing “peasant 
socialism” in China. They also disagreed on tactical matters, since Stalin refused to consider the KMT as an 
enemy in the war between China and Japan. The Soviet Union accepted in particular the KMT request that it 
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peaked, as Mao Zedong resisted the Soviet interpretation of Marxism, the dogma of 
proletariat-based economy, 5  and firmly opposed Nikita Khrushchev’s revisionism. 6  This 
tumultuous relationship across the Amour River during the Cold War attracted considerable 
scholarly attention. Its main feature was the “Sino-Russian split”, which in 1956 buried the 
short life-spanned Sino-Soviet “Pact of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” that Mao 
Zedong and Josef Stalin signed in 1950. In 1969, a military conflict broke out between the 
two countries, followed by grand rivalry in South and Central Asia. The great volatility Sino-
Russian friendly sentiments during the after-WWII period is illustrated in Annex 1. 
Normalisation  of Sino-Russian relationship only started in the mid-1980s.  
 
With the Cold war coming to an end, Russia and China chose diverging paths of 
transformation. China started before Russia by launching a process of reassessment of Marxist 
ideology in the 1970s.7 It then engaged in gradual bottom-up Party-controlled reforms, first in 
the economy, and later only, and very cautiously, in politics.8 Chinese transformation strategy 
of “crossing the river by grasping stones”9 resulted in outstanding economic performance, 
though little progress in political reforms. In Russia, a transition programme designed by 
Western economists (e.g. the American economist Jeffrey Sachs) was enforced after 
pusillanimous attempts of top-down protracted reforms failed. This audacious, comprehensive 
transition programme called for a “shock therapy”, which precipitated the collapse of Russia’s 
economy and allowed the emergence of a weak dysfunctional democracy10. Throughout the 
last 30 years, Russia and China’s economy and polity have considerably changed, and an 
extensive literature depicts China’s rise and Russia’s fall, as well as the two powers’ 
respective strengths and weaknesses.11 However, little attention is brought to Sino-Russian 
contemporary relations and interactions.12  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
should maintain its military presence in Manchuria till 1946 and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with 
KMT leader Chiang Kai-Sheck. For an analysis of KMT-CCP struggle for power during the Chinese Civil War 
and the role played by the Soviets, see Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, the Political Struggle 1945-1949 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). For an account of the specific role of the Soviet Union during 
this period, see Eva-Maria Stolberg, Stalin und die chinesischen Kommunisten, 1945-1953: Eine Studie zur 
Entstehungsgeschichte der sowjetisch-chinesischen Allianz vor dem Hintergrund des kalten Krieges (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997) pp. 24-28 
5 China had an overwhelming peasantry, whereas Russia in the 1950s and 1960s could rely on an industrial 
proletariat.  
6 John K. Fairbank (1986), pp. 296-316 
7 Christopher Marsh, Unparalleled Reforms, China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall, and the Interdependence of Transition 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005) pp. 36-44 
8 The bottom-up dynamics is to be understood in relativistic terms compared to the Soviet transformation. 
Reforms in China, although partly originating from below, were guided by elites.  
9 The expression, coined by Deng Xiaoping, underlines the absence of explicit finality in the transformation 
process. According to this doctrine, gradual reforms are to be implemented under the exclusive leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party, which shall alone decide on the pace, scope and direction of reforms.  
10 Christopher Marsh (2005), pp. 45-66; 80-100 
11 See for instance Yong Deng, Roderick MacFaquhar, Andrew Jack, Christopher Marsh.  
12 For a literature review of authors writing Sino-Russian contemporary relations, see Stephen Blank, Andrew 
Kuchins, Lo Bobo, Alexander Lukin.  
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Russia and China engaged in the mid-1980s in a novel form of relationship. At that 
time, Sino-Soviet relations were no longer officially hostile, but following the Cambodian-
Vietnamese War and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, they were still relatively cool, 
and characterised by mutual wariness. Engaging in a novel relationship, thus, required first 
trust-building and the normalisation of bilateral relations. As part of his “New Political 
Thinking” policy, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the normalisation process in 1986. In a speech 
in Vladivostok, he advocated the “full normalisation” of Sino-Soviet ties, based on “good-
neighbourliness and trust”, and cooperation instead of competition. 13 Sino-Russian relations 
improved accordingly in the following years. In order to seal political normalisation of the 
Sino-Russian relationship, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989 in an atmosphere 
troubled by the Tiananmen protests.14 But the political turmoil in Eastern and Central Europe, 
as well as growing tensions throughout the Soviet Union in 1990 slackened the on-going 
process of political rapprochement with China. In an attempt to re-launch this process, Boris 
Yeltsin, who just acceded to power in Russia, visited China in 1992, and called for a “new era 
in Russo-Chinese relations”.15 Only in 1993, i.e. fours years after Mikhail Gorbachev’s first 
State-visit, did China reciprocate Russian friendly gestures at the highest level.16 This 4-year 
delay illustrates that the efforts conceded by the Soviet Union/Russia and China for mutual 
trust-building were neither balanced nor constantly pushing. This phenomenon is depicted in 
Figure 1: between 1989 and 1993, the density of Sino-Russian mutually collaborative 
behaviour in respect with normalisation of political ties decreased. Following Jiang Zemin’s 
State-visit Sino-Russian relations found a new impetus. In 1994, Jiang Zemin and his Russian 
counterpart Boris Yeltsin enshrined political normalisation of Sino-Russian ties through the 
conclusion of a “constructive partnership”, which became in 1996 a “strategic partnership of 
equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination”. 17  Political normalisation was 
conducted through the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes and the multiplication of 
confidence-building measures. In his speech in Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to 
engage in partial border demilitarisation, which echoed the Chinese demand of transforming 
the Sino-Soviet frontier into a “zone of peace and friendship”. 18 To that end, existing border 
disputes between Russia and China had to be settled. The Treaty on the East-Section (1991) 
and the Treaty on the West Section (1994) provided the necessary settlement of the 4300-km-
long Sino-Russian border, at the exception of the Russian-controlled Bolshoi Islands, which 
ceased to be an issue in October 2004 with the signature of the Supplementary Agreement on 
the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line.19 The peaceful settlement of border 
                                                 
 
13 Gorbachev’s address at Vladivostok (28th July 1986), cited by Bobo Lo, p. 27 
14 This was the first State-visit to China by a Soviet leader since 1958 
15 Bobo Lo (2008), p. 29 
16 Jiang Zemin State-visit in 1993 was the first since Mao Zedong’s State-visit in 1950 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. p. 27 
19 For an overview of the settlement of Sino-Russian border disputes, see Rosita Dellios, “Russia-China 
Relations: the Bear and the Dragon” (FHSS, Bond University, unpublished, 2006) 
 - 18 -
disputes paved the ground to the withdrawal of “all armoured troops and heavy weaponry 
from 100-km-wide frontier zone” in April 1996 (Agreement on Strengthening Mutual 
Military Confidence).20 This initiative, which involved a group of neighbouring countries too 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), became the starting point of the “Shanghai Five” 
process, a loose regional platform instrumental in developing military confidence building 
measures.21  
 
As normalisation of Sino-Russian bilateral relations came to completion by the end of 
the 1990s, Russia and China engage in another dimension of their relational development. 
This second dimension involved enhanced cooperation with respect to international and 
regional concerns. It implied foreign policy and normative alignment in multilateral fora. The 
purpose of this alignment was to coordinate Russia and China’s approach in striking a balance 
between complying with the existing international world order and questioning one of its most 
fundamental aspects, i.e. hegemonic unipolarity.22 It aimed also at safeguarding Russia and 
China’s respective and mutual interests in their spheres of influence, and circumscribing 
exogenous normative and political interferences from the Western liberal democracies, and 
the US in particular. Already in April 1997, accordingly, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin 
hinted at the “multipolarisation of the world and the establishment of a new international 
order”. 23  Embracing Realpoltik as political leitmotiv, Russia’s Prime Minister Yevgeney 
Primakov proposed in winter 1998-1999 the creation of a Eurasian “strategic triangle” 
binding Russia, China and India in a community of principles, i.e. an “anti-hegemonic 
coalition”.24 This proposition for a tripartite defensive alliance did not appear desirable neither 
to China nor to India, but the abortive attempt did not mean the end of Sino-Russian foreign 
policy and normative alignment on the world scene. Russia and China similarly opposed the 
Nato-led Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, coordinated their views on the Iran nuclear 
question, and supported their respective interventions in Chechnya (1999-2003), Tibet (2008), 
and Georgia (2008), despite harsh criticism voiced out by Western powers. In addition, Russia 
and China denounced the US unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2001 and 
                                                 
 
20 Bobo Lo (2008), p. 28 
21 Qingguo Jia, “The Success of the Shanghai Five”, Commonwealth Institute’s website, 
<http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0110jia.htm> [21st May 2009] 
22 Compliance with the current world order involves participation in international organisations, such as the 
WTO (China), G8 (Russia), and even the UN Human Right Council (Russia and China). Participation is not 
antagonistic with revisionism, as international fora may be used as gateway to diffuse revisionist ideas. 
Opposition to the current hegemonic unipolar world order is both structural (in terms of power distribution) and 
normative (in terms of dominating values penetration). For an illustration of structural arguments in favour of the 
current world order, see the Hegemonic Stability Theory in Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (2nd ed., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 135-181 and William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a 
Unipolar World”, International Security (Vol. 24 Issue 1, Summer1999); ). For an illustration of normative 
arguments in favour of the current liberal hegemony, see Michael W. Doyle, “Liberal Internationalism: Peace, 
War and Democracy”, <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/doyle/index.html> [25th February 2009] 
and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992).  
23 Bobo Lo (2008), p. 155 
24 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 18, Issue 2, March/April 1999 
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US plans to develop a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in Asia-Pacific. In February 
2008, Russia and China proposed an international treaty banning the use of weapons in outer 
space. Russia and China justified these tactical moves in 2005 by jointly declaring that they 
would support the development of pluralism, multipolarism, and the “democratisation of 
international politics”, arguing in particular that “the international community should 
thoroughly rid itself of confrontational and alliance-making mentalities, should not seek 
monopoly and domination in international affairs, and should not categorise member states 
into leadership and subordinate types”. 25  The second axis of Sino-Russian enhanced 
cooperation in foreign policy reflected a growing concern about regional security. The US 
intervention in Afghanistan, the Colour Revolution in post-communist countries, the spread of 
the “three evils”26 and growing concerns about Western interference led Russia and China to 
sustain cooperation in order to counterbalance what they perceived as exogenous threats. 
Accordingly, in 2001, the Shanghai Five process was upgraded and institutionalised through 
the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a regional security organisation 
with Russia and China as principal pillars. The SCO acted at the beginning primarily as an 
instrument to develop Russia and China’s response capacity against common threats in the 
region. It supported the Kazakh presidential regime against Western allegations of election 
frauds in 2005, and increased visible securitisation in the military. It supported in particular 
the logistics of the organisation of the largest-scale military joint exercises in 2005 and 2007, 
the so-called “Peace Missions” with more than 10000 participating soldiers supported by 
naval and air capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates this process of foreign policy and normative 
alignment in multilateral fora: starting as a prolongation of normalisation in the end of the 
1990s, it rapidly gained impetus and acquired density.   
 
From 1986 to the end of the 1990s, Russia and China primarily worked on the 
normalisation of their bilateral ties. From 1997 onwards, they supported cooperation in 
foreign policy and coordinated assertively their response to exogenous threats. In addition to 
this process, and already from 1994 onwards, Russia and China improved cooperation on 
domestic matters, and well developed the merely reactive security-driven agenda. This third 
type of rapprochement focused on the development of the endogenous potential for enhanced 
bilateral cooperation, and required far-reaching and diversified cooperation in economic and 
non-traditional security matters. The Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and 
Cooperation signed by Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin in 2001 (the first of this kind since the 
Treaty of “unbreakable friendship” signed by Mao and Stalin in 1950), illustrates very well 
                                                 
 
25 Cited by Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, the Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 165 
26 The “three evils” are defined by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as international terrorism, ethnic 
separatism and religious fundamentalism 
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this multi-layered development in Sino-Russian relationships. This important treaty covered 
five areas of cooperation27: 
1) border dispute settlement (normalisation process of Sino-Russian ties);  
2) coordination in opposing the Western normative hegemony and 3) regional 
coordination in opposing common threats (foreign policy and normative alignment) 
4) arms and technology transfers, 5) energy and raw materials supply (geoeconomic 
strategic cooperation) 
The economic dimension of Sino-Russian rapprochement proved perhaps the most 
successful in arms trade. Estimates for Russian arms sales to China accounted for at least 
$20bn between 1992 and 2005. This represents “enough military hardware to arm a medium-
sized European country”.28 But this pattern of trade did not emerge necessarily as indicating 
the endogenous maximisation of Sino-Russian complementarities. With the arms embargo 
imposed to China in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen repression, Russia turned to be the 
only possible arms supplier with serious technological capacities. However, cooperation in 
military procurement has been significant for the last 20 years, and constitutes one of the 
pillars of Sino-Russian economic cooperation. In the field of trade cooperation in more 
traditional commodities, progress was not so impressive, as pointed out in Figure 1. In fact, 
many of the attempts for maximising economic complementarities failed, and the level of 
economic transfers between the two countries is still far below the potential level of 
interactions. In 1992, Russia attempted to open its labour market to Chinese workers by 
waiving visa-requirements. But Moscow went backwards in 1993 owing to harsh protests by 
the Far-East Province of Primorskii Kraii. It even strengthened visa-requirements in March 
1994 by reducing their validity period to 15 days for Chinese tourists. Despite a domestic lack 
of cheap labour in Siberia and obvious economic interests in relaxing conditions for 
immigrations, Russia repeatedly attempted to narrow down the flow of Chinese migrants. In 
April 2007, it prohibited foreign traders to carry out cash transactions, putting thus Chinese 
small businessmen and trading commuters under strains. In 1994 Russia and China agreed to 
set as target for bilateral trade development that Sino-Russian trade should raise from $10bn 
to $20bn by 1999. Russia had considerable raw material reserves, which were dramatically 
needed across the Amur River, as China’s economy developed. But in reality, bilateral trade 
decreased to $6bn in 1999 owing to Russia’s collapsing economy and the poor economic and 
transport infrastructures between the two countries. Only more recently did bilateral trade 
gained impetus, e.g. growing by 23% in 2008. In the field of energy security, Sino-Russian 
cooperation only bore fruit from 1998 onwards and mostly under Vladimir Putin’s first 
Presidency (until 2003). In December 1997, Russia and China agreed on the joint construction 
                                                 
 
27 Ariel Cohen, “The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia?”, 
Backgrounder, No. 1459. Washington (DC): The Heritage Foundation, 18 July 2001 
28 Vasilev Vitaly, “Russia-China Military Arms Trade” (unpublished MA thesis, National Sun-Yat-Sen 
University of Taiwan, 2007), pp. 2, 91 
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of two major nuclear plants at Tianwan supported by more than 400 Russian specialists, for 
an estimated investment of US$ 3,2bn. 29  In February 1999, feasibility studies for the 
construction of the ESPO oil pipeline linking Siberia directly to Manchuria were undertaken, 
and a first agreement was signed in March 2003 between Yukos and CNPC. But owing to 
recurrent delays, advantageous counter-offers by Japan and technical obstacles, the initial 
ESPO project risked abortion in 2005, and had to be renegotiated. Despite these ups and 
downs in economic cooperation, new fields of cooperation came under exploration, e.g. 
cultural. Russia and China celebrated their mutual support by declaring 2006 “Year of 
Russia” and 2007 “Year of China”. In December 2006, China opened its first Confucius 
Institute in Moscow; by the end of 2008, Russia numbered no less than 11 Confucius 
Institutes across the country.30 Symptomatic of this new interest for cultural cooperation is the 
declaration by the Russian and Chinese Presidents that 2009 will be “Year of the Chinese 
language”, and 2010 “Year of the Russian language”.  
 
Figure 1: From normalisation to multidimensional cooperation (1986-2009) 
 
 
Sino-Russian rapprochement since 1986 is remarkable in many respects. First, its pace 
contrasts with the long-aged rivalry, which has been characterising the Sino-Russian 
relationship for centuries. Within 20 years, Russia and China shifted from rivals mutually 
disregarding each other to mighty partners with normalised ties. Second, its scope is not 
limited to traditional security issues, but includes other vectors of convergence, as normative 
                                                 
 
29 The contract, signed by AO Atomenergoeksport and Zarubezhatomenergostrov for Russia and Tianwan 
Nuclear Power Corporation for China, plans the joint construction of the largest nuclear reactors ever built in 
China. The two Russian WER-91 PWRs’ output is 1060MWe. This is also the first time China did not choose 
France (Framatome), Japan or Canada as contractor. See Power-Technology Website <http://www.power-
technology.com/projects/tianwan> [6th February 2009] 
30 These Institutes are located in Kazan, Blagoveshchensk, Buryat, Irkutsk, Moscow, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, 
Saint-Petersburg, Kalmyk, Tomsk and in the Ural University. Confucius Institute Online, 
<http://www.confuciusinstitute.net> [4th February 2009] 
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counter-thinking, energy security strategy, maximisation of common interests in the region, 
and even cultural cooperation. Third, its operationalisation goes beyond that of mere political 
discourse, and is translated into concrete gestures, as the creation of the SCO. Sino-Russian 
rapprochement, of course, has known ups and downs. As a multidimensional process, it 
responds to a multi-layered dynamics entailing differentiated and uneven progress in each of 
its aspects. But notwithstanding this important caveat, the difference between Sino-Russian 
weak relationship in 1986 and today’s multidimensional, far-reaching and partly 
institutionalised relationship necessarily strikes the attention and raises questions.  
 
The main developments in Sino-Russian relations these last 20 years have been 
studied by a few scholars, some focusing on the SCO, some on the 2001 Friendship Treaty, 
some on arms sales, etc… But their goal was rather to anticipate the consequences of such 
manifestations, and make recommendations to Western policy-makers31. Very little attention 
has been brought to the understanding of the causality and the overall dynamics underlying 
this rapprochement process. The following study is precisely dedicated to answer to this 
research question: What is the driving force underlying the improvement of Sino-Russian 
bilateral relations since the end of the Sino-Soviet split in 1986? 
 
This thesis does not intend to support a critical view on the substance of Sino-Russian 
relationship. It only aims at highlighting the dynamics underlying Sino-Russian enhanced 
cooperation these last 20 years. It does not encourage such development, nor does it condemn 
it. The conclusions of the thesis shall be able to explain the empirical observations presented 
above in a descriptive way, and furthermore have some predictive power. The ultimate 
purpose of the thesis is indeed to identify whether Sino-Russian enhanced cooperation leans 
towards strategic convergence or tactical alignment. To that end, I will examine Sino-Russian 
political and economic relations with an emphasis on traditional and non-traditional security 
issues. Other dimensions of bilateral cooperation, e.g. cultural, educational, scientific, 
humanitarian, environmental, will be evoked to support the findings, but they will be out of 
the scope of research. This focus on politics, economy and security is justified by the 
complexity and multidimensionality of Sino-Russian relationship and a need for parsimony in 
the research. Despite the narrower scope chosen here, the research will be able to yield very 
meaningful results. It can be argued, indeed, that other dimensions of cooperation are 
subordinated to politics, economy and security, and that strategic convergence, tactical 
alignment and dyadic rivalry are best understood by examining these variables.  
 
                                                 
 
31 For some illustrations, see Weitz Richard, “Why Russia and China Have Not Formed an Anti-American 
Alliance”, Naval War College Review (Vol. 56 Issue 4, Autumn 2003), or Steven I. Levine et al., “Sino-Russian 
Strategic Partnership: A Threat to American Interests?”, Asia Program Special Report (No 99, September 2001) 
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Examining the dynamics of Sino-Russian bilateral relations is essential to understand 
whether the motive of Sino-Russian growing cooperation today is tactical or strategic. 
Economic and political rapprochement between Russia and China possibly has a leverage 
effect on their respective power to influence world politics, especially if this rapprochement is 
operated (purposefully or not) to the detriment of the Western great powers. This is something 
the Guardian of the world order, the US, and to a lesser extant the EU, should explore. With 
Sino-Russian rapprochement, the world is to become more complex, and the extent of the 
changes entailed by such strategic challenge will ultimately be determined by the nature of the 
rapprochement. Tactical rapprochement implies a lesser degree of systemic change than 
strategic convergence. Panicking or elaborating containment policies as an emotional reaction 
to the alleged existence of a growing “Sino-Chinese illiberal threat” would be counter-
productive in both cases. What is needed is to understand the underlying dynamics of this 
strategic convergence at the normative periphery, so as to design accordingly more inclusive 
security policies. At stake for the Western “older” democracies is no less than a certain 
understanding of general principles, which place the individual at the core of international 
politics, as opposed to communitarian or more corporatist visions of human societies. At stake 
are emerging customary international laws, which still lack opinio juris, as humanitarian 
intervention, right of interference and human rights directly derived from norms of public 
international law. At stake is the bargaining power of the Western great powers in 
international trade, economic matters and energy questions. At stake, finally, for Russia and 
China, is a new international status, which they equate with power, or their ability to be fully 
recognized as global players in world politics. 
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2. Theoretical Perspectives & Literature Review 
 
 
In this part, I will examine major theories of international relations providing causal 
argumentation for cooperative behaviour in interstate relations. As “a theory [shall have] 
explanatory and predictive power” 32 , I will confront these theoretical explanations with 
empirical findings from my field of research, and identify which perspectives are obviously 
inconsistent with basic observations. This approach will enable me to pick out well-defined 
theoretical explanations, which I will subsequently submit to empirical testing.  
 
I will distinguish three research perspectives in cooperation theory. Although these 
approaches differ from each other in their assumptions, they are research paradigms that 
should not be considered as antagonistic and incompatible. Their possible combination sheds 
light on the different aspects of reality, and allows a better understanding of the occurrence of 
absence of interstate cooperation. I will start with power-based explanations, which are very 
much related to the realist paradigm. Cooperation, according to the power-based perspective, 
is determined by the distribution of power in a system of interacting states. It emerges thus 
primarily, if not exclusively, from the structure of the system. I will then address interest-
based theories, which include in particular neo-liberal approaches. Interest-based theories 
justify cooperation as a rational behaviour in view of maximising states’ utility. Unlike 
power-based theories, interest-based theories assume that states are not unitary units playing 
zero-sum games, wherein the outcome is solely determined by structural constraints. I will 
finally examine identity-based theories, and focus on the social constructivist approach of 
reality. Unlike interest-based theories, constructivism assumes that interactions have a 
constitutive effect on identities and interests. Furthermore, not only do states have changing 
identities, but these are relational and multiple. This implies in particular that states behave as 
role-players rather than as utility-maximisers. Within the realm of these roles, interstate 
cooperation is determined by the identification of relation-specific interests and in accordance 
with intersubjective understandings. Figure 2 summarises the main features of these different 
schools of thought in cooperation theory.  
 
In the past 20 years, some scholars have attempted to explain the dynamics underlying 
Sino-Russian rapprochement.33 But few have referred explicitly to these general theories of 
international politics and confronted their observations with, or derived their analysis from, 
the existing theoretical models. I will thus review the existing literature dealing with my 
research question, identify implicit assumptions in order to categorise these scholars’ 
                                                 
 
32 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 69 
33 Most notably Bobo Lo, Yu Bin, Yong Deng, Christopher Marsh, Kyrre E. Braekus, Nicklas Norling 
 - 26 -
contributions according to their belonging to specific schools of international relations, and 
finally confront their argumentation and conclusions with the theoretical results driven from 
power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based explanations for interstate cooperative 
behaviour.  
 
Figure 2: Different approaches on cooperation theory 
 
 Power-based approach Interest-based approach 
Identity-based 
approach 
Principal school 
of thought 
(Neo)realism Neo-liberalism Constructivism 
Ontology Materialist  Materialist 
Ideationalist 
(Intersubjectivist) 
Central variable Power Interest Norms 
Meta-theoretical 
orientation 
Positivist Positivist Cognitive 
Behavioural 
model 
The structure of zero-
sum games determines 
egoistic and positional 
interests  
Non-constant-sum game 
structure allows absolute 
gains maximisation and the 
identification of a 
mutuality of interest 
States as (multiple) role 
players 
Rationale for 
cooperation  
Cooperation structurally 
determined by the 
distribution of power  
Cooperation determined 
 by rational maximisation 
of interest-interdependence 
Cooperation determined 
by collective identity 
formation 
 
Source: adapted from Andreas Hasenclever et al. (1997), p. 6 
 
2.1. Power-based explanations of interstate cooperation 
 
Power-based theories consider that states always act because they have the power and 
the resources to act, not because they have a will to do so. As Thucydides noted, “those who 
have power use it, while the weak makes compromises”34. The nature of interactions between 
states primarily results from the distribution of power in the system, and not from the 
                                                 
 
34 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War: A New Translation Backgrounds, Interpretations, trans. Walter Blanco 
et al. (New: York: W.W. Norton Edition, July 1998), p. 227 
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preferences of the interacting units. It follows that the prospect for cooperative behaviour is 
determined by the structure of the international system, i.e. at the systemic level, not at the 
domestic level by the interacting units’ rational choices. The most influent power-based 
theory is the neorealist balance of power theory, also called Realpolitik. But other theories, as 
the hegemonic stability theory and the dependence theory, which are not typically neorealist, 
share this assumption of cooperation as a behaviour that is structurally determined.  
 
2.1.1. Balance of power theory 
 
Realpolitik is an extremely influential theory of international relations. No wonder that 
a large part of the literature on Sino-Russian relations draws on this theory to explain 
contemporary developments across the Amur River. However, the explanatory and predictive 
power of the neorealist thinking is sometimes blurred by auxiliary assumptions, which bring 
down the analysis onto a sub-systemic level. As balance of power theory is according to 
neorealists precisely not, per se, a reductionist theory, I will therefore distinguish here the 
general neorealist argument from its reductionist derivative.  
 
In the neorealist paradigm, the prospect for cooperation is determined exogenously by 
the sole structural distribution of power in the system. Cooperation is not an end by itself, but 
a structural, i.e. non-voluntary necessity intending to ensure states’ survival. The underlying 
assumption for this systemic and rather pessimistic interpretation of interstate cooperation lie 
in the perception that states are unitary and purposive actors interacting in a self-help system 
induced by the anarchic nature of the international system. Realists derive these assumptions 
from Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan philosophy of bellum omnium contra omnes, which they 
translate at the state-level. Where Thomas Hobbes argues that human state of nature is 
“solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short”, realists echo that “among states, the state of nature is 
a state of war” 35 and “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them”.36 This does not 
necessarily mean that violence constantly breaks out in the system. But as no central authority 
has a legitimate monopoly on the use of power to maintain order, states can only rely on self-
help for their survival. It follows that “international anarchy fosters competition and conflict 
among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate, even when they share common 
interests”.37  
 
                                                 
 
35 Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), p. 102 
36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 232 
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For neorealists, cooperation is a source of uncertainty, which might jeopardise state 
survival. Power and security are perceived as a zero-sum game: an increase in one unit’s 
security entails a decrease in the aggregate security of all other units by the same amount. As 
states facing this security dilemma are “positional” and not “atomistic”, according to Joseph 
M. Grieco’s wording, they constantly assess their security relatively to others’ security and 
“worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more”38 than themselves. 
Although cooperation may be justified by absolute gains yielded through maximisation of 
common interests, it does not guarantee a status quo in the relative distribution of power 
among the cooperating units. Moreover, cooperation compels states to take into account their 
partners’ friendly intentions, not their sole military capabilities, although the latter is easier to 
determine. These uncertainties in calculating actual gains and predicting intentions are a 
major hindrance to cooperative behaviours. Another factor limiting the resort to cooperation 
by states is for realists the fear that higher interdependence, generated by cooperative 
behaviour, necessarily leads to greater vulnerability. As Kenneth N. Waltz puts it, “states do 
not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, 
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interests”.39 For the two 
reasons presented here, i.e. that cooperation increases states’ uncertainty and vulnerability, 
and thus overall insecurity, realists are usually rather sceptical about the intrinsic development 
of cooperation in world politics. They rather emphasise the “spirals of hostility”40 caused by 
the security dilemma and view cooperation as “unusual, fleeting and temporary”.41 This view 
is overwhelmingly shared among the neorealists.  
 
Notwithstanding this perhaps well-grounded scepticism, realists acknowledge the 
systemic need for cooperation in precise cases and for precise reasons. Just as the anarchic 
nature of the system compels states to pursue Realpolitik, it can compel them to cooperate 
with other states. As Kenneth H. Waltz remarks, “structures limit and mould agents and 
agencies and point them in ways that tend towards a common quality of outcome, even 
though the efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary”. The structural need for cooperation 
is dictated by states’ ultimate goal and most important concern: their survival. To ensure their 
survival, states concede internal efforts, as strengthening their military power or the economy. 
But depending on the structural distribution of power, they may have in addition to concede 
external efforts, such as concluding alliances and counter-alliances in order to balance an 
overwhelming systemic threat. Because “power is a means and not an end”, states do not 
intrinsically seek to maximise it, but rather to balance it, when they stand on the weaker 
                                                 
 
38 Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), p. 102-128 
39 Ibid. 
40 The term “spiral of hostility” has been coined by Robert Jervis 
41 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 7 
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side.42 The possible consequences of general bandwagoning, indeed, would be dramatic for 
the whole systemic order, since this would lead to the emergence of a hegemon with 
discretionary and infinite power over other actors, including that of erasing them from the 
system. “A hegemon jeopardises the survival of other states if its power cannot be curbed”.43 
As a consequence, risk-averse states have a structural and natural inducement to balance the 
greater power that threatens them by siding with the weaker side.  
 
This analysis, based on assumptions widely shared among the neorealists, does not 
provide an infallible explanation for cooperative behaviour, though. Its explanatory power is 
even considered as rather weak by some realists, who tried accordingly to mask theoretical 
flaws by modifying the theory’s research programme, so that it should better fit actual 
observations. They relaxed some assumptions and partly integrated interest-based or 
knowledge-based hypotheses in the realist paradigm, even though such borrowings tend to 
undermine the “hard core” of the theory. These reformers of neorealism did not abandon the 
classical assumptions of neorealism; nor did they abjure the neorealist paternity of their 
theories. In a limited way, they only modified the core theory. I will only mention here, 
without going into more details, Stephen M. Walt’s “Balance of Threat”, which highlights the 
need to take into account states’ intentions in addition to sheer offensive capabilities;44 Robert 
M. Jervis, who, considering the security dilemma wonders: “why are we not all dead?”, and 
suggests that states have a cognitive capacity to learn from iterated experiences, which allows 
for more space for cooperation; 45  Michael Williams, who proposes a hybrid theory of 
“Realism Reconsidered” including constructivist perspectives; and Jeffrey Legro, who 
reformulates the realist paradigm and attempts a preference-based synthesis of realism and 
liberalism.46  
 
No wonder that sheer neorealism does not provide a satisfactory explanation of Sino-
Russian cooperative behaviour since 1986. Neorealists would indeed expect to see Russia and 
China allying with each other in order to balance the current world system’s hegemon, the US, 
which allied with the European states through Nato. For neorealists, this balance of power 
configuration, with Nato states on the one side, and Russia and China, among other secondary 
states, on the other side would best guarantee the survival of all states, and should be dictated 
by structural constraints. Post-cold war systemic imbalance of power should thus be corrected 
by alignment of Russia and China. In this perspective, joint external efforts would certainly 
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involve the establishment of a Eurasian military alliance, in response to that of Nato, and a 
political pact between Moscow and Beijing open to other regional powers such as India. 
Russia did attempt to build such an alliance in December 1998, as Yevgeney Primakov called 
for a Eurasian “strategic triangle” in order to balance the power of the US, 47 and later for 
efforts in developing jointly a fifth-generation of combat aircraft.48 But the initiative failed, 
and despite the signature of the 2001 Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty, Russia under Vladimir 
Putin pursued a much more moderate, if not cooperative, foreign policy towards the US. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, Putin broke up with Yevgeney Primakov’s doctrine: he allowed the 
stationing of US military at the Manas airbase in the Kyrgyz “near abroad”, granted over-
flight rights to US non-military freight in support of the UN-mandated ISAF in Afghanistan, 
assisted the US with searched and rescue operations, engaged in intelligence cooperation, and 
established the Nato-Russia Council in 2002.49 On the other hand, China refused Yevgeney 
Primakov’s proposal of full-fledge anti-US alliance, and signed together with Russia in 2002 
the American-initiated SORT Agreement on the limitation of their nuclear arsenal.50 These 
actions by Russia and China contradict the neorealists’ predictions. Not only did Russia and 
China fail to balance the US through alliance formation, but they engaged in cooperative 
efforts with the US. From 1985 to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) from the US, the EU 
and Japan in China rose from quasi zero to $15bn per annum, and the triad accounted for 25% 
of the cumulative FDI in China in the same period.51 Growing interdependences in capital 
markets and trade in manufactured goods between China and the US, and similar 
development in the energy market between Russia and the EU contradict the theoretical 
reluctance with which Russia and China should handle cooperation, and the principle that 
economy should be subordinated to political interests. Thus, “while the [neorealist] theory 
explains Primakov’s [aborted] behaviour, it fails to explain the shift to a less confrontational 
and more cooperative behaviour” that developed across the Amur River these last 20 years.52  
 
Some neorealist scholars, aware of the discrepancies between the theoretical 
expectations of their paradigm and actual observations in Sino-Russian behaviour, chose to 
centre their research on a sub-systemic level, and apply neorealist epistemology in this newly-
created framework. Unlike the reformists of the neorealist theory, who despite some 
divergences with more conventional theoreticians still supported a monist approach of 
neorealism, these scholars gave up the fundamental assumption that states’ behaviour is 
determined by the whole system. Instead, they referred to sub-systemic levels of analysis, and 
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shifted thus from the monist interpretation of neorealism to a reductionist one. Without 
repudiating the neorealist epistemology, they modified their set of assumptions in order to 
make the theory consistent with empirical results. They designed auxiliary assumptions aimed 
at shielding the theoretical core of the balance of power theory from falsification attempts. 
This “protective belt […] secures the correctness of theoretical principles at the core” 53 by 
diverting the scientific research and making the core consistent with experimental results.  
 
In the Sino-Russian case, most neorealist scholars explained the non-formation of an 
anti-US alliance by referring to a sub-system consisting of a regional structure. In this sub-
system, Russia and China are considered as two superpowers, and the regional structure, thus, 
dictates that they should balance each other and refrain from engaging in bilateral cooperation. 
The underlying assumption is that the sub-systemic balance of power dynamics prevail over 
systemic forces, thus explaining the growing interdependences between the US and China, 
and the EU and Russia. The resulting theory, as consequence, is no longer properly systemic 
but reductionist, whereby “the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the 
interactions of its parts” at a sub-systemic, national or sub-national level.54 This poses a major 
problem to structural realism, since the level of analysis in international relations is thus 
solved “by turning the problem into a matter of choice, a choice made accordingly to the 
investigator’s interest.”55  
 
The scholarly literature using this auxiliary assumption of sub-systemic balance of 
power in Sino-Russian relations include Richard Weitz (2003), Dmitri Trenin (2000) and Lolo 
Bo (2004, 2008), who imply that on the regional chessboard, Russia would not bandwagon 
with China to become China’s “junior partner”, but would rather strive for balancing its 
growing power. This materialised in particular through enhanced cooperation between Russia 
and India. For instance, Russia’s arms sales to India included advanced weapons that were not 
offered to Beijing. Russia also provided India with nuclear reactors for civilian use. However, 
many observations seem to contradict the reductionist argument derived from neorealism. 
First, the scale of Russian arms sales to China does not characterise a relationship of 
competitors engaged in a security zero-sum game. In addition to the joint military exercises 
organised in 2005 and 2007, “China has purchased these last 20 years more weapons from 
Russia than from all other countries combined”.56 The annual value of arms deliveries ranges 
from $700 million to $1bn per annum in the 1990s and $1,5bn to $2bn since in the beginning 
of the 2000s. It is doubtful that neorealism could explain both the theoretical expectation of 
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Russia balancing China in a regional sub-system and 20 years of Russia’s arming China. I 
will therefore explore other power-based theories of international relations.  
 
2.1.2. Hegemonic stability theory 
 
The hegemonic stability theory (HST), designed by Robert O. Keohane, emerged from 
the liberal school of international relations through the “synthesis of realism and 
institutionalism”.57 Despite its origins, the HST can be considered as a power-based theory, 
since its explanation for interstate cooperative behaviour under hegemony primarily rests on a 
particular configuration of power distribution in the world system. In the HST, hegemony 
must prevail, i.e. “one state [must be] powerful enough to maintain the essential rules 
governing interstate relations, and willing to do so”. 58  Hegemonic power thus requires 
overwhelming military, economic, technological, cultural and ideological superiority. 
According to Robert O. Kehoane, such a power imbalance in the system is prone to facilitate 
cooperation between the hegemon and smaller states as well as among smaller states 
themselves. 59  The rationale is that hegemony “reduces transaction costs and mitigates 
uncertainty”, while the hegemon “ensures consistency for the system as a whole”.60 As the 
most powerful agent, the hegemon shoulders the costs of rulemaking and maintaining order. 
Its overwhelming power leaves little choice to smaller states, who comply with the hegemon’s 
rules because they are compelled to (coercion), or because they are induced to do so 
(leadership). Transaction costs arising from the process of reaching an agreement decrease 
accordingly. Moreover, because the hegemon can exert extensive control over its partners’ 
behaviour in the future, it is generally more willing to “make initial sacrifices for future 
gains”, and thus initiate cooperation. 61  On the other hand, because the hegemon wields 
unchallengeable power, “cheating and double-crossing strategies are [extremely] costly”.62 
This paves the way to more optimal conditions for cooperation, since uncertainties about the 
partner’s intentions are cleared, and the uncertainties in terms of relative gains distribution 
among smaller states are negligible compared to the certainty that the hegemon will still wield 
incomparably more relative and absolute power than any of the smaller states.  
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world system did experience an 
“unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power” ensuring the economic, 
military, technological and geopolitical supremacy of the United States. 63  Since the US 
capabilities were “too great to be counterbalanced”, William Wohlforth concluded in 1999 
that the world system was distinctly unipolar, thus responding critically to Samuel 
Huntington’s argument that the system configuration was a “strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar 
system with one superpower and several major powers”.64 Furthermore, William Wohlforth 
implicitly relied on Robert O. Keohane’s HST to conclude that “the current unipolarity is not 
only peaceful, but durable”, arguing indeed that “unipolarity minimises security competition 
among other great powers”. 65  In the 2000s, however, a growing literature questioned this 
analysis and claimed that the US hegemon was in decline. According to Immanuel 
Wallerstein, this process had already started in the 1970s, following costly military 
engagements, which weakened considerably the US economy.66 But in the 2000s, the decline 
of the US became even more acute with its dramatic loss of soft-power accompanying its war 
on terrorism.67 Yet, throughout the 2000s, cooperation between Russia and China increased, 
as the hegemonic power of the US declined. This result undermines the HST explanatory 
power for Sino-Russian rapprochement, as the theory assumes that the overwhelming power 
of a hegemon is an important, albeit not exclusive, driving force for cooperation. 
Consequently, the decline of the hegemonic power should lead to greater competition among 
smaller states, and ultimately to the return of anarchy in the world system, unless 
supplementary assumptions are made.68 The evolution of Sino-Russian relations in the 2000s, 
thus cannot be satisfactorily explained through the power-based understanding of the HST.  
 
2.1.3. Dependency theory 
 
Unlike the HST, which primarily emphasises the unequal distribution of military 
power, the dependency theory focuses on systemic wealth disparities and asymmetric 
relationships in the world economy. It includes diverse theoretical currents with liberal 
reformers as Raul Prebisch, Marxist imperialistic theorists as André Gunder Frank, and 
world-system theorists as Immanuel Wallerstein, all of them arguing critically against the 
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dominant pattern of globalisation-led modernisation. Dependency theorists assume that the 
world system consists of a dominant core crystallising wealth (the OECD countries), and a 
poorer dependent periphery contributing to the enrichment of the core at its own expenses. 
Relations between the core and the periphery are determined by the structure of economic 
power, which, according to André Gunder Frank, is largely inherited from historical 
circumstances. Peripheric states, owing to their weaker bargaining power with the core, 
cannot oppose external forces, and comply with economic principles which generate 
imbalances and are detrimental to them. For dependency theorists, free market and export-
oriented economic policies are vectors of the core’s sustaining systemic dominance vis à vis 
the periphery. Calling for a review of David Ricardo’s comparative advantage principle, Raul 
Prebisch evidenced a steady decline in the terms of trade in primary commodities with low 
added value, mainly produced in peripheral states, relative to manufactured goods with high 
value added, mainly produced in OECD states.69 This systemic deterioration in the terms of 
trade of developing countries vis à vis developed countries implies in particular that the latter 
must export always greater volumes of primary commodities in order to be able to import a 
constant volume of manufactured goods. This fundamentally challenges the principle of 
export-led development and associates core-periphery international trade cooperation with 
unbalanced accretion of wealth in core states.  
 
Cooperation in the dependency theory is therefore understood as both part of the 
problem and the solution. The theory explains that core-periphery cooperation is characterised 
by systemic unbalance in the pattern of trade, and predicts that cooperation between 
dependent states should be strengthened in order to enhance their bargaining power vis à vis 
the core and resist the downward pressure exerted on primary commodities’ prices. Although 
the theory provides insightful explanations in the relations between the core and the periphery, 
and the North-South gap, it does not seem to explain satisfactorily Sino-Russian 
rapprochement since 1986. According to the dependency theory, Sino-Russian rapprochement 
should be interpreted as validating the prediction of South-South cooperation. But in reality, 
Sino-Russian rapprochement was primarily operated in non-economic dimensions. Despite 
substantive economic complementarities, Russia and China have failed to really develop their 
bilateral economic relations these last 20 years. Russia’s reluctance towards Chinese labour 
immigration and recurrent delays in the launch of the ESPO pipeline project illustrate the 
difficult strengthening of economic ties between the two partners. It has been argued that the 
increase in Sino-Russian trade by 15% in 2006 and 23% in 2008 partly resulted from rising 
energy prices, which “artificially inflated the value of total bilateral trade”.70 Moreover, the 
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pattern of Sino-Russian trade, highly asymmetrical with Russia increasingly exporting raw 
materials in exchange of Chinese machinery does not validate the theories’ predictions of 
rebalancing international trade through South-South economic cooperation. Sino-Russian 
pattern of trade is indeed described by some scholars as “acquir[ing] a neo-colonial tinge”, 
with a “modernising China exploiting a backward Russia for its energy and timber resources 
and as a market for low-grade goods unsalable in the more discriminating West”.71 In 2006, 
oil and timber accounted for the two thirds of Russia’s exports to China, while manufactured 
goods represented the bulk of China’s exports to Russia, with machinery soaring by 72,6% in 
particular.72 The dependence theory does not explain these imbalances arising within the 
South-South cooperation pattern.  
 
2.2. Interest-based explanations of bilateral interstate cooperation  
 
Power-based theories, it has been seen, provide a systemic and exogenous explanation 
of interstate cooperative behaviour. According to neorealism, the hegemonic stability theory 
and the dependency theory, cooperation is a reactive behaviour, induced by a particular 
distribution of power in the world system. States’ cooperative behaviour is explained by the 
systematic maximisation of fixed, homogenous concerns about power, security or wealth. 
However, when cooperation is ambiguous, multidimensional, and above all multidirectional, 
as it is between Russia and China and the rest of the world, power-based causal approaches 
prove relatively weak and barely explain key empirical observations or evolutionary trends. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine another set of explanations, whereby cooperation is not 
determined by the structure of power, but emerges at least partly from rational, but non-
unitary, “functionally differentiated” societal organisations.73   
 
Interest-based explanations of interstate cooperative behaviours rest on the assumption 
that states are rational actors having preferences, and seeking to maximise their individualistic 
utility at first, not their power or relative security as such. In the liberal paradigm, these 
interests determining utility, are not fixed and exogenous. They are shaped by internal societal 
factors (e.g. political and economic ideology, partisan politics, economic and social structure), 
although not exempt of structural constraints. This implies in particular that states may 
identify common interests and rationally choose to maximise absolute gains rather than 
relative ones.   
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In this part, I will first examine the classical liberal arguments explaining cooperation. 
I will differentiate commercial liberalism from its Kantian counterpart. But as the bulk of the 
Kantian liberal theory applies to the relations between liberal democracies, which led it often 
to be considered as an ideology rather than a theory, I will present an argument suggesting 
that ideological solidarity in general, not only among liberal democracies, may be a driving 
force for cooperation. I will then present a game-theoretical interpretation of neoliberalism, 
which explains and predicts forms of cooperation between non-democratic states or illiberal 
democracies too.  
 
2.2.1. Classical liberal arguments 
 
Unlike the realists, classical liberal thinkers consider that cooperation is imbedded in 
the human nature as a means to achieve progress in an anarchic world, and build a more 
prosperous society. In the Second Treatise of Government, John Locke depicts the mankind’s 
state of nature as one that “however free, is full of continual dangers”. Fortunately, natural 
laws exist, which oblige men to act rationally and with tolerance. This allows them to 
cooperate in order to build a civil society and a government through trustful and consensual 
cooperation. As states’ behaviour for liberals assumedly reflects the internal dynamics of 
human societies, this human capacity for cooperation is translated into world politics. 
Interstate cooperation, as a result, is not imposed by a structure, but relies on two pillars: an 
economic one, which is supported by domestic economic interests, and a political one, which 
is supported by a certain form of government and domestic practices.  
 
Proponents of the economic interdependence theory closely associate trade 
development with peace and far-reaching cooperation, and contend a positive causal 
relationship between the two. Economic interdependence liberalism takes root in the 18th and 
19th century, in a context of industrial revolutions, growth of international trade, and demise 
of mercantilism. Adam Smith, David Hume and David Ricardo’s writings on economic 
liberalism greatly contributed to the success of the theory, although the theory’s premises 
were in fact designed by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws in 1748. As Montesquieu 
wrote, “the natural effect of commerce is to bring peace. Two nations that negotiate between 
themselves become reciprocally dependent, if one has an interest in buying and the other in 
selling. And all unions are based on mutual needs”. 74  In the 19th century, commercial 
liberalism was primarily supported by domestic economic actors, .i.e. traders’ interest groups, 
who benefited from trade at most, and pressured the state in order to facilitate it. Free trade, in 
that sense, was rather advocated on an ideological basis, and included a normative substance 
detrimental to the theoretical thinking. This was particularly clear in the explanation provided 
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by commercial liberals on the causal mechanism linking free trade to peace: it assumed the 
normative superiority of democracies. In the late 19th century Richard Cobden wrote for 
instance: “Commerce is the grand Panacea which, like a beneficent medical discovery, will 
serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilisation all the nations of the world. 
Not a bale of merchandise leave our shores but it bears the seeds of intelligence and fruitful 
thought to the members of some less enlightened community; not a merchant visits our seats 
of manufacturing industry but he returns to his own country the missionary of freedom, peace 
and good-government”.75 Free trade, as a vehicle of political enlightenment, would spread 
democracy, and foster peace in the completion of a civilising mission.  
 
It is only more recently that political scientists formalised and rigorously researched 
the negative causal trade-dispute relationship. They restated David Ricardo’s principle that 
division of labour is necessary to maximise economic utility, and confirmed that autarky is 
not a Pareto-optimal strategy. Individualistic utility maximisation thus requires economic 
interdependences. However, economic interdependence proves to have positive externalities, 
since they contribute theoretically and empirically to pacify political interactions. These 
externalities are induced by states mutually refraining from waging war because of the 
opportunity costs that would arise if the dispute were to escalate. As Solomon Polachek notes, 
“greater levels of conflict make trade more difficult. Reasons include retaliatory tariffs, quotas, 
embargoes, and other trade prohibitions. Conflict, thus raises the cost of trades.”76 In other 
terms, mutual dependency makes war even more costly for the belligerents, thereby 
increasing the incentives for cooperative behaviours. Commercial liberals observed in 
particular that in last century’s history, “countries with the most trade (and with the most 
welfare gains from trade) have the least conflict”77 Furthermore, Erik Gartzke et al. showed 
that economic “interdependence creates the means for states to demonstrate resolve without 
resorting to military violence”.78 This finding, that trading states are not necessarily more 
peaceful but instead have non-military channels that they can use to divert their 
confrontational drives, implicitly calls for rethinking the relationship between commercial 
liberalism and its Kantian counterpart. Erik Gartzke finally suggests that modern classical 
liberal theory should also consider interdependence through international capital, which is 
substantially larger than exchange of goods and services.  
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According to modern economic interdependence theory, trade is a non-normative 
motive for comprehensive cooperation leading to peaceful relations. Although this view can 
explain the emergence of economy-based regional integration in Europe, it fails to clarify 
Sino-Russian rapprochement in the 1990s. From 1992 to 1999, trade between Russia and 
China stagnated around $5 to $7million per year, 79  while political bilateral cooperation 
considerably improved (see Figure 1). Trade, as result was not the determining driving force 
for enhanced cooperation at this time. Bilateral trade, and thus the economic interdependence 
theory, fails to explain the specific dynamics of Sino-Russian rapprochement in the 1990s. 
But it is not excluded that economic interdependence played a role in the improvement of 
Sino-Russian relations in the 2000s.  
 
The second variant of classical liberalism is a polity-based argument for democratic 
peace. It originally derives from Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace”, the forerunner of the 
modern collective security concept. Sharing the same assumption about mankind’s state of 
nature in an anarchic world as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant agreed with John Locke on 
the human duty to cooperate in order to create political communities alleviating anarchy and 
securing peace. This goal, Immanuel Kant argued, was most likely to be achieved if these 
political communities were organised in constitutional republics, wherein the people is subject 
to the laws it created. These constitutional republics, which would convey the people’s will in 
international relations, would in turn cooperate in order to create a federation of free 
republican states, tied together so that war among them would be costly to the community of 
states. Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace inspired the modern concept of democratic peace: 
peace emerges from a particular form of political organisation. “Liberal states are different”.80 
By involving the whole society in the formulation of state policies, they constrain rent-
seeking behaviours, which would promote the interests of particularistic groups detrimentally 
to the aggregate welfare, and therefore, ensure that “wars impose net costs on the society as a 
whole”.81 The more inclusive the polity is, the less confrontational state’s foreign policy will 
be. This specific characteristic of liberal democracies generates an incentive for similar states 
to “exercise peaceful restraint and [build] a separate peace […] among them”. 82 Conversely, 
“aggressive behaviour –the voluntary recourse to costly or risky foreign policy- is most likely 
in undemocratic or inegalitarian polities where privileged individuals can easily pass costs on 
to the others”.  
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The democratic peace theory is insightful in explaining the motives for interstate 
cooperation among liberal democracies, but it does not really address the issue of cooperation 
among non-liberal or non-democratic states. Its prediction that illiberal cooperation is less 
likely to develop than liberal one fails to identify the possible motives for such illiberal 
cooperation, when it occurs. This is why its stance is often criticised for lacking paradigmatic 
status and being a “normative, even utopian, ideology”.83 As such, it cannot be applied to 
Sino-Russian rapprochement, since the two states have illiberal polities.84  
 
2.2.2. Ideological solidarity argument 
 
Ideological solidarity is an argument referring to “alliances that result from states 
sharing political, cultural or other traits”.85  It is then a broader theory than the Kantian 
republican democracy, since it does not exclusively apply to liberal states, but assumes in 
general that the more similar states’ polity is, the more likely interstate cooperate is. Stephen 
M. Walt gives three reasons for this particular inducement.86 First, the alignment with a state 
having a similar polity is a means to defend common political principles or form of 
government against exogenous interferences. Ideological solidarity strengthens regimes’ 
cohesion and decreases their external vulnerability. Second, enhanced cooperation among 
states having similar polity enhances the regimes’ domestic legitimacy, by suggesting they co-
support a larger, transnational, popular movement. This ideological solidarity-derived 
legitimacy is particularly significant for illiberal states, since legitimacy in liberal ones is 
mostly derived from popular elections alone. Ideological solidarity, as a result, decreases 
internal vulnerability too, by dampening the risk of dissenting mobilisation against the ruling 
elite. Third, it can be argued that states having a similar polity fear each other less than states 
fundamentally dissimilar. This argument, closer to identity-based views, supposes that fear 
emerges from the lack of knowledge and mutual understanding. Since similar states are more 
likely to be capable of building and internalising an intersubjective set of norms, according to 
which they will act in their relation with each other, cooperation is more likely to emerge than 
between states with no normative interlinkages whatsoever. As resumed by Andrew 
Moravcsik, “where the realization of national conceptions of legitimate decision making 
reinforce or can be adjusted to reinforce one another, coexistence or cooperation is more 
likely”, among liberal states exclusively (Kantian republican liberalism) or among states in 
general (ideological solidarity).87  
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The ideological solidarity argument does not claim to be the primary explanation of 
interstate cooperation and alignment. Realists note that “security considerations are likely to 
take precedence over ideological preferences, and ideologically-based alliances are unlikely to 
survive when more pragmatic interests intrude”.88 But as security improves, the weight of 
interstate polity similarities grows in the foreign policy agenda, thus influencing the external 
behaviour of states, including in their drive for cooperation. Although not similar in substance, 
Russia and China’s polity do have characteristics that seem to converge, e.g. in the 
concentration of vertical and horizontal power and the state-corporatisation of the economy. 
This trend is particularly significant since the end of the 1990s, which corresponds to the end 
of the normalisation phase and a boost in Sino-Russian bilateral security. Coincidentally or 
not, this convergence in polity and economic organisation developed in parallel with 
enhanced cooperative efforts at different levels (economic, political, cultural…). Therefore, it 
would be interesting to test this ideological solidarity argument in order to examine whether, 
and to what extent, this factor is a driving in Sino-Russian rapprochement from the 2000s 
onwards.  
 
2.2.3. Neoliberal argument 
 
Neoliberalism emerged as a critique of neorealism, a resurgent theory that Kenneth N. 
Waltz’ publications in the late 1970s rendered very much in vogue. It was most notoriously 
developed by Robert O. Keohane and built on modern reinterpretation of theories of 
international economics. Even though neoliberals share most of the classical liberal theorists’ 
assumptions, they succeeded in building a more rigorous and solid, as well non-normative, 
and non-ideological theory of international relations, which has gained considerable influence 
through its ability to explain institutionalised and ad hoc interstate cooperation among rational 
self-interested actors. Neoliberals often relied on game-theoretical modelling in order to 
explain and predict state behaviours’ incentives for cooperation. As this approach provides 
remarkably efficient tools to understand motives of strategic interactions and cooperative 
behaviour, I will also adopt game theory as a methodological path in my neoliberal analysis.  
 
For neoliberals, cooperation, as well as conflict, is a “product of circumstances and 
choice”;89 it is both determined structurally, by the distribution of the game’s payoffs, and 
situationally by the preferences of the players. In the neoliberal paradigm, states are not actors 
per se, but “a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, 
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors”. 90  State preferences then, 
emerge from internal factors, such as “political and economic ideology, national character, 
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89 Arthur A. Stein (1990), p. 207 
90 Andrew Moravcsik (1997), p. 519 
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partisan politics, and the social structure”. 91  Therefore, societal actors, who promote 
differentiated preferences, are primordial determinants in international politics, since their 
“societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices [can] alter state 
preferences”. 92  However, societal actors act and define their preferences under certain 
constraints imposed by “material scarcity, conflicting values, and variation in societal 
influence”. Internal preferences are thus influenced by environmental factors, e.g. cooperation 
is more likely where relative abundance of resources, a certain community of values, and 
relative symmetry in the players’ power distribution predominate. 93  As state preferences 
emerge from both internal transmission of societal pressures and environmental constraints, a 
rational-choice approach should not solely take the voluntaristic stance, but reckon that “in 
explaining outcomes, prior constraints may be more important than the process of choice 
itself”.94  
 
Strategic interactions require at least two interacting actors. But as interactions 
produce externalities, whereby one actor does not bear the full cost and benefit of its actions, 
state behaviour is rarely solely determined by internal preferences, i.e. a “course of action 
[that one actor] prefers irrespective of the other’s decision. 95  The outcome of strategic 
decisions, i.e. the type of behaviour one state will adopt, is indeed influenced by, if not 
dependent on, an external variable too: the choice of the other players. This external variable 
can dramatically alter the expected payoff of other players, thus acting as a structural 
constraint to strategic choice. Each state is thus subject to the meshing of domestic and 
international preferences, and “seeks to realize its distinctive preference under varying 
constraints imposed by the preferences of other states”.96 In other words, states determine 
their behaviour in function of the configuration of their interdependent preferences.97 Various 
structural game configurations exist, which generate a more or less strong incentive for 
cooperation. For instance, where a congruence of interests does not exist, i.e. where 
independent decision making does not lead to mutually desirable outcomes but an actual or 
potential conflict exist, cooperation regimes, i.e. institutionalised cooperation, enable actors to 
reach Pareto-equilibriums and thus optimise their utility.  
 
All in all, neoliberals do not share the neorealist assumption that states’ dominant 
strategy in games involving risks of relative losses is irrepressibly to defect. They argue that 
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93 Ibid. p. 517 
94 Robert O. Keohane (2005), p. 71-72 
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of interaction and the preference orderings of the interacting states and thus the incentives and prospects for 
international regimes” (Arthur A. Stein), contradicts the realist critique that neoliberalism is a reductionist, 
merely unit-based theory. See Andrew Moravcsik (1997), p. 522-523 
 - 42 -
cooperation can help maximise absolute gains over relative ones, and improve state utility in 
the mid- and long-term. Ultimately, they argue, “order emerges as self-interested actors 
coexisting in an anarchic environment reach autonomous and independent decisions that lead 
to mutually desirable cooperative outcomes”.98 Neoliberals question the prevalence of pure 
conflict situations in world politics, i.e. situations where actors interact in constant-sum games 
and systematically favour relativistic payoff assessment. Interstate relations in world politics, 
they argue, are not fundamentally characterised by “negative reciprocity”, whereby one state 
seeks to “maximise its utility at the expense of others’ utility, through violence and fraud if 
necessary”, nor by “myopic self-interest”, whereby states only make rational decisions based 
on a cost-benefit analysis with regard to a particular issue considered in isolation from 
others.99 They admit that no-conflict situations, wherein each actor wants to do what the other 
wants it to do, are rare. Such situations, which Robert O. Keohane depicts as harmonious, 
would even render cooperation unnecessary and irrational. Rational self-interested actors 
acting independently and individualistically would indeed obtain Pareto-optimal outcomes 
without communicating with each others, as their respective interests and preferences 
naturally coincide.100 Instead, neoliberals stress the importance of non no-conflict situations, 
i.e. “mixed-motive games”, i.e. situations wherein “actors perceive that their policies are 
actually or potentially in conflict” in a “combination of mutual dependence and conflict, and 
partnership and competition”.101 Nevertheless, since actors may “fail to cooperate even when 
their interests are entirely identical”, they refuse to infer discord from the existence, or even 
prevalence of conflicting preferences. 102  Instead, they note that in such “mixed-motive 
games”, the absence of cooperation usually leads to Pareto-deficient outcomes. The most 
notorious illustration of this process is the single-play prisoners’ dilemma, in which “both 
players can benefit from mutual cooperation, but each can gain more from double-crossing 
the other one”, resulting in sub-optimal game outcomes.103 By identifying a “mutuality of 
interests” instead of focusing on relativistic calculations, individualistic rational actors may 
maximise their utility through cooperation. This is a key rationale of cooperative behaviour in 
the neoliberal paradigm. Perceiving a mutuality of interests requires a shift in the actors’ 
perception of their own interest relative to the preferences of others. In single-play prisoners’ 
dilemma, for instance, actors have a dominant strategy of defecting: they are indifferent to the 
other player’s expected utility (or welfare), and act with “myopic self-interest”. This 
Hobbessian view of world politics hinders the identification by game players of mutual 
interests. Conversely, actors may become receptive to “instrumentally interdependent 
interests”, i.e. care about other players’ utility only as long as others’ choices affect them (as 
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in a tit-for-tat strategy, or iterated prisoners’ dilemma). They may also become receptive to 
“situationally interdependent interests”, whereby one actor’s actions are determined by a 
situation, regardless of any action taken by other actors”. They may finally be receptive to 
“empathetically interdependent interests”, which are conducive to altruistic choices. The three 
latter forms of interest-interdependence (instrumental, situational and empathic) are a source 
of potential cooperation, and a shift from the first form of interest-interdependence 
(indifference) towards the three latter forms indicates that players identify interest-mutuality 
in an increasing number of policy areas.104  
 
A particularly effective mechanism guaranteeing facilitated utility maximisation is the 
creation of, or participation in, international regimes. Cooperative regimes offer substantial 
advantages in this perspective. Robert O. Keohane defines international (cooperative) regimes 
as a “set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.105 
International regimes, by permitting institutionalised cooperation, mitigate the uncertainty 
produced by the occurrence of externalities in interstate interactions. Inverting the Coase 
Theorem, Robert O. Keohane showed that Coase’s preconditions for reaching Pareto-optimal 
solutions through bargaining in the absence of legal liability system are not met in today’s 
world politics. In a world devoid of central authority precluding or prescribing state behaviour, 
decentralised enforcement, non-universal property rights, asymmetric and costly information 
and high transaction costs entail that states need cooperative regimes to reach Pareto-optimal 
solutions. By providing information about the behaviour of other players, cooperative regimes 
reduce the fear of being exploited often nourished by asymmetric information. By defining 
what constitutes a defection and prescribing sanctions, international regimes reduce 
uncertainty regarding the players’ intentions and create “stable mutual expectations”, which 
may serve as a system of legal liability.106 Thereby, international regimes increase the cost of 
defection. In the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, for instance, a player choice is not viewed as a 
one-shot event, but will have future consequences, e.g. if a player adopts a tit-for-tat strategy 
of “equivalent retaliation” in its future interactions with the defector. “Defection, in the long-
run, is unrewarding, since the short-run gains thereby obtained will normally be outweighed 
by the mutual punishment that will ensue in the long run”.107 Cooperative regimes allow thus 
transforming single-play and issue-specific interactions into an on-going and multi-issue 
                                                 
 
104 These interest-interdependences may be mixed in a single behaviour. For instance, Robert O. Keohane 
explains that the Marshall Plan probably was a decision arising from situationally and empathetically 
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process of interactions, thus exerting greater pressure on potential defectors. In addition, by 
integrating the iterative nature of interactions into the payoffs’ calculation, cooperative 
regimes are able to create incentives for cooperative behaviours, and not only deterrents for 
defection. Cooperative regimes allow the accumulation of greater aggregate payoffs for 
cooperating players, since cooperating states will capitalise on the repetition of small absolute 
gains, rather than the one-shot exploitation of each others. Cooperative regimes allow then 
escaping dilemmas of common interests, as the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and dilemmas of 
common aversions, which realists consider as deadlock. Last but not least, Robert O. Keohane 
demonstrated that cooperative regimes reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and 
widens possibility of side-payments by the clustering of issues, creating thus a supplementary 
incentive for states to participate in regimes. For all these reasons, liberal institutionalists, as 
Robert O. Keohane fundamentally disagree with Joseph M. Grieco, who claimed that 
“international institutions can mitigate the inhibitory effects of anarchy on the willingness of 
states to cooperate only marginally”.108 Institutions and cooperative regimes, for neoliberals, 
do matter substantively. 
 
Neoliberal interpretation of interstate cooperative behaviour is complex. It combines 
internal and structural motives, choice and environment, state actor and non-state actors, 
competition and partnership, conflict and mutuality of interests. But it is a powerful paradigm 
capable of explaining and predicting the dynamics and driving forces underlying strategic 
choices of cooperation. Neoliberalism does not explain cooperation by the absence of 
conflicting interests. On the contrary, cooperation requires a process of policy coordination 
and adjustment, which brings separate individualistic actors to act into conformity with each 
other, so that the action of one of them is facilitative to the action of the other. Cooperation, 
therefore, requires a shift in the perception of actors’ utility relative to the other’s from a 
myopic relativistic stance towards a mutuality of self-interests, wherein the actors’ expected 
utility is primarily defined in terms of absolute gains and reckons with the creation of 
common expectations out of iterated interactions. This shift requires that interest 
interdependence be instrumentalised –cooperation can hardly succeed to emerge as a stable 
behavioural pattern in a self-help system if actors are indifferent to others’ choices. This shift, 
therefore, must proceed at both internal and structural levels. Internally, because societal 
actors exert cooperative pressures in this direction, and guide state preferences.109 Structurally, 
because states will maximise these absolute gains by modifying the structure of interactions 
through identifying instrumentally interdependent interests, on which they will build 
cooperative relations.  
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This offers interesting perspectives of research in the Sino-Russian case. Russia and 
China do have a great set of conflicting interests, which could be understood by neoliberals as 
a great potential scope of cooperation. Moreover, these last twenty years, they do seem to be 
shifting their preferences from a relativistic stance towards an absolute-gain one in several 
policy areas. First, they settled their border disputes peacefully, a typical zero-sum game issue, 
in the first part of the 1990s. Then, in regional security affairs, they defined common, or 
shared interests110 and set up a cooperative regime, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
Within this regime, the shift from indifferent interest interdependence to instrumental one in 
policy areas beyond the initial confidence building measures rationale for establishing the 
regime indicates an interesting development. Whether Russia and China thereby seek to 
jointly maximise the gains obtained from exploiting other players that are not members of the 
SCO, i.e. whether Russia and China jointly adopt a negative reciprocity approach, e.g. 
towards the West, or whether Russia and China have engaged in regional cooperation with the 
aim of increasing the endogenous efficiency of their interactions is still unclear and should be 
researched, possibly by adopting a cognitive approach. Besides, the persistence of largely 
under-maximised economic complementarities, despite what could be perceived as an 
objectivistic “mutuality of interests” from the outside, raises questions about the limits of 
Sino-Russian rapprochement, and may be the illustration that functionalism is not the 
dominant driving force in Sino-Russian rapprochement. These aspects i.e. shift towards 
instrumentalised interest-interdependence and interests-mutuality in regional cooperation 
through the SCO and Sino-Russian geoeconomic games, as well as persisting flaws and limits 
will be screened in this thesis, and researched through a game-theoretical lens.   
 
2.3. Identity-based approach of interstate cooperation 
 
Unlike realism and liberalism, two theories of international relations dedicated to 
explaining and predicting states’ rationalist behaviour, constructivism encompasses a wider 
ontological stance, which examines how interests and identities are formed, and how they 
interact in the construction of reality. Constructivism adopts then an approach that scrutinises 
paradigmatic aspects of power-based and interest-based theories that are often overlooked. 
Constructivism questions in particular that interest and identities are exogenous to agents and 
pre-exist interactions. For neorealists, who support the balance of power theory, interstate 
relations are “simple behavioural responses to the [systemic] forces of physics that act on 
material objects from the outside”.111 The states’ sole interests are determined by the structure 
of the system. Likewise, neoliberals consider domestic ideas as a deus ex machina belief held 
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by individuals, who adjust their preferences accordingly, and choose their strategy rationally 
according to structural and environmental constraints. Neither realism nor liberalism really 
addresses the fundamental question of interest and identity (trans)formation, although these 
questions are primordial theoretical premises, on which their differentiation is mostly based. 
By researching them, constructivism does not really compete with the two paradigms; it only 
“challenges their ontological and epistemological foundations”,112 questions their rationalistic 
and positivistic assumptions, and places itself as a “paradigm of paradigms”,113 which is not 
incompatible with realists’ and liberals’ methodological augments. Constructivism is a 
“middle ground”, which strives for generating “a synthetic theory of international 
relations”,114 and fosters a better understanding of power and interest-based theories.    
 
Constructivism will be especially useful in order to explore the motives underlying 
cooperation, and even more determinant in order to assess the driving force of Sino-Russian 
rapprochement. Constructivism can provide indeed deeper explanations for cooperation than 
rationalist-behavioural theories, which neglect the complex effect of interactions on interests 
and identities. As cooperation is precisely about interactions, this dimension is all the more 
crucial to the elaboration of a satisfactory explanation. In order to understand the 
constructivist stance, it is necessary to explain first some conceptual definitions of distinct 
importance for constructivists, e.g. of identity and interests. We will see, in this respect, that 
reality is understood as a social construction, wherein identities and interests are processes 
endogenous to interactions. I will then analyse the process of cognitive evolution entailed by 
repeated interactions, and see how states develop a set of intersubjective, consensual 
understandings, composed of norms, values and shared expectations, which they use as a 
referent in relationship-specific and issue-specific interactions in order to interpret structural 
constraints and take appropriate decisions. We will finally understand how cooperation can 
develop, through the formation of collective identities out of this set of intersubjective 
understandings, and which factors are prerequisite of and facilitative to the formation of 
collective identities, and thus cooperation. By coupling this analysis with particular 
methodological arguments presented above, I will be able to set up a theoretical framework 
and methodology adapted to my research question.  
 
2.3.1. Conceptual definitions 
 
In their analyses, constructivists give central significance to the social construction of 
identities, interests and norms in international relations, because they admittedly have an 
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essential constitutive function in the shaping of the state system’s structure. The nature of 
identities is often overlooked by international theories. In Social Theory of International 
Politics, Alexander Wendt explains that identities are both subjective, i.e. determined by 
one’s self-understanding, and intersubjective, i.e. determined by the perception of the Self by 
the Other. This dichotomisation of identities’ structure can be carried out further by 
distinguishing “corporate-identity”, “type-identity”, “role-identity” and “collective 
identity”,115 taking into account that “a state […] has multiple identities”.116  
 
Corporate-identities are not contingent of the Other’s perception, but rest on a material 
reality (humans living on a territory); they characterise the unit-level entity in its simplest and 
most essential features. Each actor may only have one of such a kind, which acts as a 
“platform for other identities”. Corporate-identity may thus refer to “state”, as in Alexander 
Wendt’s and Kenneth N. Waltz’s work, or to “nation” (e.g. Emanuel Adler). Here, as we seek 
to identify motives for interstate cooperation, we will consider that “state” is a “corporate-
identity”. The intrinsic characteristics of states, and in particular their regime type, whether, 
liberal, authoritarian or capitalist, as well as the internal principles upon which rest their 
political legitimacy are defined in their type-identities. States may have numerous ones, but 
“only those that have social content or meaning”117 count, i.e. those which derive from widely 
shared normative understandings. For instance, the democratic peace theory tends to exert a 
strong pressure on the normative content of interstate behavioural relations, so that “peaceful” 
should become a “type-identity” of liberal democratic states. Intersubjectivity is thus an 
important variable in the definition of states’ type-identities. This leads us to role-identities, 
which “are not based on intrinsic properties, and as such exist only in relation to Others”. 
Role-identities are relationship-specific, intersubjective social constructions, which result 
from the internalisation of the Other’s perception (the “Self” becoming “Me”). Role-identities 
may include “friend”, “imperial power”, “investor”, “gendarme du monde”, etc… It is “the 
Self as it sees itself through the Other’s eyes”, and thus it cannot be enacted or transformed 
simply by oneself.118 Finally, we have collective identity, which is of particular importance to 
understand the driving force underlying cooperative behaviours. Collective identity builds on 
role-identities through an identification process, which results in the merging of a pair of, or 
multiple, role-identities into a single identity, in which “the boundaries of the Self [are 
extended] to include the Other”. Identification, however, is “usually issue-specific, and rarely 
total”.119 Collective identity does not imply, then, that a state should sacrifice itself for its 
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neighbour, but that it will define the utility of the Other in specific areas as part of its own 
utility. Besides, collective identity builds on type-identities, since shared characteristics are 
necessary to feed this identification process. An obvious illustration of collective identity is 
found in the Europeanisation of the EU Member States, but less flagrant instances abound: 
states calculating their gains in a non-relativistic way in relation with anther state, i.e. giving 
up their positional utility in favour of an atomistic one, do so by developing a relationship- 
and issue-specific collective identity. The formation of collective identity, which we will 
discuss in details below, has thus causal power in inducing and sustaining cooperation. In 
order to sum up with an illustration of the multiplicity of identities, let us take the following 
example: In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union have as corporate-identity 
“state”. Their type-identities is for both “federations”, but the US is “liberal capitalist” while 
the Soviet Union is “communist” (the list of type-identities is not restrictive). Their relation-
specific role-identities are “ideological foe”, “imperial rivals”, etc… Their collective identity 
is limited, but led nevertheless to the adoption by both of the “Mutually Assured Destruction” 
doctrine and the signature of the ABM Treaty. Their collective identity, thus, was embedded 
in the shared acceptance that the Cold War should not transform into a direct nuclear 
confrontation, but should rather be operated by proxy.  
 
For constructivists identities are not the “intrinsic attributes of a portfolio”, given to 
states exogenously. They are multi-layered social constructions, and most of them only exist 
as relationship and issue-specific attributes. Interests are the motivational force of identities, 
which shape them. As they reflect identities, interests are not less complex, and cannot be 
seen as exogenously given or static either. 120  Interests are instrumental in reproducing 
identities, and in transforming them. In order to reproduce its type-identity characteristics, a 
state, for instance, has the functional imperatives of reproducing its legitimacy base. However, 
governments may not know how this should be carried out precisely (will it be enough to 
organise elections, just as last year, to remain a liberal democracy?). These objective interests, 
therefore, are constitutive of identity needs, but they are no motivation for behaviour. That is 
why another type of interests, subjective ones, is developed on the basis of reason and 
experiment. Subjective interests usually aim at coinciding with objective ones in the 
realisation of identity reproducing, or they sometimes seek to alter a particular identity (e.g. 
from foe to friend). But the outcome is barely guaranteed. First, because subjective interests 
are subject to (mis)interpretations regarding the content of the identities they are associated 
with, especially if these identities are not intrinsic. By misinterpreting a type-identity, 
subjective interests will push for the reproducing of a non-conform type-identity. 121  In 
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addition, subjective interests carry an interpretative dimension on how to meet identity needs. 
These desiderative beliefs are not perfect predictions. For instance, a state willing to surrender 
on a battlefield would designate a soldier to hold a white flag of truce. In the absence of 
collective identity sustaining shared intersubjective norms on this issue, it is highly probable 
that the identity needs of the surrendering state would not be met through this action, since the 
Other would simply shoot at the flag-holder, and possibly pursue war. In this case, subjective 
interests did not coincide with objective interests owing to a lack of knowledge or false beliefs. 
This non-correspondence, albeit barely unavoidable, is a first source of identity 
transformation.122 Another source of identity transformation, which is even more important as 
it contains the first source within it, lies in interactions. Before I study this essential source of 
transformation, I first need to address the question of intersubjectivity and social construction, 
which I so far only evoked implicitly.  
 
For constructivists, identities are first and foremost social constructions. They are not 
purely objective like Karl Popper’s World I, composed of rivers, human bodies and mountains. 
Even corporate-identities (“state”, “nation”…), the most intrinsic ones, have a certain level of 
abstraction, and do not exist objectively without their contextual meanings123. But they are not 
totally subjective either, like Karl Poper’s World II, composed of ideas, thoughts and feelings. 
As a matter of fact, states, nations, friends, foes, liberal democracies, authoritarian states, 
security communities, international organisations are all “social actors”; they are 
intersubjectively constructed by relationship- and issue-specific norms. These norms 
“constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning”.124 They are 
the intersubjective base upon which states act. “States fac[ing] security choices […] act upon 
them, not only in the context of their capabilities, but also on the basis of normative 
understandings”125. Intersubjectivity does not mean the simple “aggregation of the beliefs of 
individuals who jointly experience and interpret the world” in a consistent way, but refers to 
the development of a collective knowledge of consensual understandings. 126  These 
understandings “do not merely constrain or empower actors; they also define [the] social 
reality of social actors”.127 However, sharing normative understandings does not necessarily 
induce greater cooperation. Foes can agree that they are foes, thus defining the intersubjective 
understanding of their role-identity in hostile terms, and behave accordingly, provided their 
subjective interests is to reproduce this “foe” role-identity. At the state level, national interests 
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can now be defined. They are “not merely the collective [aggregate] interests of a group of 
people; nor, with rare exceptions, are they the interests of a single dominant individual. Rather, 
national interests are intersubjective understandings about what it takes to advance power, 
influence and wealth, that survive the political process, given the distribution of power and 
knowledge in a society”.128 At a structural level, which Alexander Wendt refers as cultural 
level too, intersubjective understandings can foster both negative and positive anarchy. If the 
normative intersubjective understanding of interstate relations is dictated by a Hobbesian 
credo, then states will act accordingly to secure their survival. However, if the credo of a 
Kantian world prevails, whereby states are not doomed to be foes, then, identity needs and 
interests will be oriented towards cooperation. Intersubjectivity allows thus thinking that 
“anarchy is what states make of it”.129  
 
2.3.2. Constructivist understanding of interactions  
 
Interactions are central to the constructivist analysis, not only owing to their 
behavioural significance, but because they are constitutive of identities too. In the 
constructivist meta-paradigm, identities are multi-layered processes supporting relationship 
and issue-specific interests. Intersubjective understandings and collective knowledge have 
constitutive effects on social reality, and may alter agents’ multiple identities. Interactions are 
at the core of this process of transformation, since they are at the source of the formation of 
intersubjective understandings. Two states living in perfect autarky, which never interact, do 
not even know about their mutual existence. Therefore, they have no collective knowledge, no 
subjective identity, and even no social reality at all. Only through interacting with each other 
do they start defining their respective (relationship-specific) identities. The process of First 
Encounter has been thoroughly described by Alexander Wendt to illustrate the impact of 
interactions upon identity formation.130 Emanuel Adler studied that of cognitive evolution in 
order to explain how interactions (understood in the large sense, not only physical ones) 
contribute to form an intersubjective set of common expectations.131 I will not detail the 
whole process, but focus on the main factors leading to the formation of these intersubjective 
understandings shaping role-identities, and possibly collective identity.  
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studied in the third part of this chapter.  
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Constructivists see the world as “a project under construction, as becoming rather than 
being”. 132  Throughout this on-going process, the mechanism underlying the permanent 
transformation or reaffirmation of social reality, as well as the functional trait driving the 
process of cognitive evolution is that of interactions. Interactions between states enable, or 
imply, reciprocal perceptions and practices, which are based on intersubjective 
understandings. Interactions are thus a functional pillar of the constructivist world. States 
sharing the intersubjective understanding of rational-choice approach to collective action 
dilemma will act according to the liberal theory. Institutionalised cooperation will change the 
structure of the payoffs, as in the iterated Prisoners’ dilemma, and urge players to cooperate. 
But unlike liberals, constructivists believe that interactions, and cooperation in particular, 
have in addition a constitutive effect, which affects the identities of the players. They explain 
this first, because interactions imply social communication. By interacting, e.g. 
communicating, trading, negotiating, states internalise the Other’s appraisal of their own 
identity, and reproduce or transform their subjective identities accordingly. For instance, by 
buying gas to Russia, the European Union reaffirms its attachment to commercial bounds with 
its neighbour. This contributes to reinforce the “friend” role-identity in this area. But by 
addressing the question of human rights in Tibet with the Chinese, the European Union 
communicates to China a social role of moral guardian, which China may reject. 
Communicating in this area, then, may lead to a change in the subjective identity of the EU in 
its relationship with China. 133  This dimension is totally neglected by game-theoretical 
analyses, which consider that actors interacting iteratively remain the same. Second, 
interactions imply social learning. Interactions enable states to attach intersubjective meanings 
to practices, for instance through reciprocating and imitating particular practices or socialising. 
This process of social learning, which in fact includes that of social communication, applies to 
the whole realm of social reality. “Identities and their corresponding interests are learned and 
then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others” interacting with 
them.134 For instance, as the EU sees that China responds negatively to its interaction in the 
field of human rights, it may learn this normative knowledge and choose not to apply it in the 
future. However, this will not entail a “return” to the identities prior-interaction, but complete 
the intersubjective understanding of both actors, perhaps by introducing a social taboo, where 
the normative dimension was inexistent prior-interaction. Thus, interactions are not only 
pivotal to the (trans)formation of social reality and state identities; they are also determinant 
for, and constitutive of the intersubjective understandings and associated norms.135  
                                                 
 
132 Emmanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundation of International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 11 
133 Whether this change is anticipated or not depends on the alignment of the EU objective and subjective 
interests 
134 Alexander Wendt (1999), p. 327 
135 Alexander Wendt identifies several factors in the process of cognitive evolution determining, or guiding the 
formation of intersubjective understandings. He agrees that practices play an important role in sustaining social 
learning, and coined the term of “community of practices”. Nevertheless, he specifies that practices must have a 
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2.3.3. Constructivist understanding of interstate cooperation 
 
Now that we understand how collective knowledge is produced, and how interactions 
shape, sustain and transform identities and interests, we will examine how, and under which 
conditions cooperation emerges among states.  
 
Cooperative behaviours emerge from mutual cooperative expectations. States do not 
cooperate with the expectation that the Other will defect, although they may fear this 
possibility. This fear of being exploited, which justifies the security dilemma in the realist 
paradigm, indicates that cooperation in international politics “does not take place on a tabula 
rasa but against a cultural background in which the dominant response to changes in the 
environment has been egoistic, whether in the extreme form of enmity or the milder form of 
rivalry”.136 In other words, structural, or cultural constraints may generate reluctance towards 
cooperation, since in a world that is intersubjectively known as Hobbesian or Loockean (in 
Alexander Wendt’s wording), states risk too much by cooperating. Considering these 
constraints and the weight of history, then, how do states acquire mutual cooperative 
expectations? The answer has been partly given in the precedent paragraph: they must create a 
new community of practice, a new set of intersubjective norms and thereby develop new 
identities and interests, all of them allowing cooperation. But most essentially, they must 
develop a collective identity upon which cooperation will be sustained and developed. The 
formation of collective identity means that the Self will define the utility of the Other in 
specific areas as part of its own utility, i.e. that the Self will shift from a positional, relativistic 
assessment of its utility towards an atomistic, absolute gain-oriented one, wherein the Self 
considers the “gain of the team” as an important goal. As already noted, collective identity 
formation does not necessarily imply self-abnegation, or negation of the individualistic 
identities of the Self. Collective identity is not the only identity actors have. As collective 
identity is relationship- and issue-specific, states may choose not to expand their collective 
identity in all spheres of interest. Just as in concentric circles, states will not merge all circles 
into one, but retain coexisting circles of identities, with their own logic of interests. This 
means that states “may be competitive in some relationships and solidary in others”.137 The 
formation of collective identity is contingent of the formation of the corresponding 
intersubjective understandings and expectations. Because states believe in cooperation in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
“cognitive authority” in order to acquire socially legitimate meaning. He also identifies further factors, such as 
intersubjective expectation of progress, socialisation, “meaning investment”. See Emanuel Adler, “The Spread of 
Security Communities: Communities f Practice, Self-Restraint, and Nato’s Post-Cold War Transformation”, 
European Journal of International Relations (Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2008), pp. 201-204, and Emanuel Adler (1997), 
pp. 339-341 
136 Alexander Wendt (1999), p. 340 
137 Alexander Wendt (1992), p. 409 
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certain areas as an effective problem-solving practice, they will signal this interest to the 
Other, which may respond positively by reciprocating the practice, which through repetition 
becomes an intersubjective norm. By accretion and stabilisation of these norms, cooperating 
states strengthen their collective knowledge, and nourish their collective identity.  
 
Alexander Wendt identifies four “master variables”, which are instrumental in 
“undermin[ing] egoistic identities and help create collective ones”.138 First, states must have 
interdependent interests. Interdependence is defined here as “when the outcome of an 
interaction for each depends on the choices of the others”.139 Game-theory refers to such 
interactions as “mixed-motive games”. However, constructivists do not only consider 
objective interdependence in their calculus, i.e. the degree of vulnerability that a player would 
experience if it withheld cooperation. Constructivists claim that beyond self-interests, the 
group as such should ultimately become the psychological basis of cooperation. Objective 
interdependence, thus, must be transformed in the players’ respective and collective 
perceptions into a subjective one, i.e. actors must be aware of their joint control over the 
outcome of an interaction. For instance, two rivals may be objectively interdependent on 
certain issues, e.g. non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, without that this interdependence 
develops subjectively and fuels a further sense of we-ness.140 Conversely, subjective interest 
interdependence allows players to identify joint interests, which they will maximise unless 
they collide with core egoistic identities. This logic has subsequent constitutive effects on 
collective identities, as “we cooperate with others included in our self-definition”.141 This 
master variable echoes and completes the neoliberal argument given to explain cooperative 
behaviours. The second driving force in the formation of collective identities is the 
identification of a common fate. Unlike interdependence, which relates to interactions 
between two players, common fate is constituted by a third party interacting with the two 
players independently or jointly, which leads to define them as a group. However, common 
fate is more than the simplistic alignment of convenience against a common threat, which the 
saying echoes as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, since the motive of such alignment 
is intrinsically related to the nature of the dyadic relationship between the two players. In 
other words, common fate shall not be contingent of the relational identities of two players; it 
should be a common vision, relational to third parties, fuelling the ideational content of the 
group’s collective identity. “Even if in theory one can imagine a community of infinite 
                                                 
 
138 Alexander Wendt (1999), p. 343-369 
139 Ibid. 
140 This capacity of developing a sense of “we-ness” is not limited to very advanced forms of cooperation. As the 
US and the Soviet Union signed in 1963 the “Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of 
Direct Communications Line”, which translated into the creation of the Washington-Moscow “Hot Line”, the 
two Cold War enemies did appeal to a sense of community and eschewed individualistic interests (which would 
have prompted them not to communicate with foes).  
141 Brenda Morrison, “Interdependence, the Group, and Social Cooperation: A New Look at an Old Problem”, in 
Margaret Foddy et al., eds., Resolving Social Dilemma: Dynamic, structural and intergroup aspects 
(Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 1990), chap 21 
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diversity, in practice communities require some consensus on values. […] Homogeneity 
facilitates that consensus by reducing conflict and increasing the ability to see Self and Other 
as members of the same group”.142 Third, players should preferably share a certain level of 
domestic homogeneity, i.e. have rather similar corporate- and type-identities. It is arguable, 
indeed, that “many wars stem from the transposition of domestic institutions or values into 
foreign policies that conflict with foreign policies of other states because they have different 
institutions or values”. By reducing differences in states’ polity, homogenisation increases the 
coincidence of states’ subjective interests. Furthermore, polity homogeneity is more likely to 
lead to “imagined communities” formation, wherein identification is facilitated, as similarities 
in domestic practices and norms already paved the way to the formation of cooperative 
intersubjective understandings. This master variable echoes the ideological solidarity 
argument. Finally, Alexander Wendt identifies self-restraint as the fourth master variable. 
Unlike the three other master variables, self-restraint is not an active cause of collective 
identity formation, but it is a passive condition, which helps mitigating states’ anxiety about 
being exploited through the emergence of collective interests. Self-restraint requires that 
states build trust through repeated reciprocity in their interactions. Trust can emerge from the 
third master variable, homogeneity, or by engaging in self-binding practices with the 
expectation that the Other will reciprocate. Normalisation of interstate relations usually 
involve such self-binding practices, e.g. through unilateral border demilitarisation or unilateral 
suspension of research on sensitive technologies. Such practices indicate a will to shift from 
negative to positive reciprocity (i.e. from relativistic to absolute gains). By reciprocating, 
states transform these practices into norms, and allow for the formation of security 
communities, upon which collective identities may develop. 
 
According to constructivism, cooperation requires that actors share the understanding 
of the issue at play. This implies a process that is much more sophisticated than it seems. In 
order to share such understanding, states must indeed build collective identities in specific 
policy-spheres. But collective identity formation implies a lesser degree of egoism, in 
particular in the assessment of one’s utility. This means that in a world socially constructed as 
one governed by the institution of security dilemma, collective identity formation must take 
place against an unpropitious “cultural” background. However, greater cooperation is not 
impossible, as the world is better seen as in “becoming rather than being”. Needed is a 
transformation of intersubjective understandings, which emerge through social learning from 
practices and interactions. Indeed, practices and interactions affect the social and relational 
construction of states’ identities and interests, and by doing allow for the transformation of 
intersubjective understandings so much needed. At their root, four fundamental motives are 
the driving force for the formation of cooperative intersubjective understandings and 
                                                 
 
142 Alexander Wendt (1999), p. 343-369 
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ultimately collective identity. These are interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and 
self-restraint.  
 
Constructivism provides a very insightful understanding of cooperation and interstate 
relations. In order to apply this meta-paradigm to Sino-Russian rapprochement and identify 
the underlying driving forces thereof, it is necessary to research and measure the density and 
scope of collective identity formation. This does not imply the repudiation of the other 
theoretical approaches that draw our attention, i.e. economic interdependence, ideological 
solidarity and neoliberalism. On the contrary, these theories provide powerful methodological 
tools, which are still lacking in the constructivist theory. What it implies is rather the 
integration of constructivist understandings of social reality into the competing theories, 
wherever social identities have a determining significance.  
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3. Research Design - Hypothesis & Methodology 
 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis and Definitions 
 
The review of the main theoretical perspectives explaining interstate cooperation led 
us to identity possible driving forces and motives for underlying rapprochement between two 
states. Some of the paradigms did not seem to have strong explanatory power when 
confronted with a first descriptive account of the Sino-Russian evolutionary, multi-
dimensional and ambivalent process of rapprochement. However, four approaches brought 
particularly interesting predictive and explanatory arguments, which a priori are not 
inconsistent with empirical observations. The economic interdependence theory asserts that 
trade interlinkages are an essential factor-force contributing to sustain peaceful relations and 
cooperation. The more economically interlinked states are, the more they are likely to 
cooperate in very various ways. The ideological solidarity theory argues that the driving force 
for interstate rapprochement derives from organisational uniformity in polity and economic 
organisation. The more similar states are, the more they will cooperate. The neoliberal theory 
contends that drives for negative reciprocities and relativistic stances can be overcome 
through the instrumentalisation of interest-interdependences, e.g. the creation of regimes. This 
possibility of shifting the assessment of state benefits towards the maximisation of absolute 
gains is not only rational, but it is mutually beneficial in the long run. Hence, the driving force 
for cooperation is for neoliberals the identification of a mutuality of interests. The more states 
mutually identify their interests in absolute terms, the more likely they will cooperate. Finally, 
the constructivist approach offers a cognitive explanation of cooperation by researching 
interests and identities formation. Constructivists argue that in a socially constructed world, 
cooperation requires the emergence of an intersubjective framework of norms and values 
producing mutual expectations. States create such a framework by interacting, 143  which 
transforms their multi-levelled relational, and ultimately intrinsic, identities. The formation of 
collective identities is identified as a major mechanism of cooperation development, as it 
actively participate to the formation of communities of thinking. Master variables underlying 
collective identity formation are first self-restraint, which induces passive trust-building, 
second common fate, which causes ideational convergence, third interdependence, which 
leads to the perception of a mutuality of interests, and fourth homogeneity, which entails an 
endogenous tropism of policy alignment in bilateral relations. The more developed, or dense 
collective identity is, the more far-reaching and comprehensive cooperation is.  
 
                                                 
 
143 For constructivists, communication is a fundamental form of interaction 
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Constructivist interpretations of cooperation motives echo and complete the neoliberal, 
economic interdependence and ideological solidarity theories, which can be reformulated in a 
constructivist understanding. Whereas neoliberalism provides a behavioural and objectivistic 
explanation of cooperation, constructivism researches the underlying constructions behind 
these motives and emphasise the importance of knowledge and learning throughout the 
process. Although different in its ontological and epistemological reading of reality, the 
constructivist perspective is therefore not incompatible with rationalist interest-based theories. 
Rationalist theories rest on the (debatable and debated) implicit assumption that agents act “as 
if” their interests were exogenously determined, and their identities did not change through 
interactions. This is self-fulfilling prophecy. By following the “as if” assumption, agents 
comply with this implicit rule, and thus validate it as a default position. As Ian Hurd notes, 
“this is unreasonable to use the difficulty in proving the presence of any one motivation to 
justify the retreat to a default position that privileges another, without requiring similar 
proof”.144 This epistemological divergence does not jeopardise the theoretical solidity of the 
constructivist approach, since it only emphasises that rationalists develop theories on the basis 
of a special (albeit arbitrarily chosen) set of assumptions, which lead them to consider their 
social institution and fundaments as the only possible ones. Theoretical attempts have been 
made to reconcile social constructivists and rational-choice proponents, e.g. by advocating for 
the former “a much needed-(re)turn to questions of agency and decision-making”, and for the 
latter, “a new emphasis on language and communication”.145 The theoretical debate on such 
synthesis is still on-going and unresolved.  
 
In this thesis, I will not go in further details into these theoretical questions, but focus 
on methodological instruments that rationalists designed to study enhanced cooperation and 
rapprochement, while integrating them in a wider constructivist perspective. I will then 
assume an inconclusive ontology, which will be detrimental to the theoretical purity of my 
demonstration, but may be more appropriate in the discussion of relations between actors with 
very different cultural backgrounds interacting within immature and evolving communities. In 
certain fields of research, which I will identify as propitious to rational-choice analysis 
(following the “as if” approach), I will then be able to rely on unambiguous definitions and 
rational explanations of causality links based on deductive logics, while I will research the 
overall interpretative understanding of Sino-Russian rapprochement mechanism through the 
constructivist lens.  
 
                                                 
 
144 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, International Organizations (Vol. 53, Spring 
1999), p. 392 
145 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Bridging the Rational Choice/Constructivist Gap? Theorizing Social Interactions in 
European Institutions”, ARENA Working Papers (WP 00/11, March 2000), 
<http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00_11.htm#Bunn*> [10th March 2001] 
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Drawing from these introductory remarks and my literature review of cooperation 
theories, I will elaborate in the following part my own theoretical framework in order to better 
understand interstate cooperative behaviours. This theoretical contribution to studies of 
international relations is not conceived restrictively for the sole application to the Sino-
Russian case, but shall have general explanatory and predictive power. Its research 
programme will therefore be applicable to any dyadic relationship in world politics. Pivotal to 
my theoretical framework is the distinction between “strategic convergence” and “tactical 
alignment”. I define the concept of “strategic convergence” as applying to evolutionary trends 
of dyadic cooperative symbiosis in politics, economy and security. In accordance with a 
liberal-constructivist perspective, I contend that driving forces of strategic convergence 
emerge from the multidirectional formation of collective identity. This allows me to formulate 
my hypothesis as follows:  
 
Strategic convergence is characterised by a high degree 
of transversal, horizontal and vertical density in 
collective identity formation.   
 
Strategic convergence is not only defined behaviourally and unidirectionally as “the 
overlap of key objectives and interests with regard to long-term developments in world 
politics, which provides the basis for extensive cooperation”. 146  It requires the dynamic 
formation of collective knowledge, intersubjective understandings and the downsizing of 
egoistic relational identities in favour of the emergence of a community of thinking. This 
community has to be sustained by an ideational framework shared by the partners as raison 
d’être of their strategic convergence. Here lies one of the main distinctive traits of strategic 
convergence, i.e. high transversal density in collective identity formation. Transversal 
density refers to the degree of normative uniformity that emanates cross-nationally from 
political beliefs, discourses, and practices. It is constituted by the whole construction of 
shared knowledge that interacting states have developed with regard to the intersubjectively 
constructed “Other”. This “Other” may be an actor or a group of actors that does not belong 
the Community, or it may even refer to the competing identities of the actors constitutive of 
the Community. Transversal identity formation, thus, does not only develop relative to the 
external “Other”, but also inwardly by mitigating “self”- (egoistic) identities so that they 
allow the emergence of the “we”. This interface is constitutive of the role-identity formation’s 
layer of collective identities, or their relationship-specific dimension. 147  More simply, 
transversal collective identity formation can also be understood as the cognitive process 
                                                 
 
146 Kyrre Elvenes Braekhus and Indra Ǿverland, “A Match in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between Russia 
and China”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (Vol. 5 Issue 2, 2007), pp. 41-61 
147 We shall remember that identities are multiple and relationship-specific. This is also true for collective 
identities.  
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leading to the emergence of the distinctive sense of “we-ness” that Alexander Wendt refers to 
as “common fate”. In global politics, for instance, reactive cooperative behaviours display a 
lower degree of transversal density than proactive alignment for a cause that two states 
intersubjectively deem “just” (e.g. “duty of interference”). Ideational convergence increases 
transversal density, since it underpins alignment of fundamental principles constituting states’ 
subjective (motivational) interests. Ideational convergence may be initiated through mutual 
trust-building, e.g. self-restraint, and furthered through the building of mutual expectations. 
For this purpose, states’ relational identities on specific issues must be partly transformed, e.g. 
through repeated interactions, social learning or international regimes, so as to fuel collective 
self-identification rather than egoistic identities. Ideational convergence is measured, for 
instance, through indicators of foreign policy alignment. Foreign policy, indeed, is the 
apanage of the executive in sovereign states; its organisational structure is not shared with 
any kind of “Other”, even when integration is quite advanced, and thus, its dynamics remains 
relatively autonomous, while being mostly relational. This allows the identification of states’ 
individual subjective interests relationally to the external Other, and consequently the 
assessment of their uniformisation.  
 
In addition to the high degree of transversal density in collective identity formation, 
strategic convergence requires interest-interdependence, whereby states develop a 
comprehensive mutuality of interests. The identification of a mutuality of interests can be 
sustained by the formation of transversal collective identity, but not only. States may indeed 
have similar and largely interdependent objective interests, and therefore cooperate on an 
egoistic basis so as to reproduce their individualistic identities. For instance, states may 
cooperate to survive in wars, although their relational and type identities greatly differ. It is 
nevertheless arguable that interactions between strategically converging states must develop 
alongside with a reciprocal focal shift from a positional stance towards an atomistic one. Here 
lies the second distinctive trait of strategic convergence: A high degree of horizontal density 
in collective identity formation is required in order to operationalise the formation of an 
always broader sense of “we-ness” in choice-making. Strategic convergence implies a broad 
scope of issue-specific cooperation, not only limited to geopolitics, but also encompassing the 
maximisation of joint material interests and complementarities, e.g. in geoeconomics. 
Horizontal density can be strengthened by broadening the scope of interstate cooperation, e.g. 
by supporting the instrumentalisation, or institutionalisation of strategic choices in mixed-
motive games.148 By solving a growing range of dilemmas of collective actions through 
cooperation, states indicate the (relationship-specific) prioritisation of common interests over 
individualistic ones. 149  This horizontal dimension is essential for the strengthening of 
                                                 
 
148 We shall remember that collective identities are issue-specific. Horizontal collective identity formation thus 
refers to the broadening of the issue-specific determinant of identity formation.   
149 Arthur A. Stein (1990), pp. 25-54 
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collective identity. It can be measured through the assessment of the degree of economic 
interdependence, and game-theoretically, through states’ strategic choices in geoeconomics, 
where inharmonious interest interdependence exists. Horizontal Collective identity formation 
is thus a fundamental driving force of interest-based cooperation theories, and in particular of 
the economic interdependence and neoliberal approaches.  
 
Finally, strategic convergence requires a high degree of vertical density in collective 
identity formation. This builds on type-identities, and implies the internalisation of the 
community’s values and norms at the domestic level, i.e. in polity and economic organisation, 
and ultimately their relative homogenisation. Internalisation results in particular from social 
learning, which is a vector of ideational convergence, economic interdependence, and the 
identification of a mutuality of interests. It is therefore a powerful driving force in the 
identity-transformational shift from the “self” to the “we”.150 Greater vertical density in states’ 
collective identity formation is an essential driving force underlying the ideological solidarity 
argument: by internalising their shared understandings and transforming their intrinsic 
identities accordingly so that dissimilarities in polity and economic organisation decrease, 
states increasingly consider the Other as it would consider itself. Increasing similarity of 
organisational and institutional structures entail changes in relational identities fostering 
cooperation, because the mutual alignment of objective needs or interests minimises potential 
divergences in subjective interests. 151  Ultimately, this mechanism, also called 
isomorphisation, “forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set 
of environmental conditions”.152   
 
“Tactical alignment” is to be distinguished from strategic convergence. It is defined 
here as ad hoc cooperation on selected issues in order to maximise individualistic utilities in 
reaction to structural or exogenous constraints. All in all, the distinctive trait of tactical 
alignment is that it does not require a high density of collective identity formation. In a 
Hobbesian or Lockean socially constructed world characterised by the normative reign of 
distrust in interstate relations, two countries may engage in tactical rapprochement, although 
they have diverging long-term strategies, for instance to balance a common impending 
                                                 
 
150 Whereas transversal collective identity formation stresses the relational interface of identity transformation, 
which is very related to the process of joint-“othering”, vertical collective identity formation rather focuses on 
the intrinsic dimension of identity changes.  
151 This argument finds an obvious illustration in the democratic peace approach. By internalising the 
“democratic-peaceful” type-relational-identity, states striving for peace may choose to transform their intrinsic 
identities, e.g. by strengthening democracy. When confronted with another democracy in future relations, first, 
they generate mutual expectations (due to greater horizontal density in collective identity formation), and second, 
they base their calculations on relatively similar objective interests (election-based legitimacy, freedom, 
preference for peaceful acts…). By sharing these objective interests, states are more likely to align their 
subjective interests in a cooperative way (due to greater vertical density in collective identity formation).  
152 Christoph Knill, “Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches, and Explanatory 
Factors”, Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 12, Issue 5, 2005) 
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external threat. Tactical rapprochement, thus, differs from strategic convergence because it 
implies a lower degree of transversal density in collective identity formation. Tactical 
alignment does not require the proactive construction of a broad set of normative 
understandings, e.g. a shared vision of the world and the place of the community therein. 
Although constitutive of collective identity, reactive normative alignment cannot be translated 
into far-reaching ideational convergence, but merely remains an issue-specific criterion 
according to which specific relational decisions are taken. The logical consequence thereof is 
a lower degree of horizontal density in collective identity formation. Indeed, the development 
of interest-interdependence is not prompted by a growing normative framework of shared 
understandings, and the process of tactical rapprochement is then a shorter-term political or 
economic instrument, which is usually contingently driven by exogenous dynamics, although 
it requires some endogenous level of trust. Tactical rapprochement does not ban cooperation 
as long as it allows maximising one’s individualistic interests, which the main motive of 
cooperation. Understandingly, instrumentalisation of interest-interdependence is looser in 
tactical alignment than in strategic convergence, as priority in the former case is always given 
to retaining one’s individualistic capacity to act. Finally, tactical rapprochement does not 
necessarily imply homogeneisation of the actors’ polity and economy. As states do not build 
on collective identity formation as such, homogeneity is not driven by the active 
internalisation of normative collectiveness, but passively derives from interaction-induced 
socialisation (whereby the emphasis in interactions is not laid on joint-interest maximisation, 
but on individualistic gains). It is then an involuntary process with a lower degree of vertical 
density in collective identity formation.  
 
“Rivalry” is finally defined here as a normative institution, wherein states adopt 
conflicting visions of mutual interests and strategies and value negative reciprocities and 
relativistic utility assessment. Rivalry does not exclude occasional tactical rapprochement and 
a certain level of cooperation, in particular through communication to solve collective action 
dilemmas. It is an intersubjective understanding, according to which rivals expect that each 
will “eschew absolute returns for relative position”,153  or accept cooperation in order to 
double-cross, free-ride, or cheat on the Other. Rivals tend to limit interest-interdependence 
and do not seek, nor allow polity homogenisation.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the three density-variables characterising distinctively strategic 
convergence, tactical rapprochement and rivalry.  
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Figure 3: Determinants of strategic convergence, tactical alignment and rivalry 
 
 
                                  Determinants  
 
Cooperation  
 associated to 
Ideational 
convergence 
Instrumentalisation 
of interest-
interdependence 
Internalisation of 
intersubjective 
norms  
Strategic Convergence ++ ++ ++ 
Tactical Alignment  + (+) 
Rivalry   (+) (+) 
Type of the density in 
collective identity formation 
transversal  horizontal  vertical  
++      high density in collective identity formation 
+        low density in collective identity formation 
(+)     very low density in collective identity formation or negligible  
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The empirical part of this thesis will be dedicated to demonstrating the plausibility of 
the hypothesis by measuring the three-dimensional density of Sino-Russian collective identity 
formation. This will enable me to answer the research question, which I articulated as: “What 
is the driving force underlying the improvement of Sino-Russian bilateral relations since the 
end of the Sino-Soviet split in 1986?” By doing so, I will show that my theoretical framework 
provides a better understanding for explaining Sino-Russian rapprochement in particular and 
interstate cooperation in general. The time framework for empirical research is set as starting 
in 1986 (with Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok) and ending in 2000/2008 (year of the latest 
statistical data available for quantitative research).  
 
It has been seen that strategic convergence requires a high degree of internalisation of 
the shared understandings constitutive of collective identity. This implies the growing 
uniformisation of polity and economic organisation, which translates into an endogenous 
tropism for deeper cooperation. The intensity of this process, termed vertical collective 
identity formation, can be measured through comparative politics. I will then start by 
analysing comparatively the evolution of Russia and China’s polity and economic structures 
these last 20 years in order to understand the “domestic sources of [Russia and China’s] 
foreign and security policy” and the endogenous driving forces underlying Sino-Russian 
rapprochement.154 Convergence in horizontal and vertical power concentration, as well as 
converging structural corporatisation of the state are striking indicators of growing 
organisational isomorphism leading to greater compatibility in Russia and China’s policy-
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making. This argument has been raised by proponents of the ideological solidarity theory, but 
is in fact underpinned by constructivism. Changes in internal power structures, which 
occurred similarly albeit unparalleledly in Russia and China, account for changes in Russia 
and China’s intrinsic identities. By converging mutually, these intrinsic identities rested on 
increasingly similarities in objective needs and interests, and thus greater mutual 
understandings, endogenously paving the way to greater cooperation. Such a process is a 
sustained through social learning, i.e. identification and internalisation, but has also a 
constitutive effect on the construction of intersubjective norms. This will lead us to the 
analysis of ideational convergence in foreign policy, i.e. the direct study of the norms and 
values that are intersubjectively shared and the social reality that is jointly constructed by 
Russia and China.  
 
Strategic convergence, it has been seen, implies a high degree of transversal collective 
identity formation. In order to assess the density thereof, ideational convergence can be 
measured qualitatively and quantitatively. The methodological instruments used for this 
purpose shall however favour the constructivist reading of reality, i.e. foster a cognitive 
approach of cooperation. Qualitatively, critical discourse analyses can be carried out in order 
to highlight the intersubjective understandings and hidden normative assumptions that 
cooperating states developed through interactions. The methodological approaches proposed 
by Norman Fairclough, Siegfried Jäger and Teu van Dijk will be especially useful in this 
respect. But my research will not be limited to the study of ideational convergence in 
semiotics. In order to convincingly establish ideational convergence, I will confront Sino-
Russian semiotic relationship with the praxis of foreign policy. A quantitative study will be 
undertaken, which will scrutinise the evolution of Russia and China’s voting behaviour in the 
United Nations General Assembly these last 20 years. This will characterise Russia and 
China’s evolutional stance towards the current world order construction, and help measuring 
the transversal density in Sino-Russian collective identity formation. In addition, a qualitative 
study of Sino-Russian comparative position-taking with regards to major geopolitical 
concerns will be carried out to illustrate growing parallelism in the normative approach of 
world issues. The study of ideational convergence will allow us measuring the transversal 
density in Sino-Russian collective identity formation, which is pivotal in understanding the 
distinctiveness of the Sino-Russian relationship.  
 
Finally, it has been seen that strategic convergence requires higher horizontal density 
in collective identity formation, i.e. growing economic interdependences and recognition of a 
broader mutuality of interests in strategic choices, in particular in geoeconomics or regional 
issues. Strategic convergence is a far-reaching process with a growing scope of issue-specific 
cooperation. This will be measured by using an economic-interdependence and game-
theoretical approach. I will first research quantitatively how Russia and China increasingly 
became economically interdependent, and emphasise in this respect the specificity of the 
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Sino-Russian relationship. In geoeconomics and regional security matters, i.e. in areas where 
concerns about relative gains usually prevail, I will demonstrate how Russia and China 
instrumentalised their interest-interdependence in order to maximise joint-interests in mixed-
motive games rather than individualistic ones.  
 
By combining these different methodologies, each shedding light on a particular 
aspect of social reality, and I shall eventually be able to conclude on the overall density of 
collective identity formation. This will logically lead me to conclude on the very nature of 
Sino-Russian rapprochement.  
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4. Empirical Research 
 
 
4.1. Sino-Russian convergence in polity and economic structure  
 
With the Cold War coming to an end in 1989, liberal scholars thought that the spread 
of Western liberal democracy worldwide would be imminent. China had launched its “reform 
and opening-up policy” in 1978, and Russia had engaged in political and economic reforms 
through glasnost and perestroika. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to confirm this 
prediction: the ideological triumph of liberalism over totalitarian ideologies was now obvious, 
complete and irrevocable. For the first time in history, liberal democracies were to have no 
ideological rival. As Francis Fukuyama wrote in 1992, “what we may be witnessing is not just 
the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end 
of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. 155 
This implied more than an ideological victory for liberal democracies – it was a philosophical 
achievement, a step towards the advent of universal democratic peace.  
 
But these hopes rested on the assumptions that economic liberalism would necessarily 
entail constitutional liberalism in transition economies, and that democracies could not be 
illiberal, neither politically nor economically. These assumptions reflected the social 
construction of reality for Western liberal democracies, but they were no universal rule, or 
norm necessarily shared by the States concerned. In this perspective, the rise of illiberal 
democracies and authoritarian capitalist regimes in Russia and China is parable of the limits 
of Fukuyama’s theory. And as Azar Gat noted, “although the rise of authoritarian capitalist 
great powers would not necessarily lead to a non-democratic hegemony or a war, it might 
imply that the near-total dominance of liberal democracy since the Soviet Union’s collapse 
will be short-lived and that a universal ‘democratic peace’ is still far off.”156  
 
In this part, I will research comparatively the dynamics underlying Russia and China’s 
transformation process. I will focus on similarities in evolutionary trends, e.g. highlight 
convergence in the evolution of power structures, and emphasise mutual interactions. This 
analysis will enable us to demonstrate a gradual alignment in Russia and China’s intrinsic 
type-identities and conclude on the endogenous driving forces of Sino-Russian rapprochement 
since 1986. I will first provide some conceptual tools and definitions related to transitology 
and democracy, in order to set a referential framework according to which Russia and China’s 
                                                 
 
155 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York,NY: Free Press, 1992), p. 4 
156 Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers”, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007) 
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polity and economic structure can be compared. I will then analyse the diverging strategic 
choices of transformation that both states initially made in the 90’s, and briefly present the 
consequences these had in terms of outcome. More importantly, I will research important 
trends in Russia and China’s transformation process, and demonstrate characteristic 
convergence in polity and economic structures. These trends reflect the gradual alignment of 
Russia and China’s intrinsic identities and objective interests.  
 
4.1.1. Definitions: Liberal and illiberal democracies 
 
Comparative politics sometimes require the use of concepts that are normatively 
constructed. For instance, there is no positivist definition, or universal understanding of 
“democracy”, in contrast with concepts such as “economic growth”. Democracy, therefore, 
can be understood in various ways. In the 1940s, Mao Zedong developed his “New 
Democracy” theory as a road towards socialism, whereby democratisation was meant as a 
controlled form of harmony between classes with divergent interests.157 The first task to be 
performed here, therefore, is to deconstruct these normative concepts prior to their use, in 
order to clearly define what they shall refer to in the precise framework of the research. Such 
a task is essential, as it allows the definition and delimitation of intrinsic type-identities by 
distinguishing them from relational ones.  
 
Democracy is defined here a minima as a form of government in which voters are 
granted certain political rights, e.g. political pluralism and free elections. These rights are the 
constitutional guarantee that the leadership may be changed in a foreseeable future, if the 
people so decides. Russia stopped being non-democratic in February 1990, as Art. 6 of the 
Soviet Constitution was amended, and the Communist Party’s monopoly on power 
consequently abolished. It became in practice democratic in June 1991 as Boris Yeltsin was 
elected President of the Russian Soviet Republic. Today, despite a lesser degree of political 
pluralism, Russia still has at least one opposition party, the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, which however, only accounted for around 11% of the votes in 2007. In China, 
despite the Organic Laws of Villagers’ Committees, introduced in 1987, which authorize 
elections at the local level and provides that “no organization or individual may designate, 
appoint or replace any member of a villagers committee”158, the Communist regime still 
                                                 
 
157 See Zedong Mao, “On New Democracy”, in Zedong Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Peking: Foreign 
Language Press, 1967), Vol. 2., pp. 339-384 
158 Art. 11 of the Organic Laws of Villagers’ Committees of the People's Republic of China, 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm> [3rd April 2009] 
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retains exclusive power in national politics. According to our definition, China, as a result, is 
a non-democratic state. 159 
 
Since the concept of democracy in our understanding only refers to political rights, 
democratically elected government need not be efficient, honest, far-sighted, responsible, or 
independent from interest groups. Democratically elected governments may offer political 
rights to the citizenry, so as to yield legitimacy from it, but deny it civil liberties such as 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law… This 
may seem paradoxical, since democracy in the West in the 20th century implicitly equated 
with liberal democracy, but a line has to be drawn to distinguish liberal democracies and 
illiberal democracies in order to understand Russia and China’s transformation pattern. As 
Fareed Zakaria notes, “Western liberal democracy might prove to be not the final destination 
on the democratic road, but just one of the many possible exits”.160  
 
Liberal democracy allies political rights and civil liberties in the realisation of a 
philosophical goal: “protect[ing] an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, 
whatever the source”. 161  This implies not only procedural rights for citizens, as free 
competitive elections, access to free information, freedom of speech and assembly, but also 
constitutional guarantees that these rights will be secured through constitutional arrangements, 
as check and balances, impartial courts, equality under the law and the rule of law. Liberal 
democracy implies that “human beings have certain natural rights and that the governments 
must accept a basic law limiting its own power, that secures them”.162 The over-concentration 
of power in the hand of the executive and the over-meshing of the state with business and 
interest groups are fundamental impediments to the emergence of liberalism in states’ polity, 
may they be democratic or not.  
 
For obvious reasons, China has not a liberal polity –as it is not a democracy in our 
understanding.163 Likewise, Russia, although democratic, is not liberal. According to Freedom 
House indicators, political rights and civil liberties peaked in Russia from 1991 till 1998 but 
the level of these indicators never went beyond 4 on a scale from 0 to 7.164 The low degree of 
                                                 
 
159 Recent changes that the National People’s Congress has undergone and on-going discussions within the Party 
nevertheless indicate that China is on its ways towards democratisation. The overall assessment of China’s 
nremaining a non-democratic state should not conceal these developments.  
160 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997) 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid.  
163 Although a certain degree of freedom is possible in China despite the absence of institutional backing 
(communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009]) 
164 The definition of political rights in Freedom House’s understanding is more stringent than ours. Besides 
requirement for the electoral process and political pluralism, it includes a requirement for functioning 
government. See Freedom House database, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1> [3rd April 
2009] 
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constitutional liberalism in Russia throughout transformation can be explained through certain 
continuities with the ancient regime and additional flaws that emerged from the 1993 
Constitution. These affected: Russian political institutions, with an extraordinary 
concentration of power in the hands of the presidency, flaws in the check and balance system 
and pressures on the judiciary; Russian political process, with the recurrent ruling by 
presidential decree, treachery in elections, growing corruption, dramatic weakening of the rule 
of law; Social transformation with growing constraints on the freedom of the press and the 
emergence of a civil society; Economic structure and property relations, with the oligarchs 
family, who constituted a state within the state.165 Russia is an example of illiberal democracy 
in which a democratically elected regime did not accept constitutional limitation of its power 
and did not seek to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens. The power structure in 
Russia, therefore, does not base its legitimacy on citizens’ rights and acceptance, but on other 
factors, which designed Russia’s polity accordingly.  
 
In the past twenty years, Russia and China’s transformation process has attracted 
considerable attention. Scholars observed thoroughly the process of democratisation launched 
in the two countries and their slow and rocky convergence towards western liberal democracy. 
They mostly used Western-style liberal democracy as an extrinsic normative benchmark in 
respect to which they attempted to assess the success and failures of Russia and China’s 
transformation. However, less attention has been brought to the intrinsic nature of the 
democratisation process –whether it really develops hand in hand with liberalism or tends to a 
hybrid model retaining authoritarian characteristics because of its different legitimacy base.  
 
Before starting the analysis of the process of two countries’ transformation, a few 
words should be said about the concept of transformation itself. In order to prevent 
teleological fallacy, I will refer the concept of transformation rather than transition. The latter 
implies indeed that the transforming state should somehow converge (preferably towards 
liberal democracy and market economy). Transformation implies an open-ended process, 
which may (or not) converge (towards liberal democracy and market economy). Likewise, I 
will not assume that Russia and China follow two separate independent processes of 
transformation. Despite very different starting points, the two countries face similar 
challenges: transformation of their economy, polity and ideology. Furthermore, interactions 
between the two countries have been observed, as well as lesson-drawing processes. As noted 
by Christopher Marsh, “by working under the assumption that there is little to no interaction 
between the cases under study, or that such interaction is insignificant, comparativists often 
neglect the systemic forces that impact domestic politics”.166 I will then assume that Russia 
                                                 
 
165 Rudolf L. Tókés, “Transitology: Global Dreams and Post-communist Realities, Central Europe Review (Vol. 
2, N°10, 13 March 2000) 
166 Christopher Marsh (2005), p. 25 
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and China follow a multifaceted transformation path, which may, or may not, result in a 
similar outcome, depending on choices that are made, and circumstances that condition these 
choices.  
 
4.1.2. Divergences in initial circumstances and strategic choices 
 
Russia and China engaged in transformation under very different circumstances. First, 
China started earlier, already in the late 1970s, while Russia had to wait until Gorbachev 
reforms in the mid-1980s. They did not inherit the same ideological constraints, as Mao’s rule 
was more personality cult-oriented than that of his Soviet counterparts. But more importantly, 
the structure of Soviet economy and the relationship between the Republics and Moscow 
greatly differed from those in China. The Soviet Union’s economy was characterized by very 
high distortions in the industrial structure and the external trade patterns, which accounted for 
some 40% of the FSU GDP.167 Vladimir Popov identifies this factor as an important cause for 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. China, a more backward and rural economy, suffered from 
these distortions to a lesser degree. Internal cohesion in China was also much higher owing to 
Chinese long-aged unitarian policy and despite growing regionalism. The Soviet Union, in 
contrast, had to cope with strong tensions arising from the Republics and the rise of 
nationalism. Unlike in China, regionalism in Russia undermined the unity of the country.  
 
Furthermore, Russia and China developed different ideological bases in order to 
legitimise transformation. Transformation in Russia was characterized by the weak and 
unsuccessful reassessment of the Party’s ideology, followed by the complete and overnight 
rejection of Communism. In the late 1980s, Moscow, indeed, launched the “new political 
thinking” policy, and was forced to acknowledge possible “deviations” in the party-line. The 
Party, for instance, had to allow Soviet Republics to “find their own path towards socialism” 
in 1989.168 The same year, harsh strikes broke out on the Soviet territory, resulting in the 
abolition of the power monopoly by the Communist Party. The amendment of article 6 of the 
Soviet Constitution in February 1990, upon which the one-party dictatorship rested, was 
parable of the political and ideological opening of the Soviet Union. However, the ideological 
forces unleashed by this political opening did not result in cooperative transition.169 The 
failure of the 500-day Plan, negotiated by Soviet soft-liners and Russian moderate leaders in 
Fall 1990, and most relevantly, the failure of the “9+1 Accord” in Summer 1991, which tore 
                                                 
 
167 Vladimir Popov, “Circumstances vs. Policy Choice: Why Has the Economy Performance of the Soviet 
Successor States Been So Poor?”, in Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, After the Collapse of 
Communism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 96-129 
168 Christopher Marsh (2005), p. 47 
169 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy & Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in the Post-
communist World”, in Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, After the Collapse of Communism (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 58-95 
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apart the Soviet Union, illustrate the political and ideological power struggle, which ended 
with the victory of the “Democratic Movement” led by Boris Yeltsin. Russia eventually did 
not transform its Communist ideology, but banished it.  
 
The “Democratic Movement”, which grew in the following years consisted of (1) 
“Russia’s Choice” Party (VR), a pro-business, upper-class party in favour of liberalisation and 
opposing statism, and (2) “Yabloko”, a pro-democracy, urban, middle-class party in favour of 
human rights and civil liberties, created in 1993. Both parties fully rejected the ideological 
heritage of Marxism and supported a comprehensive ideological shift from Communism 
towards economic and political liberalism.170  The weaker position of the Yabloko party, 
however, did not allow it to influence to the same extent as VR the new ideological framing 
of the transformation process. The VR party in particular understood democracy as the need 
to constrain the state’s power by depriving it from its capacity to act.171 This was a direct 
response to the previous period of Communist oppression by Soviet state-bureaucracy. 
Democracy was associated with state-nihilism. This new ideological framework benefited 
regions, which would thus gain in autonomy, and answered positively to Yeltsin’s declaration 
in 1991 that they should “take as much sovereignty as [they] can swallow”.172 Yeltsin, as 
President of the Russian Federation, signed a number of bilateral treaties with the Russian 
administrative units granting them with asymmetrical rights in tax collection, police, 
lawmaking, etc…173 It also benefited private interests and rent-seekers, who could purchase 
the state’s assets at bargain price. The “shock therapy”, inspired by Western economists but 
willingly supported by Russian politicians, illustrates the ideological drift towards state-
nihilism and its excessive character: By liquidating public assets and accelerating their 
transfer into private hands, whatever the method and the costs, Russia would never turn again 
to Communism. But by doing so, it weakened dramatically the state’s capacity to act and 
authority, so that it no longer could guarantee the rule of law at all. Particularly illustrative of 
this drift was the transfer-pricing technique, which the oligarchs develop in 1998: it allowed 
them to siphon off oil revenues from productive units, move the money offshore and 
dismantle these productive units instead of re-investing their profits. As Andrew Jack sums up: 
“everything is possible became everything is permissible”174.  
 
China, on the other hand, never abandoned Marxist-Leninism as leading ideology, but 
reassessed its practicability and its understanding. The first reassessment period took place 
                                                 
 
170 Gerhard Mangott, “Russia’s rocky transformation path” (lecture at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 
October-December 2008). 
171 Andrew Jack (2005) 
172 Gerhard Mangott (2008) 
173 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Whither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia’s Stalled Reforms”, in 
Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, After the Collapse of Communism (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 130-172 
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after Mao’s death, and opposed two factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The 
first faction, the “two-whatevers”, supported Hua Guofeng’s hard ideological constraints: 
“whatever decisions that Mao made, we shall resolutely adhere, whatever instructions that 
Mao gave, we shall always follow”.175 The second faction, led by Deng Xiaoping, argued for 
softer ideological constraints, claiming that “practice is the sole criterion of truth”. Deng 
Xiaoping, quoting Mao Zedong’ s work, advocated “do not blindly believe that everything is 
good in a socialist country” 176 and eventually took the informal lead of the CCP in 1978. The 
softer ideological constraints imposed on state bureaucracy allowed transformation to occur in 
weighted conformity with, and not full opposition to, the ancient regime’s ideology.177 Deng 
Xiaoping, unlike Boris Yeltsin, favoured cooperative transition. The CCP’s mandate was 
redefined – the Party still had the exclusive leadership, but was to endorse the strategy of 
“crossing the river by grasping for stones”, i.e. guiding China’s gradual transformation based 
on practical experiments, not on dogmatic theories. In addition, the CCP gave up war class as 
a leitmotiv for mass mobilisation.  
 
The second period of reassessment accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
was a reflection on political democratisation and radicalism. It opposed Zhao Ziyang and 
Deng Xiaoping, and resulted in important negative borrowing from Russia, i.e. “a type of 
learning [that] can take place when increased self-awareness helps a country recognize 
features of its own system that are dysfunctional, or which obstruct other policy aims”. As the 
Soviet Union crumbled as political liberalisation grew, the CCP prioritised unity over 
liberalisation.178 With the demise of Zhao Ziyang, it rejected direct democracy and restated 
the vanguard role of the Party in establishing “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It also 
clarified the relationship between capitalism and socialism, by dissociating economic and 
political reforms. As Deng Xiaoping put it, “the difference between capitalism and socialism 
does not lie in the degree of central planning”179. Or more distinctly: “planning and market 
forces are not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy 
is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market 
economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of 
controlling economic activity.” 180  The third reassessment process started after the Asian 
                                                 
 
175 Henry Wang, Socialism and Governance A Comparison Between China's Governance Under Mao and Deng 
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financial crisis in 1997, and involved reflections on egalitarianism and political participation 
of markets and civil society.  
 
These divergences in political stance towards ideology led to diverging choices in 
policy-making with respect to transformation strategy. As it banished most of its ideological 
constraints, Russia could opt for an integral programme of transformation encompassing 
political and economic reforms. It became democratic before having a (functioning) market-
economy. The rationale for such a reform sequencing derived from the new ideological 
framing, which aimed at depriving the state from its authority. Some scholars criticized the 
bad sequencing of reforms in Russia for yielding dramatic results, and identified the 
simultaneity of political and economic liberalism as a catalyst for economic collapse.181 China, 
on the other hand, adopted gradual targeted reforms of the economy, and excluded or 
circumscribed political reforms. Organic Laws of Villagers’ Committees, for instance, were 
initiated in 1987, as political reformers, such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, wielded 
relatively more power on the Party organs than the conservative Communists of the Old 
Guard. But these Organic Laws, which allow free elections of Villagers’ Committees, did not 
entail political representation of non-Communist parties in the provincial or national 
Assemblies.182 A system of cooptation in the provincial and national Assembles hampered 
political penetration by non-affiliated parties. This shows how political reforms in China 
remained subject to ideological constraints favouring the one-party rule.  
 
Reforms in Russia and China also differed with respect to their dynamics. Russia’s 
reforms followed a top-down approach. In the economy, the transformation programme was 
designed by rent-seekers at the highest level with the help of foreign experts.183 This top-
down approach was often criticised, even in Russia, for ignoring the daily life concerns of the 
citizens, who referred to the leading parties as “sofa-parties”. In politics, general elections 
were introduced despite the lack of grass-root political culture. Finally, when reforms could 
not be exploited by rent-seekers, they were resisted by bureaucrats and regional authorities. 
This could be observed, for instance, through the rising non-compliance of regional 
governments to central state policies, expressed through regions passing legislation that 
contradicted the federal Constitution. This legal separatism trend peaked in 1998-2000 and 
has been studied in details by Kathryn Stoner-Weiss184.  
 
                                                 
 
181 See in particular Christopher Marsh (2005).  
182 The Organic Laws were in fact supported by the Maoist factions of the CCP, hence their limited political 
implications (communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009]).  
183 See for instance the “shares for loan” programme designed by the American Economist Jeffery Sachs in 
collaboration with A. Chubais, Russia’s Minister of Privatisations and CEO of the RaoEES electricity company, 
and friend of Yeltsin. 
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China, on the other hand, opted for a Party-controlled bottom-up approach based on 
local experiments. The first significant experiment took place in 1978 in Anhui province, 
Fengyan County, as Township and Villages Enterprises, the local economic unit, started to 
de-collectivize land in the locality and redistributed user rights to households. 185  The 
emerging Household Responsibility System first met fierce opposition in Beijing, but owing 
to the de facto quick spreading of the practice and support by local CCP bureaucrats, it was 
eventually declared legal in 1984.186 A similar initiative by local authorities gave birth to the 
first Special Economic Zone in Shekou (1980). This Party-supervised bottom-up approach 
equally applied in China’s political reforms, as shown by the scope of the Organic Laws, 
which intended to introduce a grass-root political culture of pluralist democracy at a local 
level, and not election at the national level.187 
 
Substantial differences in the initial circumstances under which transformation was 
carried out in Russia and China, and important divergences in strategic choices regarding the 
scope, sequencing, ideological basis, and speed of the reforms necessarily led to dissimilar 
outcomes. In the economy, Figure 4 shows that in 1992, Russian GDP equated with Chinese 
GDP. In 1995, it was only half of Chinese GDP, and in 2007, one third. This is best explained 
by Figure 5: between 1992 and 2007, in average, China’s GDP grew by 10,46% per annum, 
while that of Russia oscillated between sharp drops (-15% in 1992) and moderate growth 
(around 7% in 2000s), with an average of 3,70% over the period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
185 Households did not receive property rights but only user rights. In exchange, “peasants had to sign a contract 
through which the state made them produce goods that were not of high profit, such as grain”. Despite the 
dissolution of the Communes in 1983, land was not privatised and remained collective ownership 
(communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009]).    
186 Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 27-34 
187 Daniel A. Bell China’s Confucianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).  This idea of introducing 
a grass-root political culture of pluralist democracy at a local level only concerns China’s rural population 
(communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009]).    
 - 76 -
Figure 4: China and Russia's GDP (PPP) 1992-2007 
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Figure 5: China and Russia's GDP growth 1989-2007 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2008
an
nu
al
 %
 c
ha
ng
e 
(c
on
st
an
t p
ric
es
)
China Russia  
 
 
 
4.1.3. Convergence in the ideological reframing of transformation 
 
Following the dramatic impact of the Western-inspired shock therapy on the Russians’ 
welfare and the leadership’s legitimacy under Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin opted in the 
2000s for a twofold reframing of the ideological background of transformation. First, he 
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supported ideological reassessment as a means to re-establish the state’s authority, which had 
been sacrificed on the altar of the liberal ideology. Second, he advocated the indigenisation of 
the bases upon which Russia’s leadership should legitimise transformation in order to mitigate 
exogenous interferences. This process of ideological reassessment of Boris Yeltsin’s blind 
commitment to liberalism strikingly recalls China’s characteristics. And it is not excluded that 
identification, as a social learning process, acted as a driving force in Russia’s ideological 
rapprochement.  
 
As previously seen, China started reassessing the ideological foundations of the 
leadership’s legitimacy in end of the 1970s. This process of ideological reassessment provided 
China with more stable and solid development. In Russia, ideological reassessment was 
achieved through the establishment of a state-legalist “dictatorship of the law” in the 2000s. 
Under Vladimir Putin’s mandate, funding and staffing of the judiciary increased, and a 
criminal code with jury trials was introduced. 188 The judiciary was not intended to become 
fully independent, but rather to serve as a functional instrument of the executive, which had 
been considerably weakened. The strengthening of the judiciary aimed in particular at the 
pillars of the “state within the state”: the oligarchs. Vladimir Putin set new rules, affirming 
that governmental support for their activities, and his forgiveness for their earlier enrichment 
now depended on their economic patriotism. Some oligarchs, as Alexander Smolensky, 
founder of SBS Agro, kept low profile and benefited from the newly introduced state-legalist 
policy. Others, as Mikhail Khodorkovsky openly lobbied against higher oil taxes, and 
therefore were jailed or exiled, despite colossal wealth. Under Vladimir Putin’s mandate, 
corporate law with incentives for transparency and corporate governance, as well as 
procedures for bankruptcy were initiated. 189 The goal was to constrain and organise economic 
and political liberalisation, not on the basis of another countervailing ideology placing the 
individual’s rights at the core of legislations, but on the basis of laws passed in the state’s 
interests.  
 
The other factor of convergence with China is the indigenisation of the ideological 
discourse resulting from this process of ideological reassessment. As Vladimir Putin stated, 
“our future depends on combining the universal principles of market economy and democracy 
with Russian realities”190. This combination echoes the official denomination of China’s form 
of government, i.e. “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, meant to “keep China safe, 
stable and standing”191. By acknowledging the fact that no exogenous ideology shall dictate 
the process of transformation in their respective countries, Vladimir Putin and now Hu Jintao 
                                                 
 
188 Andrew Jack (2005) p.216-254 
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190 Christopher Marsh (2005), p. 330 
191 Ibid. p. 107 
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freed themselves from the leading paradigms of international politics binding market 
economy or democracy with liberalism. They refuted the accusations of ideological paradoxes 
in their policy choices: for Russia, democracy is not inconsistent with illiberal policies; for 
China, socialism is fully consistent with market-economy. 
 
Indigenisation of political thinking, however, is even more advanced in China, where 
the leadership increasingly promotes a revival of Confucianism to legitimize the conduct of 
the state in political matters. The “harmonious society” doctrine promoted by Hu Jintao, in 
February 2005, echoes the Confucius’s precept that “harmony is something to be 
cherished”192. And as stated by Premier Wen Jiabao in March 2007, “from Confucius to Sun 
Yat-Sen, the traditional culture of the Chinese nation has numerous precious elements, many 
positive aspects regarding the nature of the people and democracy”. 193  Confucianism is 
nowadays taught in most Chinese universities, including the Central Party School, alongside 
compulsory lectures of Marxism-Leninism for CCP cadres. Despite similar developments in 
the ideological reframing of their transformation, Russia and China tend to rely on ideological 
arguments of different origins. While those of Russia are hankered in the recent past and the 
present, China’s new ideology tends to search for deeper roots. This may suggest a lesser 
degree of ideological volatility.  
 
4.1.4. Convergence in horizontal power concentration  
 
Horizontal power concentration refers to the tendency of the Presidency to accumulate 
power from other branches of government. Vladimir Putin’s and Hu Jintao’s mandate show 
signs of mutual convergence in this respect, with Russia’s presidency becoming stronger over 
the 10 last years, and China’s exclusive leadership accepting devolved structures of political 
participation to balance, albeit indecisively, the CCP dictatorship. The rationale behind 
Russia’s horizontal power concentration is the outspoken necessity to establish a strong state 
and reaffirm the rule of law after the state-nihilist mandate of Boris Yeltsin. As Putin himself 
put it, “for Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to be got rid of. It is a source of order 
and main driving force of any change” 194 . China’s goal, on the other side is not the 
weakening of the CCP as such, as the Party also considers a strong state as primordial. The 
Communist regime, drawing lessons from the Russian experience, is aware that “glasnost and 
pluralism caused the entire CPSU and the people to fall into chaos. The Soviet Union & the 
CPSU collapsed under the impact of his Westernisation & bourgeois liberalisation”.195 The 
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rationale for allowing more political participation is rather to channel and control social forces 
through cooperative interfaces, or transmission belts.196  
 
Horizontal power concentration in Russia started in theory with the enforcement of the 
1993 Russian Constitution, following the October Events, which established a super-
presidency. But owing to the weakening position of Boris Yeltsin in the political process, and 
his detrimental medical record,197 horizontal power concentration actually started in Russia in 
the years following Vladimir Putin’s office-taking as acting President. Under his mandate, 
Vladimir Putin mitigated the horizontal constraints on the Presidential authority, which had 
limited Boris Yeltsin’s capacity to act. Removing these constraints, which were mainly an 
opposition-dominated Parliament and pluralist media, was sufficient to ensure the effective 
centralisation of horizontal power in Russia’s polity, since the 1993 Constitution already 
provided the constitutional framework.198 
 
Control over the Russian Lower House, the Duma, was secured through party-system 
modifications in favour of Vladimir Putin’s Party, United Russia. 199 The creation in 2001 by 
Vladislav Surkov of a “party of power” with no ideological identification line and sole 
political programme to support the President resulted in the depolarisation of the political 
spectrum. At the same time, manipulation of electoral law led to the demise of competing 
parties, in particular the liberals (Yabloko) and the Communists: Single district voting was 
abolished for the election of the half of the Duma’s deputy in 2001, and first-past-the-post 
party-list voting set as the rule for the election of the totality of the Duma. This excluded 
independent candidates and weaker parties from the electoral run. In addition to that, the 
electoral threshold to enter the Lower House was raised from 5% to 7%. Parties presenting 
candidates had to register at the Ministry of Justice and fulfil harsher conditions, such as 
declared party-branches in every Russian province. This excluded regional parties and parties 
with lower financial resources from the electoral run. Last but not least, Vladimir Putin’s 
presidency strengthened the financial consequences that candidate-parties with modest results 
would face in case of electoral defeat: under 7% of the votes, the state would not reimburse 
electoral costs; under 3%, the party would not receive governmental aid; and under 2%, the 
party would have to reimburse costs arising from TV broadcast. Besides these electoral 
reforms, Vladimir Putin’s spin doctor Vladislav Surkov created spoiling parties subordinated 
to United Russia, in order to capture the votes of the Liberals (Yabloko) and the 
                                                 
 
196 One must not underestimate the risk that a weak state posed to China’s unity throughout its history. Power de-
concentration, therefore, cannot be achieved following the Russian way, through state-nihilism.  
197 Yeltsin suffered from alcoholism and depression.  
198 Putin’s actions dealing with vertical constraints (assertive regionalism) and corporatist constraints (a strong 
private business sector) will be seen below. 
199 Gerhard Mangott (2008)  
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Communists.200 Electoral engineering and party-system spoiling contributed to the collapse of 
political opposition in Russia, and to the subordination of the Lower House of the Federal 
Assembly to United Russia, the Presidential Party. With more than 60% of the seats 
(compared to 11% for the Communists) and the demise of opposition parties, it is not 
surprising, then, that the proposal to extend the Presidential mandate from 4 to 6 years was 
voted in December 2008 in less than 10 days.  
 
Control over the Upper-House, the Federation Council, by the Presidency, was 
similarly secured through electoral manipulation.201 Since 2004, regional governors, who used 
to sit at the Federation Council, are no longer elected, but appointed by the Presidency, who 
can dismiss them. Their representatives account for half of the Members of the Upper-House. 
Moreover, since 2001, regional Assemblies, whose President account for the other half of the 
Federation Council, can be dissolved if the Duma votes a bill at the request of the Presidency. 
This means that the Presidency controls indirectly the totality of the Upper-House. It is worth 
noting, finally, that the referendum law was revised under Vladimir Putin so that no 
referendum should be initiated without the support of the party of power.202  
 
Control over the media was also intensified during Putin’s mandate. Gazprom-media, 
a state-owned enterprise, seized the only independent television channel, NTV, in 2001 (the 
so-called “Gusinsky Affair”). The other television channels, Pyervy Kanal and RTR are state-
owned or state-controlled through majority shares. As 90% of Russian citizens declare that 
television is their primary source of information, this implies a quasi monopoly of the state’s 
Presidency over information in Russia. As a matter of fact, check-and-balances to the 
presidential power in Russia have considerably shrunk in the last 8 years. The demise of 
independent media, 203  and political opposition 204  accompanied the process of horizontal 
power concentration, legitimised by Vladimir Putin through the necessity to create a stronger 
state capable of re-establishing the rule of law and defend Russia’s interests.  
 
In China, where the power of the executive is indivisibly merged with that of the Party, 
the CCP never renounced to its exclusive leadership. Its authority was therefore never 
weakened to such an extent as in Boris Yeltsin’s Russia. Horizontal power concentration 
remained maximal after the Tiananmen incident, and is still much higher today than in Russia. 
                                                 
 
200 These parties are “Just-Russia” (created to spoil votes from the Communists) and “Right-Cause” (created to 
spoil votes from Yabloko) 
201 Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice (New York, London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 186-214 
202Gerhard Mangott (2008) 
203 According to Freedom House database, the index for independent media in Russia dropped from 4,74 in 1999 
to 6,25 in 2008, on the scale of 0 to 7 wherein 7 is the worst mark.  
204 The remaining political opposition to the Presidency originates from the Communists (11% of votes), 
Yabloko (1%), and the very heteroclite and loose Drugaya Rosiya Movement, which gathers liberals as A. 
Gasparov, personal foes of Putin as Kasyanov, and Bolsheviks as Limonov and the Red Youth Vanguard.  
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The CCP nevertheless engaged in a limited process of horizontal power de-concentration, by 
granting the National People’s Congress (NPC) with a growing scope of action, and creating 
para-political outlet structures aimed at channelling political and civil claims. Another 
essential vector conducive of power de-concentration is the transfer of socially-owned 
enterprises from the central state to the local entities. As part of this process, the power of the 
regions in China grew substantially.205  
 
In 1997, the CCP launched a new stage of reassessment of Marxism-Leninism. One of 
the focus consisted in deciding whether markets and society have a political of apolitical 
nature, i.e. whether they constitute a threat to the Communist Party.206 Depending on the 
result of this reflection, wider political participation of non-partisan forces may be expected in 
the years to come, for instance through the reestablishment of meritocracy in the selection 
process of higher officials, which so far is based on Party allegiance.207 The introduction of 
meritocracy in complement with the traditional partisan structures would, however, not act as 
checks and balances, since the political guidance could not be delegated to non-partisan 
bureaucrats. But it would possibly increase the lobbing power of non-partisan actors. Another 
indicator for the relaxing of horizontal power concentration is found in the growing role taken 
by the NPC in the political process. China has a unicameral system with the NPC playing the 
role of a non-independent legislature transforming the party-presidential decrees into law. The 
NPC has not become “a unified institutional rival of the Party; [since] the most vital […] 
issues […] are still decided either in party decision-making bodies or informally among senior 
party leaders”.208 But it has a consultative role, which has been strengthened, and more 
importantly, a suspensive veto, which it increasingly used over the last 10 years. Despite these 
developments, scholars are rather sceptical as for the emergence in the near future of proper 
check and balances mechanisms in Chinese polity, owing to the absence of ideological 
support for this idea. Bao Huizhang notes for instance that “Chinese political history by 
highly centralized rule by absolutist emperors”, and current ideological developments, with 
the revival of Confucianism, tend to emphasize the “rule by virtue and virtuous men”, as 
opposed to the importance of checks and balances in interpersonal and inter-institutional 
relations.209 Last but not least, the CCP created intermediary, but non-independent structures 
acting as rubber stamps between the state-Party and interest group (religious organisations, 
labour unions, etc…). These structures, indirectly subordinated to the Party, enable the 
emergence of channelled lobbing practices, which, although very moderate, can be seen as a 
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sign for horizontal power de-concentration. These structures are complemented with newly 
enforced procedures to transmit complaints against party officials accused of corruption or 
clientelism, 210  or newly passed regulation allowing private entrepreneurs to take official 
positions. 211  However, these new developments in what could be seen as power-sharing 
should not be misunderstood: the CCP goal is not to balance his power through participative 
structures, but rather to absorb other political and apolitical currents into the pre-existing 
Party-line. “Far from simply retreating gracefully in the face of relentlessly advancing civil 
society, the state proactively encircled, enmeshed, and incorporated the various new economic 
and social forces unleashed by reform.”212 Accordingly, access to information, freedom of the 
press or reunion all remain extremely controlled in China, and little, if no improvement has 
been seen in the area of civil liberties.213  
 
In order to illustrate Sino-Russian convergence in horizontal power concentration, i.e. 
the strengthening of the Russia’s presidency and the limited relaxing of China’s dictatorial 
authority, a graphic account of the evolution of political rights and civil liberties over the past 
20 years can be presented. There is indeed a negative relationship between power-sharing, 
political rights and civil liberties on the one side and power concentration on the other side. 
Figure 6 shows that political rights and civil liberties in Russia peaked under Boris Yeltsin’s 
mandate, whilst sinking in China the aftermath of the Tiananmen protests. But under Vladimir 
Putin’s mandate, political rights and civil liberties in Russia sunk, while moderately 
favourable developments took place in China after 1998. Figure 7, which is built on the 
calculation of the degree of correspondence between Russia and China for the two variables 
(political rights and civil liberties), clearly illustrates Sino-Russian divergence in horizontal 
power concentration in the early 1990s, followed by convergence after 1998.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
210 Tianjian Shi, “Mass Political Behavior in Beijing”, in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, The 
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Figure 6: Civil liberties and political rights in Russia and China 
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Figure 7: Degree of convergence in horizontal power concentration based on political rights 
and civil liberties’ variables 
 
 
4.1.5. Convergence in vertical power concentration  
 
Vertical power concentration refers to the distribution of powers between the Central 
state and the republics, provinces or regions. Federal states, as Russia, have a lesser degree of 
vertical power concentration than unitary ones, as China, since they grant some autonomy to 
their administrative units, allowing them to rule over certain policy fields (taxation, 
education…).214 The degree of vertical power concentration may vary significantly among 
Federal states and even within Federal states. Asymmetric federalism in particular generates 
non-homogenous vertical power concentration, with the Central state retaining as a rule 
certain powers that it may nevertheless devolve to certain regions only. In Russia, the 
relationship between Moscow and the Republic of Tatarstan, or Chechnya since 2003, is 
particularly illustrative: Tatarstan negotiated with Moscow its sovereignty over oil resources 
(and oil-revenues); Chechnya, its own army. These privileges originate from case-by-case 
negotiations with the Central state, most of them settled in the beginning of the 1990s by the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Federal State and the Republics.  
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union’s apparatus, which ruled over a highly 
centralized territory, rapid and extensive political and economic decentralisation took place 
throughout the 1990s. State-nihilist liberalism, then promoted as leading ideology, benefited 
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Russia’s regions and republics, as well as the private interests embedded in them. Although 
economic reformers thought that decentralisation would bring about better economic 
governance, it actually proved to be a source of economic distortions, due to the Russian 
Central state’s growing incapacity to regulate markets at the periphery. 215  The process 
political and economic decentralisation, which failed to create the structures of an unified 
functioning market regulated by relevant taxation law, property rights and internal trade 
barriers regulations, nourished the capture of political interests by economic agents with a 
regional base –the oligarchs. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss shows that these private interests were 
powerful enough to have regional assemblies passing legislation at their request, even though 
these regional legislations clearly contradicted the federal constitution or the bilateral treaties 
regulating the scope of these assemblies’ powers. For instance, candidates to official positions 
in some regions had to comply with language requirements, or trade was subjected to illegal 
tariffs.  
 
In order to halt growing regional legal separatism, and reaffirm the Central state’s 
authority, Vladimir Putin launched an administrative reform in 2000. He created seven 
“okrugs” (super-districts) covering the totality of the Russian territory and regrouping 
Russia’s 89 republics and other administrative units. As head of these okrugs, Vladimir Putin 
appointed “pol-pred” (representative of the President) directly accountable to the President, 
and in charge of screening the regions’ legislations and put them in conformity with federal 
law. Moreover, in 2001, he withdrew the regional governors’ immunity, which was 
previously granted to them in their function of Members of the Federation Council.216 As 
politicians in Moscow with former FSB background are known to always have 
“kompromat” 217  at their disposal, the suppression of the regional governors’ immunity 
entailed greater control of the Central state over regional affairs. This vertical power 
concentration trend was confirmed in 2004, as Putin decreed that regional governors shall no 
longer be elected by regional assemblies, but shall be directly appointed by the Presidency. 
These policies clearly demonstrate a strong recentralisation of powers in Russia. 
 
Unlike Moscow in the 90s, Beijing did not perform political and economic 
decentralisation at the very beginning of the transformation process. But China faced similar 
challenges, although these were less related to legal separatism than fiscal separatism. The 
“reform and opening-up” policy generated important internal tensions between in Beijing and 
the regional authorities in the coastal economic poles. The Special Economic Zones in 
particular are a source of trade and monetary distortion, siphoning off capital and labour force 
                                                 
 
215 Ibid. p. 131-134 
216 As seen earlier, since 2004, regional governors are no longer members of the Federation Council, but must 
delegate this function to a collaborator, who will then alone benefit from the due immunities.  
217 Kompromat is compromising material, which is used as means of coercion.  
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from inland regions, while fuelling the province in charge of their development with 
revenues. 218  Provinces as Guangdong, which hosts most of the SEZ, openly showed its 
reluctance to withdraw SEZ receipts to the Central state.219 Instead of resisting this growing 
trend of fiscal separatism, the State Council, the chief administrative authority in China with 
exhaustive and supreme powers in economic and administrative affairs, to devolve certain 
rights to provincial governments and subject provincial legislation to NPC review. 220 
Following Beijing’s decentralisation policy, provinces are now entitled to rule on how to 
implement the Party’s guideline in public investment matters, education, health, and in the 
allocation of their revenues. At the local level, the role of party cells also changed 
considerably these last 10 years. Marketisation, desideologisation and decentralisation have 
blurred the distinction between economic and political power and redefined the mission of 
party-cells into “agencies of dynamic economic growth” promoting primarily their own 
pecuniary interest. 221  This explains the high asymmetry in local economic development, 
which primarily depends on the entrepreneurial qualities of party-secretaries.  
 
Unlike in Russia, decentralisation in China did not entail political power devolution 
but was limited to fiscal, economic and administrative questions. This prevented the 
emergence of regional oligarchs capturing enough political power to supplant the central state 
authority. Concentration of wealth and power in China in fewer hands occurred as a result of 
vertical power de-concentration, but this mainly concerned local authorities, and to a lesser 
extent, provincial ones. Unlike Moscow, Beijing remains indeed “the foremost redistributors, 
regulator and policy coordinator, thereby continuing to play a decisive role in determination 
of ‘who gets what, when, and how’”, 222 and retaining effective power of economic guidance 
and supervision223. China’s limited economic decentralisation and Russia recentralisation 
processes nevertheless indicate a tendency of mutual convergence in vertical power 
concentration.  
                                                 
 
218 For a study of inequalities in regional development, see Jr-Tsung Huang et al., “The Inequality of Regional 
Economic Development in China between 1991 and 2001”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 
(Vol. 1, N°3, September 2003), pp. 273-285 
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220 Asian Development Bank, Private Sector Assessment in the People’s Republic of China (November 2003), 
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221 Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko (2000), p. 342 
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223 The dissociation of devolution of economic power from political power may originate from lesson-drawing 
from Russia’s experience. By granting important political rights to the regions, Russia became a dysfunctional 
market-economy. Beijing attempted to allow the devolution of more economic freedoms to the provinces without 
granting them the political rights necessary to ensure autonomous economic guidance.  
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4.1.6. Convergence in state-business relationships  
 
Throughout their profound economic transformation process in the 1980s and 1990s 
Russia and China implemented market-oriented reforms, and subsequently abandoned 
planned economy as sole economic leitmotiv for their development. This transition, strongly 
supported by capitalist states, was primarily furthered by Russian and Chinese elites, who 
experienced the flaws and inefficiencies of a socialist organisation of the economy. In China, 
market-oriented reforms were considered as a pragmatic solution to economic des-
organisation and structural distortions, or a means of improving economic performance, rather 
than as a part of a broader ideological project meshing political liberalism and economic 
capitalism. This particular understanding of market-oriented reforms is illustrated by the 
crushing of the Tiananmen protests followed by Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour”, through 
which the leadership clearly notified its resolve to dissociate economic and political processes 
of transformation. As Deng Xiaoping put it in 1992, the “fundamental difference between 
socialism and capitalism does not lie in the degree of planning in an economy”. This 
declaration was in line with Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “practice is the sole criterion of 
truth”: market-oriented reforms were an instrument, whose practicability and necessity stood 
beyond ideological questioning. “Market-economy” was a functional, not an ideological, 
feature, and was thus compatible with socialism, understood as an ideology conferring upon 
the state the supreme responsibility of the population’s welfare. At the 14th Central Committee 
meeting of the CCP in fall 1992, the term of “planned commodity economy”, which was used 
by Li Peng to describe the organisation of Chinese economy, was for the first time replaced 
by the term “socialist market economy”. This confirmed on the one side the growing role of 
market forces in Chinese economy, and on the other side the sustaining engagement of the 
state in the economy as essential political player. Conversely, in Russia, throughout the 1990s, 
economic reforms, and in particular privatisations, were carried out on an ideological basis so 
as to deprive the state of its capacity to (re-)monopolise economic assets. The voucher (1992) 
and loans-for-shares (1995) privatisations, which accelerated the transfer of state-owned 
assets in private hands at market-undervalued prices, illustrated the prevalence of ideological 
motives in economic transformation prerogatives. Under Vladimir Putin, however, power 
concentration increased in the head of the executive, and attempts were made to invert the 
dynamics by re-increasing the engagement of the state in the economy and re-establishing its 
authority.  
 
All in all, the pattern of economic organisation inherited by both Russia and China 
from their respective transformation is one of market-economy: China entered the WTO in 
2001, and Russia should be finalising its admission soon; rigid economic planning, which 
characterised the two communist regimes, is today antiquated, and most of the markets are 
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relatively free; finally, property rights are overall relatively well-defined. The outcome of 
transformation, thus, at first sight, seems in line with the liberal organisation of western 
market-economies. But this first analysis does not take into account the specific importance of 
the few economic sectors where the state still plays the most important role. Nor does it take 
into account the specific importance of the few economic mechanisms that have not been 
liberalised. First, Russia and China have not banned all restrictions and not liberalised all 
sectors of the economy: labour mobility is still hampered, agricultural land ownership is still 
imprecise, restricted export-regimes are still in place224, currency is not fully convertible. 
Second, Russia and China have not developed economic institutional structures capable of 
ensuring the liberal functioning of their market-economies: antimonopoly legislation, 
anticorruption organisations, market surveillance authorities and codification of state-business 
relations. In place of these essential structures, which classically aim at securing economic 
good governance and free competition, Russia and China have opted for the meshing of state 
interests in the promotion of economic development. This model, explicitly advocated by 
Vladimir Putin in his PhD thesis and closely linked with power concentration in Russia 
throughout the 2000s,225 and de facto operating in China since the 1990s, strongly resembles 
state-corporatism.226  
 
Vladimir Putin started his mandate by initiating some liberal reforms, e.g. cutting 
corporation tax and personal income tax respectively from 35% to 24% and from variable 
rates to a low flat-rate of 13% in order to reduce tax evasion and fraud.227 This was in line 
with Boris Yeltsin’s economic policy. In the following years, Russia’s GDP grew by 6% p.a. 
on average. This economic success, however, did not result from Vladimir Putin’s liberal 
economic governance; it was externally driven by rising energy prices. Urals blend oil prices 
rose indeed from $12 per barrel in 1998 to $130 in 2008. This led to a substantial inflow of 
                                                 
 
224 In Russia, for instance, Gazprom is he only (state-owned) enterprise allowed to export gas. In China, export-
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fiscal revenues from oil and gas228, which fed Russia’s currency reserves and the stabilisation 
fund created to dampen adverse shocks. Although its skyrocketing currency reserves (US$ 
417bn in 2007)229 gave the illusion of a booming economy, Russia, as a matter of fact, 
increasingly suffered from the “Dutch Disease”: revenues drawn from the exploitation of 
mineral and raw materials were making other economic activities increasingly unprofitable. 
Vladimir Putin’s economic model, which supported state engagement in the strategic 
promotion of the energy sector made thereby Russian economy very vulnerable to external 
shocks. But it made it relatively rich and strengthened the role of the state in the economy. 
Therefore, Vladimir Putin did not attempt to dampen Russia’s rising economic vulnerability 
through diversification of the economy and reorganisation of the banking system and capital 
market. On the contrary, the government launched a vast programme of re-nationalisation of 
strategic assets in the energy sector. The state’s share in the total value of mergers and 
acquisitions doubled between 2004 and 2005, and major takeovers included big businesses as 
Sibneft by Gazprom and most of the banking sector. Only in 2005, “the state regained control 
of a quarter of the oil market”.230 The financial crisis in 2008 strengthened this tendency: 
“Now, it is the companies that are in debt, whereas the state is cash-rich and can buy the 
assets […] cheaply”231 Meanwhile, a vast movement of business concentration was initiated 
by the oligarchs in the 2002, under the government’s guidance, who cherished the emergence 
of powerful enterprises buying off foreign assets. In 2002, 85% of the shares of the top 65 
Russian firms were controlled by only eight conglomerates.232 By putting all the major banks 
under state control, Vladimir Putin also made a decisive step towards state’s involvement in, 
and supervision of, Russian sectoral development strategies. Cash flows and loans during this 
period were not directed towards production of commodities, but the exclusive priority for 
project financing was clearly given to the energy and, to a lesser extent mineral sector. As a 
result of this process, Russian economy turned to have two owners: the oligarchs, who 
acquired their shares through dubious practices in 1992 (voucher privatisation), 1995 (loans-
for-shares) and 1998 (transfer-pricing) at a time when state’s capacity was minimal233, and 
were forced to declared their allegiance to the Vladimir Putin following his “dictatorship of 
                                                 
 
228 The price of gas is pegged to that of oil. 
229 Maria Levitov, “Russian Currency Reserves Advance to $417.1 Billion“, Bloomberg News (13/09/2007) 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=a70bd2vBDwrk&refer=east_europe> [6th April 
2009] 
230 Richard Sakwa (2007), p. 249 
231 “The Long Arm of the Sate”, The Economist (Vol. 389, 29 November 2008) 
232 Richard Sakwa (2007), pp. 149-162 
233 It is important to note that the degree of state capture by private interests was much higher under Boris 
Yeltsin than under Vladimir Putin. The weakness of Boris Yeltsin as a statesman was indeed abused by oligarchs. 
For an account of the emergence of oligarchy in Russia and their early influence on politics, see Philip Hanson 
and Elizabeth Teague, “Big Business and the State in Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies (Vol. 57, N°5, July 2005), pp. 
657-680 
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law” doctrine; and from the mid-2000’s, the state itself, which, sometimes forcibly, 
reacquired strategic sectors of the economy, previously held by the oligarchs234.  
 
The relationship between the state and the oligarchs is currently still one of symbiosis. 
Oligarchs participate in the political process at the all levels. They hold key offices, as Igor 
Sechin, Russia’s present Vice-Prime Minster, also in charge of the energy portfolio, and head 
of the board of Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft; or they have direct close friends sitting 
in the government, as Sergey Sobyanin, close ally of Vladimir Bogdanov, Director General of 
Surguteneftegas, the oil company that was suspected to be behind Yukos’s takeover and 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest. Oligarchs support the government for re-election through 
dubious funding of political campaigns and negotiate economic take-overs abroad. In return, 
the government grant them special privileges as monopoly on exports, exemption of licensing, 
state subventions, and constrain domestic competition by limiting for foreign investors the 
access to the Russian market. With the 2008 financial crisis, however, the government had to 
go further to support the oligarchs, and lent them billions of dollars from public funds. This 
move is typically parable of state-corporatist regimes, where profits are privatised; while 
losses are nationalised. Although Vladimir Putin succeeded in limiting the oligarch’s power 
by subordinating power-ministries, the “siloviki”235 directly to the President, he did not get rid 
of the symbiotic relation characterizing state-corporatist regimes –and had little interest to do 
so completely. His reluctance to modernise Russian economic structures in period of growth 
demonstrates that rent-seeking logics still prevail among the elite and the oligarchs in Russia. 
And it also demonstrates that the Russian central state and regional authorities are still 
engaged in a form of exclusive public-private partnership with big businesses in the symbiotic 
promotion of their mutual interests.  
 
State-corporatism in China is deep-rooted in local government, and rests on an even 
more symbiotic relationship between business and public authorities than in Russia. 
Ideological reassessment of Marxism, as previously seen, led to the clarification of the 
relationship between socialism and capitalism: the CCP acknowledged the fact that market 
forces are not paradoxical with socialism. The CCP applied this new paradigm throughout its 
economic reforms, but also within the party-organisation at the township and county levels. A 
striking reform conducted in this respect consisted in the introduction of a performance 
                                                 
 
234 The 2008 crisis, which stroke Russia harshly relative to other nations, stroke the Oligarchs even stronger. 
According to “Easier for a Camel”, The Economist (Vol. 391, No 8625), “the number of billionaires oligarchs 
has halved […], and assets of the ten richest tycoons have lost two-thirds of their value”. This tendency will 
possibly reinforce the pivotal role of the state and rebalance the state-business equilibrium accordingly.  
235 The Siloviki are “power ministries” held by ex-FSB cadres: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Finance, 
Defence, Civil Emergency and Secret Services. They can be used by the Presidency to exert pressure on 
embarrassing oligarchs, such as Mikhail Khodorkovski, if they refuse to comply with the Presidency political 
line. 
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assessment-based responsibility system for Party officials at the local level.236  Township 
governments are given precise targets by higher CCP cadres as regards tax collection, 
industrial development and social order237 . At the end of each year, an internal survey 
assesses the individual performance of each CCP local cadre and establishes a performance 
ranking, which determines promotion prospects and financial bonuses. What is important here 
is that financial bonuses, introduced by the Central Party to complement the modest wages, 
are not paid by the central party-state, but from the local budget. In other words, the 
development of the private sector at the local level directly co-finances CCP officials. As a 
result, local government has a strong incentive in intervening directly and selectively in the 
promotion and protection of the more profitable enterprises and projects. Richard Baum and 
Alexei Shevchenko note that they found villages that were reorganised into “profit-making 
units”, with selected enterprises receiving considerable preferential treatments. 238  These 
preferential treatments include tax concessions, the waiving of particular fees or guarantees 
for loans.239 Although some banks in China have been (partially) privatised (e.g. Minsheng 
Bank),240 their director is still appointed through procedures requiring the assent of the CCP 
party. Without support from the local government, an enterprise, therefore, will not obtain 
bank loans. In addition, local CCP cells “establish credit ratings, allocate resources and raw 
materials, grant tax-relief, create channels to outside suppliers and end-users, hire and fire 
managers, and engage in lobbying with higher authorities”.241  Local state-corporatism in 
China involves therefore a high degree of interpenetration between local party-state 
organisation and business. This does not necessarily lead to the weakening of the Party-state, 
contrary to the development of state-corporatism in Russia under Yeltsin, which was 
accompanied by legal separatism. Indeed, the Central Party retains full political power over 
local CCP cells. At the provincial and national levels, another form of corporatist relationship 
prevails: symbiotic clientelism. In China, the connections (“guanxi”) usually replace 
institutional and legal mechanisms of economic governance, for instance in the selection of 
directors of important enterprises. By controlling key mechanisms of economic governance, 
and strategies of business development at the local level, the CCP retains ultimate control 
over the overall economic development strategy of the country. 
 
                                                 
 
236 Maria Edin, “Local State Corporatism and Private Business”, The Journal of Peasant Studies (Vol. 30, N° 3-4, 
April/July 2003), pp. 278-295 
237 Social order is assessed on the basis of the number of complaints per capita or peaceful participation in the 
political outlets designed by the Central Party to contain and channel discontent claims.  
238 Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko (2000), pp. 346-341 
239 In 1999, about 90% of the Township and Villages Enterprises were privatised, which had great implications 
for local public budget settings. But despite privatisation, other channels enable the local and central 
governments to favour enterprises following their political agenda. Moreover, socially-owned enterprises still 
contribute directly to the central state’s and the region’s budgets, as these are their main shareholder. 
240 Communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009] 
241 Ibid. 
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Russia and China both display a very particular state-business relationship. Despite 
some differences regarding the level of interaction and symbiosis, both rest on a state-
corporatist structure of the economy. In both cases, strategic priorities for business 
development are defined and selectively promoted by the state, while other sectors of the 
economy are neglected, or subdued to the strategic ones. State-corporatism in Russia and 
China results in asymmetrical rule of law: the state only guarantees its protection and help to 
the economic partners abiding with its economic guidelines. These economic agents, in return, 
wield significant influence over political and legislative process, as well foreign policy.  
 
4.1.7. Interactions, convergence and collective identity formation 
 
At first sight, it seems that although Russia and China initially followed different 
transformation paths, their polity eventually converged and became more homogenous. 
Initially, indeed, diverging initial strategic choices were made in very different circumstances, 
diverging ideological bases were relied on to legitimise reforms, and above all different 
methods were chosen in the approach, the scope, the speed and the sequencing of reforms. 
This eventually led to dissimilar developments and outcomes. But China acted in the 1990s as 
if it were learning from Russia’s failures. Contemplating the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
fully dissociated political and economic transformation, and openly referred to reforms in 
Russia as failed transformation model. In March 1989, Premier Li Peng clearly announced 
that he disapproved of glasnost and perestroika, adding that “democracy should not be 
implemented too rapidly and that China would not mechanically copy the policies adopted in 
the Soviet Union”. 242  Instead, Deng Xiaoping remarked publicly that “some [socialist] 
countries have gotten into serious trouble. It seems that socialism has been weakened, but 
people… can learn from these lessons. This can help us improve socialism and lead it on the 
path to healthier development…. Do not think that Marxism has disappeared, has fallen out of 
use, or has failed”.243 In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which the Chinese call 
“great change”244 , Jiang Zemin advocated the causal analysis of the phenomenon: “The 
reasons and the lessons inherent in this [collapse] need to be concluded profoundly and 
comprehensively”, so that “there will be new development of Marxism-Leninism”.245 To that 
end, Chinese research institutes were created, as the China Reform Forum at the Central Party 
School, the Centre for Russian Studies at the East China Normal University.246  Lesson-
drawing between the Soviet Union/Russia and China was not a one-way process. Throughout 
the 2000s, Russia acted as if it were learning from China’s more successful development too. 
                                                 
 
242 Cited in Christopher Marsh (2005), p. 104 
243 Ibid. p. 107 
244 In Chinese 巨变 (jubian) 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
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It reassessed its ideological framework, strengthened the authority of the state and furthered 
power concentration, and finally re-imposed state-control over strategic sectors of the 
economy. These reforms contrasted with Boris Yelstin’s more liberal governance, and were 
welcomed by the Chinese, who saw Putin “as the type of leader who could bring stability and 
restore order to Russia”.247 These reforms eventually brought Russia closer to China in terms 
of polity, state-business relationship and ideology.  
 
The comparative analysis of Russia and China’s transformation process indicates on 
the one side possible interactions, with China and Russia acting “as if” they were (positively 
or negatively) imitating each others, and on the other side it shows clear tendencies of 
convergence in polity and state-business relationship outcomes. Drawing a simple causal link 
between the two observations is tempting, but it would neglect the complex nature of the 
causality relationship and its implications. The first process of negative lesson-drawing, which 
China initiated towards Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, clearly 
explains the initial diverging evolution of power concentration, with Russia becoming more 
liberal politically while China froze its transformation process (until 1992). Negative lesson-
drawing, during that period, entailed the construction of non-cooperative understandings, 
which were internalised in polity too. After 1992, negative lesson-drawing also played a role 
in Chinese domestic politics, as it oriented transformation exclusively towards the economy. 
Only in the late 1990s and in the 2000s, as positive interactions took place between Russia 
and China, did the respective polities of the two states transform in a positive mutually-
reinforcing way, which paved the ground to more cooperation and deeper collective identity 
formation. The process that interlinked interactions with convergence in this period was 
driven by imitation and social learning. Imitation, whereby “identities and interests [were] 
acquired […] when actors adopt[ed] the self-understandings of those whom they perceive as 
successful”,248 enabled Russia to identify itself with China. Russia was aware of China’s 
economic performance and domestic stability; it necessarily had to compare its own poor 
record in the economy and weak success in politics with those globally much more glorious of 
China. Simultaneously, social learning played an important role in transforming Russia and 
China identities. In the 1990s, Russia’s “reflected appraisals” mirrored in China’s 
representations, i.e. those of a weak state subdued to Western influences, suffering from 
economic turmoil, lost legitimacy and downgraded international status, certainly contributed 
to determine the reorientation of Russian domestic polity under Vladimir Putin. Consequently, 
imitation and social learning can be identified as driving forces that “tended to make 
populations more homogenous”, 249  by fostering convergence in polity and state-business 
relationship, although their precise importance relative to other factors, such as independent 
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problem-solving, cannot be determined here. It could be argued, indeed, that Vladimir Putin 
solely drew lessons from its own experience of transformation, and responded to the problems 
inherited from Boris Yeltsin’s years independently from any reflected appraisal. With Russia 
fully unaware, or completely ignoring China, convergence polity and state-business 
relationship would not be the consequence of social learning or imitation, but a mere 
historical coincidence. This argument will be dissipated later in this thesis, as I will establish 
that convergence was multidimensional.  
 
Now that the relationship between interactions and convergence is cleared, I may 
conclude on the significance of our findings for collective identity formation and cooperation. 
Convergence in polity in state-business relationship implies growing uniformity in power 
structures, intrinsic identities and objective interests between Russia and China (e.g. growing 
polity isomorphism). As the process is possibly sustained through imitation and social 
learning, it rests on the construction of mutual understandings, which is constitutive of the 
formation of Sino-Russian collective identity.250 Convergence in polity and state-business 
relationship indicates in particular the internalisation of these mutual understandings, i.e. 
growing vertical density in collective identity formation, which validates my hypothesis. To 
sum up, convergence in polity and state-business relationship since the 2000s is a driving 
force of Sino-Russian rapprochement during this period. Similarly, divergences in polity in 
the early 1990s constituted a motive of withheld cooperation.  
 
 
4.2. Sino-Russian ideational convergence in international politics 
 
In this part, I will research the degree of transversal density in Sino-Russian collective 
identity formation. I will assess the construction of normative understandings vis à vis the 
current world order and major international concerns, and measure Sino-Russian foreign 
policy alignment in international politics. This will enable us to conclude whether, and to 
what extent, ideational convergence is a driving force of Sino-Russian rapprochement. 
 
4.2.1. Methodology 
 
The first part of the analytical work will be dedicated to defining and understanding 
the intersubjective socio-cognitive content of Sino-Russian doctrine of “strategic partnership” 
in security and geopolitical matters. To that end, I will apply critical discourse analysis, based 
                                                 
 
250 A further path of research could be dedicated to understanding more precisely the mutual learning and the 
interactions (e.g. imitation) that characterised Sino-Russian relations during this period, based on the study of 
Chinese and Russian first source documents.  
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on the writings of Norman Fairclough (2001, 2003)251, Siegfried Jäger (2004)252 and Teun A. 
van Dijk (2001).253 Critical discourse analysis is a “theory or a method which is in a dialogical 
relationship with other social theories and methods”.254 As it views discourse a “moment of 
social practice”, i.e. an important element of social construction, which is constitutive of 
reality, its theoretical and methodological frameworks can easily be combined with 
constructivism. Critical discourse analysis usually focuses on the study of “the role of 
discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse and domination”.255 But this 
application is not the only one. Critical discourse analysis can be applied to any social 
practice that is being socially reproduced or transformed, and contains a semiotic element (e.g. 
any form of meaning-making, as language). And as “every practice has a semiotic 
element”,256 critical discourse analysis can virtually deconstruct any type of relationship. This 
particular feature of critical discourse analysis stems from the role that discourses play in the 
social process of identity construction. Just as ideologically biased discourses seek to 
“polarize the representation of us (ingroups) and them (outgroups)”, 257 discourses in general 
always seek to transform or shape representations of the Self and the Other. This process 
implies the reproducing or transforming of “social construction of practices, including 
reflexive self-construction” i.e. the “me”, and the reproducing or transforming of social 
institutions, as notably here the “current world order”. In other words, critical discourse 
analysis may help identifying Sino-Russian mutual representations, understandings and 
knowledge, as well as their shared attitude towards each other and the current world order. 
Thereby in will be useful in order to demonstrate the degree of Sino-Russian normative 
convergence, i.e. growing similarities in Russia and China’s mutual and shared attitudes.  
 
In order to fully address both aspects of the question, I will research two texts: The 
China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order (dated 2005, reproduced in annex 
2, and abbreviated as J.S.), 258  and the Treaty for Good Neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation (dated 2001, reproduced in annex 2, and abbreviated as T.F.C.).259 The choice of 
these two texts is justified by their particular function and significance. The first one presents 
a joint vision of the world order and answers the question “what”; the second provides a legal 
                                                 
 
251 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research, (London; New York: 
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framework for bilateral strategic cooperation, and answers the question “how”. The critical 
discourse analysis of these two texts will finally be put in perspective of other scholarly 
findings.  
 
In the second part of this analytical work, I will confront Sino-Russian semiotics and 
dialogical relationship with the praxis of Russia and China’s foreign policy. I will analyse 
quantitatively Russia and China’s voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly and 
highlight foreign policy alignment in world affairs. This result will be put in the perspective 
of the previous findings to support the argument of Sino-Russian ideational convergence in 
international politics. In addition, I will research qualitatively Russia and China’s response to 
some important geopolitical crises these last ten years in order to illustrate my conclusion.  
 
4.2.2. Sino-Russian normative convergence in semiotics 
 
Critical discourse analysis recommends a four-step discourse examination.260 First the 
institutional framework of the text, i.e. the pre-existent factors that played a role in the 
emergence of the text, should be studied. This includes the social, economic and political 
environment, which prevailed as the text was being formulated. This is important in order to 
understand and interpret the text without setting aside conditions that participated to its 
genesis. The second step consists in research the semantic macrostructures of the text, i.e. the 
global meanings and topics that language was to convey in text. This “provides a first, overall, 
idea of what a discourse of corpus of texts is all about, and controls many other aspects of 
discourse”, which are used by the author to exert influence and manipulation over social 
reality. 261  The third step is the examination of local meanings, which have particularly 
important social consequence. Local meanings are the meaning of words, and language-
rhetorical contents attached to them, which the authors do not deem necessary to explain 
thoroughly, because these are assumed to be shared intersubjectively. As they result from a 
mental process of cognitive selection (between which meaning should be further defined, and 
which need not) local meanings betray the socially shared understandings that are underlying 
in the text. Local meanings may contain ideologically biased discourse elements, and 
“implicit meanings […], such as implications, presuppositions, allusions, vagueness”, which 
are part of the mental model intending to have social consequences, although they are not 
explicitly stated in the text.262 The final step of critical discourse analysis consists in the 
interpretation of the findings provided by steps one to three.  
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The T.F.C. is dated 16th July 2001 and the J.S. 1st July 2005. The institutional 
framework of these two texts can easily be deducted from previous analyses. The T.F.C. was 
concluded by Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin as a bilateral treaty in a period of enhanced 
cooperative efforts between Russia and China. These efforts had been strengthened in 
particular under Yevgeney Primakov’s mandate, who advocated in 1998-1999 the creation of 
a Eurasian “strategic triangle”, and later under Vladimir Putin’s mandate, who strove for re-
establishing Russia’s authority in domestic politics and sovereign status in international 
politics. Cooperative efforts were additionally strengthened following geopolitical concerns, 
which fostered Sino-Russian rapprochement: joint opposition to the Nato-led humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, mutual support vis à vis the Second Chechen War in 
opposing international criticisms, and mutual support vis à vis Taiwan…263  Cooperative 
efforts were finally furthered on regional security through the foundation one month earlier, in 
June 2001, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. These cooperative efforts were 
sustained in the following years, so that the J.S. should be seen in continuity of the past, as 
forming the dialogical bulk of Sino-Russian relationship together with T.F.C.264 The J.S. 
emerged in 2005 after almost 4 years of American engagement in Central Asia. Although US 
battlefield was Afghanistan, American presence and influence in Central Asia were broader. 
In 2003 and 2005, the outburst of colour revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan deeply 
concerned Russia and China. These factors, and Vladimir Putin’s growing disappointment 
regarding the US, accompanied the J.S. genesis. Last, the J.S. is not binding, although its 
format strongly resembles that of a treaty. 
 
The semantic macrostructures of the T.F.C. are the following:  
Mtfc1: The parties commit themselves to respect the “Five Principles of peaceful coexistence”, 
i.e. principles of state-sovereignty and territorial integrity (arts. 1, 4, 5), mutual non-
aggression (arts. 1, 2), non-interference in domestic affairs (arts. 1, 3), equality and mutual 
benefit (art. 1) and peaceful coexistence (arts. 1, 6, 7) 
Mtfc2: A threat to one party shall be considered as a threat to the other party (arts. 8, 9) 
Mtfc3: The parties commit themselves to mutually support each other in international fora and 
international organisations, as well as coordinate their position in opposing geopolitical 
threats to world peace, interference in third parties’ domestic affairs, and arms proliferation 
(arts. 11, 12, 17) 
Mtfc4: The parties commit themselves to support the pivotal role of the UN in guaranteeing 
world peace (art. 13). 
Mtfc5: The parties commit themselves to support the political stabilisation of their 
neighbourhoods, e.g. by addressing jointly threats to regional security (arts. 14, 20) 
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Mtfc6: The parties commit themselves to strengthen their bilateral ties through enhanced 
cooperation in various fields (arts. 15, 16, 19, 20, 21) 
Mtfc7: The parties commit themselves to respect their national understanding of Human 
Rights in conformity with their international engagements (art. 18).  
 
This macro-structural analysis shows that the T.F.C. is more than a bilateral treaty 
having strictly bilateral implications. Most of the semantic macro-structures involve third 
parties (e.g. potential aggressors, the world community, the UN, regional actors), and commit 
the parties to adopt certain stances towards them. Strictly bilateral commitments are either 
normative and self-reflective (Mtfc1 and Mtfc7), i.e. they are guidelines for each party’s self-
conduct in dealing with domestic affairs; or they are functional and developmental (Mtfc6), i.e. 
they support the development of mechanisms of enhanced cooperation in certain policy areas.  
 
The semantic macrostructures of the J.S. are the following:  
Mjs1: The best approach of global security is multipolar cooperation, international dialogue 
and multilateralism. A new world order, built on these principles, should be accepted by all, 
and not imposed by some. The role of the UN in this perspective is pivotal (arts. 1, 2, 3, 9, 12) 
Mjs2: Respect of state-sovereignty is a universally recognised principle or norm of 
international law and a fundamental basis upon which interstate relations shall rest, included 
in policy areas such as Human Rights. (arts. 2, 6, 7, 8) 
Mjs3: Globalisation and the current world order convey great inequalities, which should be 
alleviated through sovereign development and respect of national cultures and specificities. 
There is no “clash of civilisation”. (arts. 2, 4, 5, 7, 8) 
Mjs4: Global security shall be promoted through regional integration. Sino-Russian friendship 
greatly contributes to world peace. (arts. 10, 11) 
 
The macro-structural analysis of the J.S. indicates a general/specific and almost 
deductive approach in the text. Russia and China first state their utmost general representation 
of a new world order. They underline the requirement for designing a new world order 
universally accepted by all, which intrinsically requires some degree of multilateralism (Mjs1). 
Then, they propound one principle, which is precisely universal, i.e. state-sovereignty, which 
therefore should be at the core of the new world order (Mjs2). The understanding of state-
sovereignty is subsequently widened so as to include developmental rights, human rights, and 
specific rights stemming from national culture and traditions. Because state-sovereignty is a 
universal principle, then, the right to cultural differences is also universal, included when it 
translates to policy-making and forms of government. State-sovereignty precludes the concept 
of “clash of civilisation”, since cultures should all be respected as sovereign identities of 
nations (Mjs3). In reforming the current world order, Russia and China finally play a central 
role (Mjs3), since their peaceful and exemplary successful relations are precisely built on these 
principles.  
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The study of some local meanings in both texts can already be inferred from the 
macro-structural analysis. I will focus parsimoniously on three thematic local meanings, 
which are the most important in view of demonstrating Sino-Russian normative convergence 
in semiotics vis a vis international affairs. These thematic local meanings can be summed up 
as follows:  
LM1: Russia and China are the respectful Guardians of Universal Principles that are 
scandalously and increasingly violated by the hegemonic nature of the current world order 
LM2: Some universal principles, e.g. human rights, are misused by normative revolutionaries 
in order to weaken the most essential universal pillar of world peace, i.e. state-sovereignty.  
LM3: Russia and China’s quest for a new world order will be best achieved by strengthening 
bilateral cooperation, including in regional politics, and using appropriately institutions and 
mechanisms that are already in place so as to increase Russia and China’s soft power at lower 
costs. Russia and China have a reciprocal responsibility and a mutual interest in that end.  
 
Semantic macrostructures and lexical choices first emphasise an identity-cleavage 
between the “we” (Russia and China), Guardians of the fundamental principles guaranteeing 
global security, and the implied “they” (western-style liberal democracies supporting the 
hegemonic spreading of normative unorthodox thinking). This cleavage is prima facie denied 
in the T.F.C., as arts. 7 and 22 explicitly provide that T.F.C. provisions are “not directed 
against any third country”. But despite this cautious disclaimer (and perhaps because of it too), 
the cleavage is revealingly important. Article 8 of the T.F.C suggests the existence of third 
parties or blocs that may constitute a threat to parties to the treaty, and article 11 more 
precisely states that Russia and China shall oppose “any action of resorting to the use of force 
to bring pressure to bear on others or interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state 
under all sorts of pretexts”. Although the treaty enshrines opposition to “any actions”, what is 
meant is rather “any state”. This is best seen in the J.S., which restating Sino-Russian 
opposition to “the adoption of unilateral action and coercive policy”, nevertheless points out 
that the current social construction of the world wrongly allows the division of countries into 
“a leading camp and a subordinate camp” (art. 2). This “leading camp” is implicitly accused 
of “monopolis[ing] or dominating world affairs” (although explicitly, the J.S. rather blames 
the “international community”, a vague concept, less personified than the mention of “leading 
camp”) (art. 2). Again, the cleavage between “we” and “them” is evoked in art. 7 of the J.S., 
which hints at “social and political systems and models [unfairly] from the outside”, and in art. 
9 (4), which implies that “double standards should [cease to] be adopted”. The formation of a 
semiotic cleavage between the “we” and the “they” contributes to the overall polarisation of 
the conceptual structure of the texts with the ideological objective to de-emphasis “our” 
negative aspects and underline “their” bad features. This process helps the formation of biased, 
polarised relational identity-models, and sustains, as well legitimise, the formation of a 
community of security in the constructivist sense. Mtfc2, Mtfc3 and Mjs4 clearly illustrate this 
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socio-cognitive dynamics, which goes further than a mere pact of non-aggression. In order to 
guarantee Sino-Russian security, the T.F.C. and J.S. implicitly demands that each party sees 
the Other as an extension of the Self in world and regional politics. Article 8 of the T.F.C. 
provides, for instance, that signatories shall refrain from any action which “compromises the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party”, including 
“entering into any alliance or be a party to any bloc”, if such an act constitutes a threat to the 
other. What is implied by Russia and China is to behave empathetically in security matters. 
Empathy is also suggested by the lexical and semantic parallelism (rhetorical anaphora) of 
article 4: “the Chinese side supports the Russian side in its policies of defending the national 
unity and territory of the Russian Federation; the Russian side supports the Chinese side in its 
policies of defending the national unity and territory of the Russian Federation”. And it is also 
underlying to the mutual support each party shall confer upon the other to “make efforts to 
promote the participation of a contracting party in the […] institutions of whih the other 
contracting party is already a member” (article 17).  
 
The formation of a Sino-Russian community of security is actively supported by 
Russia and China. The social construction rests on two functional traits. First, Russia and 
China support the process of socialisation in security matters. The T.F.C aims at strengthening 
bilateral dialogue at all levels (article 10), including with the purpose of solving the last 
border dispute (article 6),265 and furthermore creates mutual obligations in case of external 
aggression: “When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace 
is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is 
confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold 
contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats” (art. 9). This article recalls 
article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty266 and article VIII (3) of the Western European Union’s 
Treaty.267 The implicit content of article 9 of the T.F.C. involves mutual understanding of the 
concepts of “peace”, “threat” and “national interest”. However, the T.F.C. does not go as far 
as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1950, which enshrined a formal 
defensive military-economic alliance, mainly directed against Japan and the US. Nor does it 
go as far as Nato’s and WEU’s articles 5, which enshrine automatic collective self-defence. 
Even though Russia and China today construct mutual understandings in security matters, 
their community of knowledge does not allow them to automate response to potential threat. 
The second functional trait pivotal in the formation of a Sino-Russian community of security 
is Sino-Russian commitment to support the institutionalisation of global security through the 
                                                 
 
265 The border dispute over the Bolshoi islands was eventually settled in 2004.  
266 “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” (art. 4 NATO)  
267 “At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to 
permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this 
threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability” (art. VIII (3) WEU) 
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United Nations, and to a lesser degree, the institutionalisation of regional security through the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This is less surprising than it may seem. Russia and 
China see the United Nations as “the most authoritative and the most universal world 
organisation composed of sovereign states” (art 13 of the T.F.C). The J.S. adds to this 
laudatory description “the most representative […] international organisation, and role and 
functions are irreplaceable”. Accordingly, the United Nations “should play a leading role in 
international affairs and serve as the core for establishing and executing the basic norms of 
international law” (article 3(1) of the J.S.). In fact, however, Russia and China’s support is not 
strictly targeted to the United Nations as a whole, but to two of its pillars: the United Nations 
Charter (arts. 3(1) and 9(4) of the J.S; Preamble and art. 2(1) of the T.F.C). Article 3(1) of the 
J.S. for instance states that “UN peacekeeping operations should be in compliance with the 
aims and principles of the United Nations Charter”. UN peacekeeping operations are notably 
inferred from the UN implied powers, based on article 24 of the UN Charter and the 1949 
Reparation Case. What article 3(1) of the J.S. refers to, therefore, is not a direct framework 
delimiting the use of UN peacekeeping operations, but general principles that are found in 
articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. Article 1(1) of the UN Charter states indeed that the 
“purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end, take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”. 
However, article 2(4) provides a clear prohibition of the use of force, and article 2(7) warns 
that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”. UN 
peacekeeping operations, as they entail the deployment of international troops on the territory 
of a sovereign state, therefore, are explicitly prohibited, unless they are based on the legal 
provision stating that the latter “principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII”. In substance, this means that what Russia and China defend 
through article 3(1) of the J.S. is the Security Council’s monopoly on the legal use of force 
through enforcement measures, based on articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. This leads us 
to the second pillar that is actively supported by Russia and China: the Security Council (art. 
13 of the T.F.C and 3(1) of the J.S.). In the Preamble of the J.S., Russia and China 
acknowledge a “historical responsibility for world peace and development in their capacities 
as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council”. As members of the P5, and 
in accordance with article 27 of the UN Charter, Russia and China have a veto right in all 
subjects submitted to the Security Council, i.e. all matters invoking enforcement actions under 
chapter VII. Therefore, by advocating the strengthening of the United Nations through 
supporting compliance to the UN Charter in the very provisions entrusting the Security 
Council with its monopoly on enforcement measures, Russia and China, in fact, support the 
strengthening of their respective position with regards to the most critical international affairs. 
The J.S. call for “UN-led global system to deal with new threats and challenges on the basis 
of the United Nations Charter” should eventually be understood as a claim for more respect 
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for Russia and China’s international status in international security fora. As for Russia and 
China’s support for the institutionalisation of regional security, the J.S. and T.F.C. implicitly 
mentions the Shanghai Cooperation organisation as a diplomatic, political, and economic 
forum. Article 10 of the J.S. provides that “regional initiatives should promote greater 
openness and effectiveness in trade communities”. They should also jointly address security 
issues, by tackling in particular the “three evils” (art. 20 of the T.F.C.) and promoting the 
“consolidation of stability of the surrounding areas of the two countries” (art. 14 of the 
T.F.C.). Russia and China, thus, distinguish two levels of institutionalisation conducive to the 
formation of a community of security. At the global level, Russia and China defend their 
mutual status; at the regional level, Russia and China defend their joint interest in preserving a 
harmonious environment propitious to their development.  
 
Finally, Sino-Russian community of security formation is fuelled by a normative 
argumentation resting on two principles: challenging the unilateralism of the US (although the 
US is not explicitly addressed); and supporting state-sovereignty as core principle and norm 
of international law and condition sine qua non of sustainable peace. The first principle, 
directed against unilateralism, hegemony and unipolarity has already been studied. In order to 
define itself, a community, e.g. of security, needs defining the Other, as its identity is partly 
composed through relational and reflexive inputs. Challenging US unilateralism through 
polarisation of the “we” and “they”, as we previously highlighted, is therefore a mechanism 
constitutive of Sino-Russian collective identity. The second fundamental normative 
understanding that is shared by Russia and China in the T.F.C. and J.S. is the primacy of 
state-sovereignty in interstate relations. China and Russia refer to the principle of state-
sovereignty no less than six times throughout the T.F.C. and similarly six times throughout 
the J.S. These repetitions indicate the importance of the concept for the normative shaping of 
their relationship and the envisaged new world order. State-sovereignty is invoked in a way 
(and even a wording) consistent with provisions of the UN Charter. For instance, the UN 
Charter states that “the Organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality” (art. 2(1)). 
Likewise, “sovereign equality” is invoked by Russia and China with respect to Human Rights 
(art. 6 of the J.S.), development right (arts. 8 of the J.S.), international negotiations art. 9 of 
J.S.), and belongs to the five principles guiding Sino-Russian relations (arts. 2 of the J.S. and 
1 of the T.F.C.). Sino-Russian normative commitment to state-sovereignty is constructed as a 
universal condition to guarantee world peace and global stability. It is then understood in 
contrast with the practice propagated by the dominating powers of illegal interference in 
weaker states’ domestic affairs. Such a practice, Russia and China argue, are vectors of 
ideological destabilisation in world politics, and denounced as such. It follows that the 
construction of intersubjective understandings between Russia and China, e.g. regarding 
human rights, are not shared with dominant powers as the US. Respect of human rights is 
recognised and advocated in the T.F.C and J.S. However, as a normative construction, i.e. 
only existing in the realm of social reality, human rights are subdued to the universal and 
 - 103 -
fundamental principle or norm of international relations, i.e. state-sovereignty (art. 18 of the 
T.F.C. and art. 6 of the J.S.). This implies no normative equal-footing, but in case of colliding 
interests, the prevalence of the latter over the former.  
 
The critical discourse analysis of the T.F.C and J.S. indicates that Sino-Russian 
dialogical relationship is constitutive of collective identity formation. Building on a 
community of security, Russia and China clearly identify a relational common identity, and 
polarise the cleavage between the “we” (Russia and China) and the “they” (presumably the 
Western style liberal democracies epitomised by the US hegemon). The “we”, which 
enmeshes the “Selves” through collective rights and duties, is conceived as an extension of 
the Self, not only the sum of the Selves. Local meanings in discourse betray two functional 
traits, which underlay Sino-Russian collective identity formation: socialisation (trans-national 
communication) and institutionalisation of global security. Collective identity formation in 
security issues is finally nourished by Sino-Russian normative alignment with respect to two 
sets of dichotomies: multilateralism instead of unilateralism, and equal sovereignty instead of 
interference in domestic affairs. These findings are important to highlight the normative 
shaping of the Sino-Russian multidimensional relationship: they illustrate that rapprochement 
is not merely issue-driven, but encompasses the construction of broad mutual understandings. 
This already indicates a certain degree of transversal density in collective identity formation, 
which I will research more in depth through quantitative methods in the next part of this 
chapter.  
 
4.2.3. Sino-Russian convergence in foreign policy  
 
The concept of foreign policy convergence can be defined as an increase in cross-
national foreign policy similarities over time.268 It should be distinguished from organisational 
isomorphism, whereby growing similarities in structures, caused by a variety of factors, lead 
to an independent increase in cross-national policy similarities. The study of foreign policy 
convergence focuses on the alignment of policy characteristics, and not on growing 
organisational similarities between two states’ polities or power structures. Convergence 
primarily constitutes the result of a process, i.e. a movement from different positions towards 
a common point. Foreign policy convergence, therefore, should be distinguished from 
uniformity, as it refers to becoming alike rather than being alike. The intensity of “becoming 
more alike” is indicated by the degree of foreign policy convergence.269  
                                                 
 
268 Christoph Knill (2005) distinguishes σ-convergence, whereby there is a “decrease in variation of policies 
among the countries under consideration”; β-convergence, whereby “laggard countries catch up with leader 
countries over time”; δ-convergence, whereby “similarity change is operationalised by comparing countries’ 
distance changes to an exemplary model”.  
269 Katharina Holzinger and Christoph Knill, “Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence”, 
Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 12, Issue 5, 2005) 
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The shift from rivalry to “strategic partnership” conducted by Russian and Chinese 
elites throughout the 1990s implied that both countries should carry out mutually-supporting 
actions in world politics in order to strengthen their respective position relative to the 
dominating powers, e.g. the US hegemon. This commitment is enshrined in a number of non-
binding declarations and legal acts. Article 11 of the J.S. provides that Russia and China “are 
determined to make unremitting joint efforts […] to build a world that is developed and 
harmonious”, and that in this perspective, “the practice of Sino-Russian relations attests to the 
vitality of the principles enunciated in this statement”. The T.F.C. is even more precise as to 
which efforts should be sustained in order to support the normative development of Sino-
Russian principles: The parties shall “co-ordinate their stand on bilateral ties and on important 
and urgent international issues of common concern” (art. 10); they shall “work together for 
maintenance of global strategic balance and stability and make great efforts in promoting the 
observation of the basic agreements relevant to the safeguard and maintenance of strategic 
stability” [i.e. state equal-sovereignty] (art. 12); they shall in particular “ strengthen their 
cooperation in the United Nations” (art. 13), and support each other’s membership to 
international organisations (art. 17). Based on these discourses and mutual commitments, I 
will assess in this part to what extent political will has been translated into concrete and 
measurable actions over the past 20 years, i.e. to what extent normative convergence in 
semiotics has been operationalised in foreign policy. I will then scrutinise the causal 
mechanisms in order to identify which causes are consistent with my hypotheses.  
 
Russia and China, as two sovereign States, do not have an integrated executive organ 
responsible for the conduct of a common foreign policy. Decisions are taken autonomously in 
Moscow and Beijing, although both states agreed to regularly consult each other, and drew 
some political guidelines with respect to world order, peace and stability. The hypothesis of 
isomorphism in foreign policy structures is therefore weak, and I shall rather focus on that of 
foreign policy convergence, i.e. on policy characteristics rather than organisational ones. In 
order to illustrate the extent to which Sino-Russian foreign policy positions converged these 
last two decades, I will study their respective voting behaviour in the United Nations General 
Assembly since 1986. The UN General Assembly cannot pass binding acts,  but only 
recommendations. 270 The positive implication is that recommendations are associated with 
lower political stakes than binding acts, thus allowing states to express their views more freely. 
This guarantees a higher strategy-proofness than those highly politicised interactions in the 
Security Council, where legally binding acts are passed under Chapter VII.271 Furthermore, 
                                                 
 
270 The only binding acts that the UN General Assembly can pass are budget resolutions of the GA (art. 17 UN 
Charter) and appointment of the Secretary General of the UN Secretariat (art. 97 UN Charter). For the UN 
General Assembly Rules of Procedures on voting, see rules 124 to 127.  
271 Researching foreign policy convergence in the UN Security Council is not only less strategy-proof, due to 
higher political stakes, but it may be highly misleading, as the Security Council’s permanent members (P5) 
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the draft resolutions submitted to the UN General Assembly cover a very broad range of 
geopolitical, economic, social, legal, environmental, military and financial issues, from the 
prevention of arms race in outer space (e.g. R/41/59D) to the support of Human Rights (e.g. 
R/42/69G, R/46/46I) and the promotion of a right to food or development (e.g. R/57/226, 
R/57/223). It is therefore a valuable source of data to analyse long-run tendencies in foreign 
policy convergence, and more generally in cross-national ideational convergence. In order to 
make the quantitative analysis more pertinent, three dyadic relationships will be studied: 
Russia v. China’s voting; Russia v. US’s voting; and China v. US’s voting.  
 
Figure 8 shows the yearly percentage of recorded votes where a dyadic consensus was 
reached for each pair of voters. Dotted lines represent the corresponding linear regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
having veto right, almost always refrain from putting a question to the vote if they are sure that it will be vetoed. 
Thus, in the Security Council vote record archives, there is little evidence of Russia or China’s disagreement 
with the US over the 1999 Kosovo war or 2003 intervention in Iraq, as the US, knowing it would face a veto, 
refrained from proposing a vote, and chose to act outside the UN legal framework through Nato in the first case, 
and through a “coalition of the willing and able” in the second case. In addition to votes which did not take place, 
a research of Sino-Russian voting behaviour in the UN Security Council should also take into account 
abstentions as a political tool, either for tacit agreement or moderate opposition. Practice in the UN Security 
Council provides that abstention does not constitute a veto (see Namibia Case). Interpreting abstention, therefore, 
can be discretionary in a quantitative analysis, but not taking it into account neglects an important way of 
expressing foreign policy. This is all the more the case in the case of China, which so far only used its veto four 
times (see annex 5), and uses abstention in the Security Council as a foreign policy strategy. For related research 
see Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Voting Behaviour in the UN Security Council”, China Brief (Vol. 6, Issue 18) 
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Figure 8: Russia, China and US voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly (1986-2008) 
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The first striking observation is the constantly much higher degree of uniformity in 
Sino-Russian voting behaviour in comparison with the lower degrees of uniformity 
characterizing Russo-US and Sino-US voting behaviours. According to Annex 4, in average, 
Russia and China voted identically in 70,3% of the draft proposals submitted to the General 
Assembly, whereas the US position corresponded to that of Russia and China respectively in 
only 19,9% and 11,8% of the votes. In other words, Russian and Chinese foreign policy are 
much more aligned with each other than with the US. Secondly, Figure 8 shows that since 
1993 onwards, the percentage of identical votes cast by Russia and China increased from 
38,5% to 76,6%. This clearly indicates Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence in the UN 
General Assembly. Conversely, from 1996 onwards, Russia and the US displayed increasing 
divergences in their voting behaviour. The percentage of Russo-American consensus dropped 
from 37,8% to 10,4%. As for the China v. US dyad, Figure 8 shows that consensus never 
exceeded 20% of the votes (reached in 1996), and lays today at a 9%-level. Over the past 20 
years, China never really aligned its foreign policy with the US, nor did the US with China. 
Both kept diverging ideational understanding of world affairs.  
 
Figure 8 is also instructive in understanding the evolution of Sino-Russian relationship. 
Between 1986 and 1989, the degree of Sino-Russian ideational convergence in foreign policy 
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was relatively high, with more than 80% of identical votes recorded. This can be explained by 
the process of normalisation of political ties launched between the two socialist states in 1986. 
However, Russian and Chinese foreign policy positions sharply diverged between 1989 and 
1993, precisely as Russian and US positions started to converge. The underlying motive was 
Russia’s fledgling (and revolutionary) commitment to the American understanding of 
democracy and market-economy, a vision that China did not share, especially after the 
Tiananmen Protests of May 1989. This decline in Sino-Russian mutual normative 
understanding, illustrated here in foreign policy, echoes the observation previously made that 
China did not reciprocate Russian State-visit until 1993. Gorbachev’s State-visit in 1989 took 
place during the Tiananmen demonstrations, and turned out very embarrassing for the CCP 
leadership, as demonstrators interpreted it as a sign of support for their pro-democratic 
movement. Students openly referred to Gorbachev as a “vigorous symbol of political 
liberalisation”, and were “not only motivated by […] his reforms, they actually hoped that he 
would intervene on their behalf with the CCP leadership to bring about further reform in their 
own country”.272 In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese Communist Party’s 
leadership shifted in favour of the hardliners’ faction of Premier Li Peng, who remained 
extremely hostile towards the demokratizatsia, glasnost and perestroika processes launched in 
the Soviet Union. Li Peng criticised Gorbachev for not being “in conformity with true 
Marxism-Leninism”, arguing that “democracy should not be implemented too rapidly and that 
China would not mechanically copy the policies adopted in the Soviet Union”.273  More 
importantly, the Chinese leadership expressed deep concerns about the gradual crumbling of 
the Soviet Union’s world. When Ceausescu and his wife were executed, local observers recall 
that the Chinese leaders panicked. This was all the more understandable since the Soviet 
Union’s crumbling echoed the Chinese saying that “the Soviet Union’s today will be our 
tomorrow”.274 From 1989 onwards, the Chinese leadership remained thus extremely cautious 
and suspicious towards its Russian counterpart, and feared the contagion or destabilisation 
effect. As President Hu Jintao noted in 2004, “glasnost and pluralism caused the entire 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the people to fall into chaos. The Soviet 
Union and the CPSU collapsed under the impact of his westernisation and bourgeois 
liberalisation”.275 Only in the late 1992 did the situation improve, following Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour, which gave a new impetus to the “Reform and Opening Up” Policy. This was 
translated into renewed foreign policy convergence from 1993 onwards. Parallel to the 
improvement of Sino-Russian ideational understanding in foreign policy, Russo-American 
understandings deteriorated from 1996 onwards, according to Figure 8. The socio-economic 
                                                 
 
272 Christopher Marsh (2005), p. 104 
273 Ibid. 105 
274 In Chinese: “苏联的今天就是我们的明天”. This saying was first popularised by Mao Zedong in his essay: 
“The Greatest Friendship”, People’s Daily, 9 March 1953. 
275 Cited in Christopher Marsh (2005), p.108. For an account of China’s perception of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, see chap. 5 
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disaster caused, or amplified, by the shock therapy strongly supported by the US 
administration gradually de-legitimised the western models of market economy, and liberal 
democracy altogether. Moreover, despite Russia’s desire to improve its relationship with the 
US through its participation to stabilising Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, divergences and 
rivalries reappeared on how to conduct operations on the ground. Tensions grew under 
Yevgeny Primakov’s mandate and culminated for the first time since the end of the Cold war 
in the context of the Kosovo crisis in 1999.  
 
More specifically, Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence acted as a driving force 
for joint or similar position-taking vis à vis major geopolitical crisis. In 1999, Russia and 
China opposed the Nato-led Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia and prevented the 
voting in the Security Council of enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry harshly criticised the Nato-coalition’s use of “any pretext to 
interfere in the internal affairs of a country” through “random actions that circumvent the UN 
Security Council”. Furthermore, it stressed the “right of each country to voluntarily choose its 
own path of development”.276 Likewise, the Russian Ambassador Lavrov declared at the 
United Nations that “attempts to apply other standards to international law and to disregard its 
basic norms and principles create a dangerous precedent, which could cause a shanty 
stabilization and chaos on a regional and global level. If we do not put an end to this very 
dangerous trend, then the virus of unilateral, illegal approaches could spread, not only to other 
regions, but to other areas of international relations, in addition to questions of peace and 
security”.277 Similarly, Russia and China expressed their joint opposition to the decision of the 
International Criminal Court to indict the Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Russia argued that it “sets a dangerous precedent in 
international relations”, while China declared that it is “deeply worried” about this 
“interfere[nce]” in the “overall peaceful situation in Darfur and Sudan”. 278 In addition, Russia 
and China supported their respective interventions, at the very least tough ones, in re-
establishing domestic order. For instance, during the Second Chechen War, Jiang Zemin 
declared that he “understands and supports the efforts made by Russia in safeguarding 
national unity and territorial integrity”.279 In the Georgian crisis in August 2008, China, facing 
a political dilemma owing to its complex relationship with Taiwan, did not openly criticise 
                                                 
 
276 “China, Russia Lead Opposition to Nato Bombing”, UN Wire (25/03/2009) 
<http://www.unwire.org/unwire/19990325/1669_story.asp> [17th March 2009] 
277 Ibid.  
278 This warning was voiced by the Russian Pressidential Envoy to Sudan, Mikhail Margelov, is cited in 
“International Criminal Court issues arrest warrant for Sudan’s leader”, Novosti Russian News & Information 
Agency (04/03/2009), <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090304/120424636print.html> [05th March 2009]. “La Chine 
s’oppose au mandate d’arrêt contre Bachir”, Le Figaro (04/03/2009) and “China regretful, worried about Sudan 
President arrest warrant”, Xinhuanet News (05/03/2009); 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200903/05/content_10946492.htm> [05th March 2009];  
279 “Yeltsin wins Chinese Support on Chechnya”, Associated Press (09/12/1999), 
<http://archive.seacoastonline.com/1999news/12_9_w1.htm> [18th March 2009] 
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Russia, but kept a low profile, merely “hoping that all parties can resolve the issue through 
dialogue and consultation”.280 Regarding the outburst of riots in Tibet at the eve of the Beijing 
Olympic Games, Russia reiterated its support to China, declaring: “we hope that the Chinese 
authorities will take all necessary measures to stop illegal actions and provide for the swiftest 
possible normalisation of the situation. […] Russia has repeatedly declared that it views Tibet 
as an inalienable part of China, and considers the resolution of relations with the Dalai Lama 
to be an internal matter of the People’s Republic of China”.281 Finally, Russia and China 
aligned their foreign policy discourse in opposing the US plans to develop a Theatre Missile 
Defence (TMD) system in Asia-Pacific. They also sought to circumscribe the US influence in 
Central Asia and prevent the related spreading of the colour revolutions by institutionalising 
the Shanghai Five process, upgraded into Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001, 
officially with the purpose of combating the “three evils”282. Intensive pressures exerted on 
Kyrgyzstan through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation for the closure of the US Manas 
Airbase are illustrative of Sino-Russian consensus on regional security issues.  
 
4.2.4. Ideational convergence and collective identity formation 
 
Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence in the UN General Assembly and in postion-
taking vis à vis important geopolitical concerns does not imply foreign policy uniformity at all 
levels. Russian and Chinese positions are still diverging in some 20% of the cases presented 
to the UN General Assembly, and are colliding in some particular cases outside the scope of 
the General Assembly (e.g. regarding the Georgian crisis and, to a more limited extent, 
regarding negotiations with North Korea). However, Sino-Russian foreign policy does 
converge to a significant degree (see Figure 8 and annex 4).  
 
Policy convergence can be generated by a variety of the causal mechanisms.283 These 
are for instance independent problem-solving, which arise when similar but independent 
responses emerge to parallel problem pressures (e.g. aging population); or imposition, which 
results from both “formal and informal [political] pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations upon which they are dependent”. Imposition refers then to “direct coercive 
transfers” (e.g. voluntary exports restraints), or “conditionality” (e.g. EU accession 
process). 284  Neither independent problem-solving, nor imposition explain satisfactorily 
negative and then positive changes in similarity vis à vis Sino-Russian voting behaviour in the 
                                                 
 
280 “Cautious China Concerned Over Georgia”, Javno (28/08/2009), <http://www.javno.com/en-world/cautious-
china-concerned-over-georgia_176483> [18th March 2009] 
281 Foreign Ministry declaration cited in “Russia Supports China Over Tibet”, Associate Press (17/03/2008), 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/17/europe/EU-GEN-Russia-China.php> [18th March 2009] 
282 The “three evils” are defined by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as international terrorism, ethnic 
separatism and religious fundamentalism 
283 Katharina Holzinger (2005) and Christoph Knill (2005) 
284 Ibid. 
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UN General Assembly. Neorealists would possibly argue that foreign policy convergence is 
structurally determined by systemic balance of power. Thus, convergence is derived from 
independent problem-solving, whereby Russia and China both facing hegemonic threat from 
1991 onwards, necessarily make converging decisions in order to oppose the US. Although 
such argument seems to explain Sino-Russian behaviour prima facie, it does not explain 
Russo-American foreign policy convergence in the early 1990s until 1996. Nor does it explain 
the relative improvement of Sino-US foreign policy alignment between 1990 and 1999. 
Moreover, Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence in the UN General Assembly is not 
limited to foreign policy convergence vis à vis the US. As seen, proposals in the UN General 
Assembly cover a much wider spectrum of issues, for which the US hegemony in world 
politics is little, if not, relevant. Interpreting Sino-Russian convergence in the UN General 
Assembly as merely determined by a common opposition to the US would thus be a reductive 
conclusion. As for the second causal mechanism, i.e. imposition, it is highly doubtful that 
neither China, nor Russia considers itself as a subordinate to the other. Treaties and 
declarations conversely stress Russia and China’s “equality”, “mutual benefit” and non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs”285. Therefore, even though political pressures may 
occasionally be exerted on one of the “strategic partner” by the other (e.g. in order to prompt 
support by China of Russia’s military campaign in South Ossetia), imposition does not 
constitute a casual driving force in Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence.   
 
Another further causal mechanism for policy convergence is international 
harmonisation derived from compliance with legal obligations (e.g. trade liberalisation in the 
framework of WTO law). According to this mechanism, Russia and China’s foreign policies 
would converge because both states have to comply with articles 12, 13 and 17 of the T.F.C. 
This legalist interpretation of compliance, however, falls short of empirical evidence in our 
case. It relies on the assumption that compliance is motivated by the will to avoid certain costs 
related to non-compliance. These costs may be pecuniary (e.g. economic sanctions) or hit the 
reputation of the non-complier (e.g. through black listing, public denunciation). In extreme 
cases, costs may also be imposed on the very existence of the contracting states (e.g. through 
invasion, which entails not only economic appropriation, but also territorial and political). But 
unlike the UN Charter, the EU Treaties, the WTO Treaty, or Multilateral Environmental 
Treaties, none of Sino-Russian bilateral legal texts creating obligations in foreign policy 
contain non-compliance procedures. Nor do they create institutional structures responsible for 
tackling non-compliance cases.286 Furthermore, articles 12, 13 and 17 of the T.F.C. do not 
                                                 
 
285 These are some of the Five Principles upon which the J.S. and T.F.C. were established.  
286 Non-compliance procedures and institutional structures are provided in the UN Charter by chap. VI and VII, 
as well as art. 25 (power to take binding decisions in the Security Council, including the creation of Sanctions or 
Compensation Committees or International Criminal Tribunals) and art 5, 6 (suspension, termination of 
membership). Non-compliance procedures are weaker in the EU Treaty, as foreign policy is part of the CFSP 
(intergovernmental) pillar. But non-compliance procedures exist in the EC Treaty in order to guarantee the 
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create specific obligations upon which charges of non-compliance could be brought. Last but 
not least, specific details on the particular positions to be defended jointly by Russia and 
China are provided in non-binding texts, as the J.S., which are out of the application field of 
the international harmonisation causal argument for policy convergence. Under such 
circumstances, it is not possible to identify legal compliance as driving force of Sino-Russian 
foreign policy convergence.  
 
One more causal mechanism may explain foreign policy convergence, i.e. trans-
national communication. Trans-national communication is based on shared knowledge, and 
contains various processes such as lesson-drawing, trans-national problem-solving and 
emulation of policies, which are of particular importance in a constructivist analysis. Lesson-
drawing is based on “a voluntaristic process whereby government A learns from government 
B’s solution to a common problem what to do [positive borrowing] or what not to do 
[negative borrowing]”. I previously pointed out that Russia and China’s polity converged 
(growing polity isomorphism) following such process. Lesson-drawing, and more specifically 
negative borrowing, plausibly also played an important role in Russia’s foreign policy dis-
alignment vis à vis the US in the late 1990s. Yevgeney Primakov’s doctrine contrasted then 
with that of Boris Yeltsin’s, and aimed at re-establishing Russia’s status in world politics by 
refocusing on Russia’s regional “chasse gardée” in Central Asia. In the aftermath of 9/11, 
Putin broke up with Yevgeney Primakov’s doctrine: he allowed the stationing of US military 
at the Manas airbase in the Kyrgyz “near abroad”, granted over-flight rights to US non-
military freight in support of the UN-mandated ISAF in Afghanistan, assisted the US with 
search and rescue operations, engaged in intelligence cooperation, and established the Nato-
Russia Council in 2002.287 This change in Russian foreign policy can be observed in Figure 8 
through the rise in the share of identical votes cast by Russia and the US in 2003. It is 
accompanied by a stagnation of Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence between 2001 and 
2003, mainly because China did not agree on concessions made by Russia to the US in 
Central Asia (e.g. regarding over-flight rights and the creation of the US airbase in Manas). 
However, this tendency did not last, as Vladimir Putin quickly realised that his gestures 
towards the US were not rewarded: On the Iraqi question in 2003, the US did not consult the 
Russians; besides, the US lobbied against the joint Nato-Russia Council, ordered planes to fly 
over Georgia, imposed steel quotas on Russia and encouraged Radio Liberty’s broadcasts in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Common Market, and the Economic and Monetary Union. These procedures place community-policy under the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (arts. 230, 232, 226, 228, 292 of the EC Treaty). Note that the 
Lisbon Treaty virtually extends the scope of the ECJ jurisdiction to the CFSP. Non-compliance procedures are 
thoroughly provided in WTO law by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which codifies the 
functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body. Finally, non-compliance procedures, with defined tasks for dispute 
settlement bodies, exist in Multilateral Environmental Treaties (e.g. art. 8 of the Montreal Protocol, art. 18 of the 
Kyoto Protocol…) 
287 Andrew Jack (2005), pp. 255-314 
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Ukrainian. 288  Drawing lessons from his disappointment and the position held by China 
regarding the US in the aftermath of 9/11, Vladimir Putin subsequently weakened his ties with 
the US in foreign policy and Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence resumed. 
 
In addition to lesson-drawing, we should not neglect trans-national problem-solving as 
another process underlying the trans-national communication causal mechanism we focus on 
here. Trans-national problem-solving is “driven by the joint development of common problem 
perceptions and solutions to similar domestic problems and their subsequent adoption at the 
domestic level”.289  It requires thus the sharing of normative understandings, upon which 
foreign policy is cognitively constructed, with eventually converging dynamics. In the 
previous part, I demonstrated though critical discourse analysis that Russia and China do 
share mutual understandings regarding the norms and principles that should rule the world 
order. This process of trans-national problem-solving plays an even clearer role at the regional 
level, where Russia and China institutionalised their security policy through the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. It is therefore a crucial driving force underlying trans-national 
communication, and consequently, foreign policy convergence.  
 
The last process based on shared knowledge is the convergence caused by emulation 
of policies, i.e. “driven by the mere desire for conformity with other countries” (mimetic 
isomorphism).290 This process, however, does not seem to describe most correctly the Sino-
Russian relationship in foreign policy. China refused to join the Yevgeney Primakov’s 
Eurasian “strategic triangle” in 1998-1999, and always proved cautious towards the 
traditionally more assertive tone of its counterpart vis à vis the US. On the other side, Russia 
is officially still very careful towards China’s model, even though it emulated some features 
from its polity these last 10 years.291 In foreign policy and geopolitics, Russia and China face 
very different conditions and challenges, which make emulation rather unlikely, and no 
evidence going in this direction are easily found.  
 
In conclusion, we have seen that Sino-Russian foreign policy convergence is mainly 
driven by trans-national communication, i.e. the construction of mutual understandings 
through various mechanisms. In semiotics, the process is driven by socialisation and 
institutionalisation of security issues. All these driving forces participate in the creation of 
mutual understandings regarding geopolitical concerns and the world order, which go beyond 
the mere reactive opposition to the US hegemony. These findings demonstrate that it is 
                                                 
 
288 Ibid. 
289 Katharina Holzinger (2005) and Christoph Knill (2005) 
290 Ibid.  
291 One of the reasons is that Russian proponents of the Chinese model are found in the Russian Communist 
Party, which only plays a minor role in the Duma (communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th 
April 2009]) 
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appropriate to characterise Sino-Russian rapprochement as driven by ideational convergence, 
whereby shared understandings on ideas and norms are prevalent causal factors. Ideational 
convergence implies a high degree of transversal density in collective identity formation, 
since these norms that are collectively developed by Russia and China constitute the 
normative framework according to which each “strategic partner” will act in relation with the 
other (it creates mutual expectations), and possibly too, in domestic affairs (provided these 
understandings are internalised through polity isomorphism).292  
 
 
4.3. Sino-Russian economic interdependence and mutuality of interests 
 
Already in 1994, Russia and China committed themselves to enhance their economic 
relations: by 1999, bilateral trade was to rise from $5bn to $20bn.293 Although this target 
failed to be reached, Russia and China reiterated their will to develop trade in the Treaty for 
Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. Article 16 provides that “the contracting 
parties shall conduct cooperation in such areas as economy and trade, military know how, 
science and technology, energy resources, transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and 
aviation, information technology and other areas of common interest”, including “economic 
and trade cooperation in border areas and local regions between the two countries”. In 2005, 
Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao agreed on an agenda in order to implement this cooperative 
economic policy, and draw lessons from the 1990s trade development failure. The agenda 
includes in particular the “joint elaboration of a medium-term programme for the promotion 
of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in 2006-2010”.294 New trade targets were set 
accordingly in 2007, with Presidents Hu Jintao declaring that “the trade volume of the two 
countries would surely meet the target of 60 billion to 80 billion U.S. dollars by 2010 with 
deepening bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation”.295 
 
The economic dimension of Sino-Russian “strategic partnership”, nevertheless, is still 
considered by most scholars as the Achilles’ heel of Sino-Russian relationship. 296 Not only 
does this weakness allegedly demonstrate the ambiguities of Sino-Russian friendship, but it 
also illustrates its superficiality. In the absence of an “intransigent need for each other”, a 
                                                 
 
292 There is, however, some ambiguity in the relationship between China and the US, which constitutes a limit to 
the ideational convergence between Moscow and Beijing. China, indeed, is highly dependent economically on 
the US, and worries about international campaigns likely to nourish the image of “China Threat”. 
(communication with Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, [30th April 2009]) 
293 Yong Deng (2008), pp. 128-167 
294 Victor Voitenko, “Russian-Chinese Trade and Economic Cooperation: Current Situation, Problems and 
Prospects”, Nato Committee Report 174 ESC 05 E (Annual Session of the Nato Parliamentary Assembly, 2005) 
295 “China-Russia Trade To Hit 60 to 80 bln US dollars by 2010”, People’s Daily Online (26/03/2007), 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/26/eng20070326_360885.html> [18th March 2009] 
296 See for instance Bobo Lo (2008), Richard Weitz (2003) and Nicklas Norling (2007) 
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“healthy assessment of Sino-Russian relations suggests that they were more reactive that 
proactive –emerging more as flexible responses to Western policies”.297 Analysis of Sino-
Russian economic ties supposedly supports the conclusion that “tactical convenience” is the 
underlying motive of Sino-Russian the overall relationship.298 At first sight, the past failures 
that marked Sino-Russian trade development prospects vindicate their claims. However, these 
arguments should not be taken for granted. First, most of them are based on an analysis 
focusing on the 1990s, a period of economic distress in Russia. Second, most analyses are 
carried out on a rational-positivist basis, focusing on the disproportionate mis-optimisation of 
large economic complementarities, which they assess theoretically. This approach enables 
them to highlight discrepancies between potential and actual cooperation, which they attribute 
to political reluctances and distrust. This approach, however, rests on the assumption that 
states and markets intrinsically allocate resources in an optimal way, which they only do in 
theory. In order to better understand Sino-Russian economic relationship, the reverse 
approach should be chosen. Starting from the actual development of Sino-Russian trade and 
economic ties, I will assess the relevance of Sino-Russian strategic economic partnership 
relative to other dyadic relationships, regardless of economic potentials. The causes of non-
optimal maximisation of economic complementarities are not only political, as many scholars 
assume. They stem from market failures (e.g. informational asymmetry), or more importantly, 
they may be identity- or knowledge based. For instance, neorealists are very sceptical towards 
trade interdependence, as it jeopardises state survival. Therefore, they tend to eschew absolute 
gains, accepting Pareto-deficient outcomes, not for political reasons related to the relational 
identity of the potential partner (e.g. friend/foe), but on “structural” grounds, i.e. in line with 
the way social reality is constructed and states interact therein. In the social real world, mutual 
expectations do play an important role in resource allocation. As economic relations are 
subject to “structural constraints” in Alexander Wendt’s constructivist understanding, I will 
admit that trade efficiency is not exogenous to interstate relationships, but is constitutive of 
them. Identity changes, e.g. through collective identity formation, entail the permanent 
redefinition of economic complementarities. Their maximisation, thus, is not purely 
contingent on rational calculations, but rests on cultural and social assumptions, and is also 
determined through cognitive processes.299 In short, the significance of economic relations 
should not be taken out of the social context.  
 
                                                 
 
297 Nicklas Norling “China and Russia: Partners with Tensions”, Policy Perspectives (Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2007) 
298 Bobo Lo (2008), pp.53-55 
299 For instance, the analysis of interstate economic relations rests on the “cultural” or “social” assumption that 
states are primary actors. Economic complementarities and potential trade development are then analysed under 
this lens at a bilateral level, constrained by a social institution, sovereignty, which precludes other types of 
analyses at various levels (e.g. interregional). Yet, maximisation of interstate complementarities does not entail 
maximisation of interregional complementarities. The level of analysis, mostly simply assumed, is a social 
construction, and hence, should not be neglected in the analysis of the significance of economic relationships.  
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The approach chosen in this part of the thesis, therefore will not consist in researching 
economic complementarities between Russia and China, and subsequently underline the weak 
and suboptimal nature of Sino-Russian economic ties. As mentioned, I will first research and 
measure Sino-Russian trade interdependence, regardless of complementarities, and compare 
its relevance with other major trade partners. I will also analyse Sino-Russian trade pattern, 
and focus on important markets (e.g. energy, labour, commodities, arms) both at national and 
regional trans-border levels. The aim of this research, in line with commercial liberal theory 
and constructivism, will consist in identifying to what extent Russia and China construct their 
relationship through mutual interests. Only then will I put these results in perspective of 
economic complementarities in geoeconomics, and research to what extent Russia and China 
operationsalised a shift from relativistic stances towards absolute gains maximisation in the 
2000s. This shift, occurring through strategic interactions, is an important mechanism 
fostering the further construction of a mutuality of interests and the strengthening of the 
collective identity formation process. This dynamics will be analysed by combining game-
theoretical methodology with constructivist interpretations.   
 
4.3.1. Sino-Russian trade pattern and economic interdependence 
 
In 1994 Russia and China agreed to develop bilateral trade by 1999 from US$ 5,1bn to 
US$ 20bn. Russia had considerable raw material reserves, which were dramatically needed in 
the Chinese booming economy, and prospects for mutually beneficial exchanges were 
accordingly very promising. However, Russia’s economic collapse prevented the US$ 20bn-
target to be reached. The sudden liberalisation of prices and the forcible, unregulated 
privatisations of Russian state-owned enterprises, stroke the country’s industrial production 
output very badly (-21% in 1994), and hit Russia’s GDP harshly (-12,7% in 1994). GDP 
growth remained negative between 1992 and 1999, except in 1997, where recovery seemed 
insight before being slashed by the 1998 financial crisis and the collapse of the banking sector 
(see Figure 5). Throughout the 1990s, the major sectors of Russian economy, which were the 
most likely to generate export-produced revenues, suffered from heavy disinvestment. Large 
industries were dismembered to be sold at bargain prices. Supply-chain was disrupted, and 
maintenance work in essential infrastructures could not be carried out satisfactorily owing to 
the deterioration of financing capacities drowned by hyperinflation. Under such circumstances, 
Russia’s export capacity to China could not be developed appropriately, and Chinese exports 
to Russia were limited by Russia’s insolvability. By 1999, Sino-Russian bilateral trade 
consequently amounted to no more than US$ 5,7bn. In deflated terms the increase in trade 
volumes between 1994 and 1999 appears even more ridiculous: it rose from $5,897bn to 
$5,913bn (in 2000 dollars, see annex 6). In a word, Sino-Russian bilateral trade stagnated 
throughout the 1990s, not so much because of mutual distrust or ambivalent interests, but 
mostly because of Russia’s economic slump. As illustrated by Figure 9, bilateral trade growth 
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actually only started in the 2000s, with growth rates as impressive as 30% to 40% per annum. 
Figure 9 also show that bilateral trade growth was not driven by growing energy prices, which 
benefited Russia’s exports, but mainly by Chinese skyrocketing exports to Russia, boosted by 
Chinese weak Yuan and Russia’s strong Rubble. This observation contradicts the argument 
often presented in the literature that Sino-Russian bilateral trade in the 2000s was virtually 
inflated by rising energy prices. The pending implication of China’s contribution to swell 
bilateral trade is the constantly deteriorating trade balance of Russia in favour of China. As 
seen in Figure 9, from 2006, China exported more than Russia, thus shifting Russia’s trade 
balance from a comfortable trade surplus of US$ 5,2bn in 2001 to a large trade deficit of US$ 
8,8bn in 2007.  
 
Figure 9: Sino-Russian Trade 1992-2007 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
source: ow n calculations, IMF Database, China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Bobo Lo
U
S$
 m
ill
io
ns
Chinese exports to Russia Russian exports to China
Total bilateral trade Total bilateral trade (deflated)
 
 
In 2007, Sino-Russian bilateral trade peaked to US$ 48bn, out of which US$ 19,5bn 
were Russian exports to China and US$ 28,5bn were Chinese exports to Russia. Between 
2006 and 2007, China almost doubled its exports to Russia, and became Russia’s 2nd trade 
partner with a trade share of 7,3%. This places China as one of Russia’s major trade partners, 
just after the EU. The EU is indeed Russia’s top trade partner with an impressive trade share 
of 48%, with a volume of trade of US$ 266bn in 2007. At a national level, Germany is 
Russia’s top trade partner (trade share 9,5%, i.e. US$ 52,9bn in 2007). On the other side, 
Russia is also listed in China’s top 10 trade partners, but only at the 7th rank, with a modest, 
though not negligible 2,22%-trade share. The EU remains China’s main trade partner (trade 
share of 16%, i.e. US$ 356bn in 2007), followed by the US (trade share 14%, i.e. US$ 302bn 
in 2007). Hong Kong ranks 4th on this list, although it is difficult to assess the distinctive 
proportion of China’s exports to Hong Kong, as most of these exports are in reality re-
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exported to mainland China.300 These trade relationships are summarised in Figure 10 and 
detailed statistics are found in annex 7.  
 
Figure 10: Russia and China 's Main Trade Partners (volumes, 2007) 
 
 
 
In 2000, Sino-Russian trade amounted to US$ 8bn; this figure was subsequently 
multiplied by 6 within only seven years. In order to assess the significance of this impressive 
trade growth, it should be compared with other relevant bilateral trade relationships, so as to 
identify whether Sino-Russian trade relationship followed a specific developmental path, or 
whether it merely follows the general pattern of growth in international trade driven by 
globalisation and decreasing tariffs.301 Between 2006 and 2007, Sino-Russian bilateral trade 
increased by 44,3%, while bilateral trade between China and the US “only” grew by 15%, 
Sino-Japanese trade by 13,9%, Sino-EU trade by 24% and Sino-South Korean trade by 19,1% 
(see annex 7). This indicates the growing importance of Russia as trade partner for China 
relative to its other partners. This tendency is reciprocal, as Russia increasingly looks 
eastwards in Asian economies to develop its trade. Between 2006 and 2007, trade between 
Russia and China rose by 44,3%, as previously seen. Russo-Japanese trade in the same time 
grew by 64,1% and Russo-South Korean trade by 57,5%. Sino-Russian bilateral trade is 
increasingly significant for Russia and China, also relative to their respective number one 
trade partners. Figure 11 shows that Sino-Russian trade grew at a relatively quick pace 
throughout the 2000s compared to Russia and China’s first trade partners. Among their 
respective top trade partners, Russia and China are then not only important for each other, but 
overall becoming steadily even more important.  
 
                                                 
 
300 This process aims at countervailing the official export regimes, which does not allow selling goods in 
mainland China if these goods were produced for exportation.  
301 N.B.: China is WTO member since 2001, and Russia still holds negotiations in view of its admission.  
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Figure 11: Comparative evolution of Sino-Russian trade (2000-2007) 
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Figure 9 showed the growing importance of Sino-Russian bilateral trade in absolute 
terms, especially throughout the 2000s. This growth is not only generated by the lower levels 
of trade that previously characterised Sino-Russian relationship. Indeed, Figure 10 showed 
that Russia and China have become significant trade partners for each other. Nor is it solely 
driven by globalisation, since Figure 11 shows the growing importance in relative terms of 
Sino-Russian bilateral trade in comparison with other major trade partners. As a matter of fact, 
this analysis of Sino-Russian trade volumes indicates that Sino-Russian “strategic 
partnership” did develop through the absolute and relative improvement of Russia and 
China’s mutual position as trade partners.  
 
The analysis of Sino-Russian trade structure, however, reveals a very asymmetric 
pattern, which Lo Bobo describes as “beginning to acquire a neo-colonial tinge: a 
modernising China exploiting a backward Russia for its energy and timber resources and as a 
market for low-grade goods unsalable in the more discriminating West”.302 And indeed, raw 
materials with low value added account for 65% of Chinese imports from Russia, while 
consumer goods and machinery, with higher value added, constitute the bulk of Chinese 
exports to Russia (more than 80%).303 Russia is China’s first supplier of timber (64,7%), out 
of which 98% is unprocessed. This trade imbalance in the distribution of value-added is a 
major concern for Russia, which would rather develop its export of engineering products (5%). 
Asymmetric development is even stronger in interregional trade. For instance, in 2007, 44% 
of the Khabarovsk Krai exports headed to China, while 55% of the region’s imports 
originated from China. Exports were composed of timber (46,9%) and oil (19,5%), while 
                                                 
 
302 Bobo Lo (2008), p. 85-86  
303 Victor Voitenko (2005) 
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imports were mainly machinery (44%) and textiles (30%).304 In these circumstances, the 
prospect for a balanced trade pattern between Russia and China is unpromising, at least as 
long as Russia does not diversify its economy, e.g. through investments in export-oriented 
timber processing factories or agro-alimentary utilities.305  
 
The critique of the asymmetric pattern of Sino-Russian trade structure should not be 
overstated, though. First, because it cannot be consistently claimed while criticising Sino-
Russian suboptimal trade pattern and un-maximised complementarities. Logically, proponents 
of the latter approach should support further labour division between Russia and China, and 
deem asymmetries in the structure of trade as positive specialisation. Instead, they deem 
critical both asymmetries and non-maximised complementarities, which is paradoxical. 
Second, Russian statistics of exports to China do not take into account arms trade, which 
typically have a high-value added and technological content. Although figures are mostly kept 
secret, it is commonly known that Russia provides China with large amounts of military 
equipment. Between 1990 and 2005, experts’ estimates for Russian total arms sales to China 
range between US$ 20bn and 25bn.306 Owing to an arms embargo imposed on China in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, Russia has become China’s number one arms supplier. 
It accounts for 95% of Chinese arms imports and China accounts for one third to one half of 
the Russian defence industry’s total revenues.307 Arms flows, however, are not likely to 
develop upwards, as Russia sold production license to China, e.g. to build SU-27 fighters in 
Shenyang, and China invests increasingly in R&D in view of producing its own military 
technology. 308  This tendency of producing domestically and developing domestic 
technologies is appears also in statistics: On the one hand they show stable arms imports 
expenditures (between US$ 1,5 to 2bn yearly in the 2000s), and in the other hand, the constant 
growth of Chinese military budget in absolute and relative terms (2,5% of GDP in 2008) 
despite the downsizing of personal costs triggered by the army reform.309 In the middle-term, 
China is still expected to remain Russia’s pivotal arms customer, despite violations by China 
of property rights safeguards and Russia’s reluctance to provide China with some particular 
                                                 
 
304 Bobo Lo (2008), p. 67-69 
305 As a result of the increasing energy prices, Russia suffered from the Dutch disease, whereby the development 
of sectors of the economy beside that of oil and gas could not be as profitable as the latter.  
306 For studies on Sino-Russian arms sales, see Stephen Blank, “Recent Trends in Russo-Chinese Military 
Relations”, China Brief (Vol. 9, Issue 2, January 2009), and more comprehensively, Vitaly I. Vasilev, Russia-
China Military Arms Trade (unpublished Master Thesis, National Sun Yat-sen University of Taiwan) 
307 Konstantin Makienko, “Once the largest customer of Russian weapons, China is rapidly turning into a 
formidable rival in the arms market”, Russia & CIS Observer, (No 4, Issue 23, November 2008) 
308 China already developed a capable air-force, but still lacks the knowledge to build a high-tech navy.  
309 For more details, see the databases of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/databases> [24th March 2009], and that of Nuclear Threat Initiative 
<http://www.nti.org/index.php> [24th March 2009] 
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military technology.310 But the waiving of the embargo on arms sales for other potential 
suppliers as the US, Great Britain and France, could change the odds. Be that as it may, 
declining arms sales to China relative to trade in raw materials would contribute to accentuate 
the asymmetry in Sino-Russian cross-national distribution of value-added.  
 
In my theoretical framework, I identified interest-interdependence as a key driving 
force for interstate cooperation at a strategic level. By meshing or mutually instrumentalising 
their economic interests, interacting states develop shared understandings and mutual 
expectations, which are conducive to shape the dyadic mutuality of interests. This process is 
fundamental to the horizontal formation of collective identity. An effective method to 
measure dyadic interdependence at the macroeconomic level is to resort to trade 
interdependence indicators. Trade interdependence is a mathematical construction which 
quantifies the importance of a given bilateral trade relationship relative to the country’s 
overall trade, or alternatively, relative to the country’s total economy. As presented in annex 8, 
two methods can be used to measure dyadic trade interdependence.311 The first composite 
variable, built on Barbieri’s work, is based on, and derivative from, trade shares calculations. 
It measures whether “a given linkage is valuable, relative to other trade relationships”, 312 thus, 
“treating interdependence as the proportion of bilateral trade to a state’s total trade”. 
According to this method, a 100%-interdependence ratio would characteristic of a dyadic 
relationship in which two states would trade 100% of their exports exclusively with each 
other, and in perfectly symmetric way (both partners trade an equal volume of goods). A zero-
interdependence ratio would characterise a perfectly asymmetric trade relationship (with total 
bilateral trade equating one partner’s imports), or two non-trading partners’ relationship. The 
second composite variable, built on Oneal & Russet’s work, analyse the significance of a 
dyadic trade relationship relative to a state’s overall GDP or performance. It captures the 
“share of the […] economy that is devoted to a particular dyadic trade relationship, suggesting 
the state’s trade dependence on the bilateral relationship”.313 Unlike Baribieri’s method, trade 
dependence measurement seeks to assess the economic importance of a trade relationship for 
the overall GDP regardless of the trade relationships with third-party states. The two methods 
are complementary rather than antagonistic, and measure different dimensions of the 
                                                 
 
310 China sold illegally to India SU-27 fighters that were under Russian license. Russia, on the other hand refused 
to sell to China its last generation of fighters (SU-33 and its ground-based variant SU-35), although it accepted to 
sell them to India. Gerhard Mangott (2008)  
311 For a theoretical analysis of economic and trade interdependence, see Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “Measure 
for Measure: Concept Operationalisation and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict Debate”, Journal of Peace 
Research (Vol. 40, No 5, 2003), pp. 553-571; and Erik Gartzke et al. “Investing in the Peace: Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict”, International Organization (Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring 2001), pp. 391-
438 
312 Erik Gartzke and Quan Li (2003) 
313 Ibid.  
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underlying multidimensional concept of interdependence. 314  For the sake of analytical 
correctness, I will present the results of both methods.  
 
Figure 12 presents the evolution of Russia and China’s trade shares in their respective 
overall trade. As previously seen, Russia accounts for 2,2% of Chinese trade, and China for 
7,3% of Russian trade. But Figure 12 demonstrates that these trade shares have not been 
constant over years: whereas Russia hardly improved its trade share in China until very 
recently, China conquered Russia’s pool of trade partners by doubling its trade share in only 
10 years. Bilateral trade growth, thus, is not only asymmetrical in the cross-national 
distribution of value-added. It is also asymmetrical in the relative and positional importance 
that trade partners acquired for each other over years. In other words, Sino-Russian trade 
development these past 15 years has been mainly sustained and developed by, and in favour 
of, China relative to Russia’s other trade partners. This trade-share asymmetrical development 
is represented graphically in Figure 13 by the green line (trade asymmetry).  
 
Figure 12: Evolution of Russia and China's respective trade shares 
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Barbieri Method (2002)
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Figure 13: Trade Asymmetry and Trade Interdependence 
Oneal & Russet Method (1997)
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Figure 13 also indicates that the level of trade interdependence between Russia and 
China, despite trade asymmetry, grew constantly from 1995 onwards (according to the 
Baribieri’s method), or from 1999 onwards (according to the Oneal and Russet’s method). 
According to annex 9, Sino-Russian trade interdependence was 0,03% in 1995 (Baribieri 
method) and 0,21% in 1999 (Oneal and Russet’s method), versus 0,19% (Baribieri’s method) 
and 0,7% (Oneal and Russet’s method) in 2007. This means that according to the Baribieri 
method, Sino-Russian trade interdependence between 1995 and 2007 was multiplied by 7. 
Alternatively, according to the Oneal and Russet’s method, Sino-Russian trade 
interdependence was multiplied by almost 4 between 1999 and 2007. Differences in timing 
and multiplying factors can be explained by the composition of the economic indicators used 
by each method in the calculation of the trade interdependence. The Oneal and Russet’s 
method, for instance, is more sensitive to trade dyadic openness than the Baribieri’s method, 
as it captures the significance of a dyadic trade relationship relative to the overall economy. 
Between 1992 and 1999, China’s GDP grew by no less than 125%, while Sino-Russian trade 
only grew by 2,4% (constant dollars, 2000 basis, see annex 6). Chinese trade dependence on 
Russia, thus decreased considerably. As trade dependence is positively correlated with trade 
interdependence, this unparalleled growth of China’s GDP relative to dyadic trade resulted in 
the decrease of trade interdependence during the 1992-1999 period. This dimension is not 
reflected in the Baribieri’s calculation, which nevertheless captures that from 1995/1996 
onwards, the Sino-Russian trade relationship became increasingly important in terms of 
respective trade shares. Finally, the difference of levels between the Baribieri’s and Oneal & 
Russet’s methods, with Sino-Russian trade interdependence barely reaching 0,2% in 2007 
according to the first one, and 0,7% according to the second one, is primarily due to the 
multiplicative integration in the first one of the asymmetrical variable, which undermines 
interdependence.  
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Again, the significance of Sino-Russian growing trade interdependence must be 
studied in relation with other dyadic trade relationships. I choose here as benchmarks the 
Sino-US and Russo-German trade relationships, i.e. China’s and Russia’s respective top trade 
partners. Figure 14 and annex 10 present the comparative evolution of the three major dyadic 
trade dependences since 2002. Figure 914 shows first that Sino-Russian trade dependence is 
comparable with Russo-German one, despite the fact that Russo-German trade is 15 to 20% 
larger than Sino-Russian one in absolute terms (in 2007, US$ 52,9bn vs. 48,3bn). Both Sino-
Russian and Russo-German trade dependence are around 0,2%. Second, Sino-US trade 
interdependence is higher, since it was 1,06% in 2007. But trends indicate a sharp decline in 
Sino-US trade interdependence (from 2,13% in 2002 to 1,06% in 2007) and the relative 
stagnation of Russo-German trade interdependence these last two years, whereas Sino-
Russian trade interdependence rose dynamically, and could possibly overrun Russo-German 
one in 2009-2010. 315  This trend is very important for our research, as it implies that Sino-
Russian trade pattern, albeit very asymmetrical, conveys a rather remarkable, significant and 
specific dynamic of trade interdependence growth.  
 
Figure 14: Comparative evolution of trade dependence of relevant dyadic trade partners 
(Baribieri’s Method) 
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315 The significance of trade-interdependence in this case, however, is undermined by the importance capital 
flows between Germany and Russia. Germany is indeed Russia’s first contributor in foreign direct investment. 
This dimension is not integrated in the calculation of interdependence and constitutes a major flaw in the 
indicator’s calculation, which only captures trade in goods and services. In a globalising world, capital mobility 
and the interest-interdependences it generates should preferably not be neglected.  
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As Sino-Russian trade interdependence grows, interest-interdependence similarly 
develops; and the formation of mutual understandings, following a cognitive approach, 
sustains this process. These empirical findings, therefore, does not only indicate that trade 
interdependence is conducive to more cooperation between Russia and China, based on a 
commercial liberal argument. These findings illustrate a deeper-rooted process, that of the 
formation of a mutuality of interests, which is constitutive of collective identity formation. It 
can thus be seen as a specific (horizontal) dimension, which participates, together with the 
other driving forces previously studied, in the formation of a sense of “we-ness”. Mutual 
expectations, upon which rest shared understandings of Sino-Russian collective identity, are 
supported by a cooperative dynamics, which should have led, and still lead to behavioural 
changes in strategic interactions involving mixed-games motives. This is now the dimension I 
shall test in one of the most disputed policy fields, i.e. bilateral and regional energy geo-
economics.  
 
4.3.2. Sino-Russian focal shift towards a mutuality of interests in 
bilateral and regional geo-economics  
 
In very different ways, energy is essential to the rise of Russia and China as re-
emerging powers. It is also fundamental to understand the complexity and presumably 
sometimes ambivalence of the Sino-Russian relationship, as energy is closely intertwined 
with geopolitics and national security. In this part, I will review China’s energy needs now 
and in the future, and focus on oil consumption. I will also briefly analyse other energy 
sources, such as gas and nuclear energy. But I will research in more details Russia’s oil-
supply capacities and point out important energy complementarities. We will see that these 
quasi-ideal complementarities are systematically maximised, although large discrepancies still 
exist between potential and actual cooperation. The repeated failures of oil pipeline projects 
aiming at linking Russia and China illustrate the volatility of Sino-Russian common interests 
in bilateral and regional geoeconomics. They also betray tensions arising from a sense of 
competition in Central Asia, which the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation hardly succeeds in 
mitigating. But we will see that recent developments indicate effort in the identification of a 
mutuality of interests, and a change in attitude with regards to strategic choices in mixed 
motive games.  
 
According to the Chinese government’s White Paper on Energy, China is now “the 
world’s second-largest energy producer and consumer”. 316 With an average GDP growth of 
10,46% p.a., China’s demand for energy has surged rapidly between 1989 and 2007. Today, 
                                                 
 
316 White Paper on Energy, China’s State Council Information Service (December 2007), available in English on 
the China.org.cn Website <http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm> [25th March 2009] 
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30% of the increase in world energy demand comes from China, a trend that is not losing its 
impetus. The International Energy Agency forecasts that the share of China in world primary 
energy demand will rise from 15% today to 20% by 2030.317 These statistics illustrate very 
well why China is increasingly concerned about its energy security, and why it deems 
indispensable to secure reliable, long-term access to energy. Security of energy supply is 
doubly crucial for China: it is indispensable to pursue its economic modernisation, and 
consequently, to sustain the regime’s legitimacy.  
 
Figure 15 shows that China’s primary source of energy is coal (73% of Total Primary 
Energy Supply, TPES). China holds an estimated 126,2bn tonnes of coal reserves, mainly 
located in Northern China. These large verified reserves (13% of world reserves, the third-
largest after the US (27%) and Russia (17%)), suffice to cover China’s coal needs and are 
almost exclusively used for indigenous consumption. China’s coal demand by 2030 is to grow 
only by 2,8%, which will result in a relative decrease in the share of coal in China’s TPES 
from 73% to 47,8% by 2020.318 China’s strategic choice of diversifying its energy mix is 
motivated by diverse reasons: first, China’s coal extraction’s capacity is limited owing to 
inefficient management, insufficient investment and outdated equipment. Second, domestic 
coal reserves, even if optimally exploited, could not secure China’s long-term booming 
demand. Third, ecological concerns, which easily translate into social unrests in a 
predominantly rural society, deter the Chinese leadership from developing the coal sector too 
massively. Already a large CO2 emitter (with 15% of world emission, and the biggest by 
2010), China alone is responsible for 39% of the rise in global emissions.319 China’s second 
source of energy is oil, with a TPES share of 21%, which will reach 31,3% by 2020. The 
growing importance of oil supply, and the role of Russia in this strategic calculation, will be 
analysed below in greater details. Gas only accounts for 2,9% of China’s TPES, a share that 
will rise to 12% by 2020 through a sharp increase in gas imports from Central Asia and 
possibly (or necessarily) Russia. To achieve this, several gas pipeline projects are underway, 
as the Kovykta gas pipeline (export capacity: 20bcm p.a. scheduled for 2011)320 and the 
Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline (export capacity: 20bcm p.a. scheduled for 2011).321 Today, 
China’s gas consumption is almost exclusively met by indigenous production (61,5bcm, i.e. 
98,4% of total gas consumption).322 Finally, China actively promotes the development of 
nuclear energy as a clean and efficient source of electricity, which it links with technological 
                                                 
 
317 World Energy Outlook 2006, International Energy Agency, available on the IEA Website 
<http://www.iea.org/> [25th March 2009] 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid.  
320 BNK-BP Website, “Kovykta Project” <http://www.tnk-bp.com/operations/exploration-
production/projects/kovykta/> [25th March 2009], Bobo Lo (2008) 
321 Alexander Sukhanov, “Caspian Oil Exports Heading East”, Asia Times (09/02/2005) 
322 Ibid. 
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development and foreign investment.323 Although nuclear energy in 2006 only accounted for 
0,9% of TPES, this share is likely to grow substantially in the future. Today, China has 11 
nuclear reactors on its mainland. Annex 11 provides the main technical features of these 
reactors. In our research, it is very interesting to note that China chose Russia as partner to 
build Tianwan 1&2 reactors, the most powerful ever built in China. Thereby, it broke with its 
traditional technological reliance on France, Canada and Japan. This Sino-Russian project 
implied large technology and know-how transfers, as thousands of Russian experts were 
mobilised in China for the construction, and illustrates successful Sino-Russian cooperation in 
the field of energy and technology transfers.324  
 
Figure 15: China’s energy balance (TPES, 2006) 
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China’s concern about security of supply is of paramount importance and underpins 
China’s energy strategy towards oil. By 2020, one third of China’s TPES will be provided by 
oil. But indigenous production is limited, though, by depleting reserves and suboptimal 
exploitation capacities. Despite its emphasis on domestic energy production, China is bound 
to see its oil-import dependency soaring in the years to come. Figure 16 illustrates China’s 
growing incapacity to meet its oil-demand through indigenous production. In 2006, China’s 
domestic production of crude oil amounted to 184,8 millions tonnes, although consumption 
was 329,9 millions t. This brought Chinese oil-import dependency to 44%. China’s main 
sources of oil-imports are the Middle-East (45% of total oil-imports), Africa (30%) and 
                                                 
 
323 See White Paper on Energy (2007) 
324 Nuclear energy is a development priority for China in order to minimise its energy dependency. China has 
large uranium reserves, although its lack of extraction capacity leads it to import half of its uranium needs from 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Namibia and Australia. See World Nuclear Association, <http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf63.html> [25th March 2009] 
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Russia (11%). Figure 17 shows that among China’s top-oil suppliers, Russia occupies an 
important position, just after Saudi Arabia, Angola and Iran. In 2006, Russia supplied China, 
exclusively by train, with 16 millions t of crude oil, a volume that will nevertheless rise 
significantly as Russia and China develop their oil transportation infrastructures and agree on 
constructing a pipeline network.  
 
Figure 16: China's domestic production and consumption of crude oil 
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Figure 17: China’s Oil Suppliers 
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From the Chinese standpoint, Russia is an outstandingly interesting oil-supplier for 
three reasons. First, its oil reserves can be connected to the Chinese market directly, which is 
a fundamental geopolitical asset. So far, China transports most of its crude oil from the 
Middle East and Africa by oil-tankers. This makes oil naval routes Beijing’s Achilles’ heel, as 
China cannot secure them, e.g. against piracy in the Straits of Malacca, through a capable 
navy. 325  China’s energy security is in this respect contingent on other foreign navies 
guaranteeing the security of naval routes.326 Besides, these naval routes “could be cut off [e.g. 
in the Straits of Hormuz or Malacca], in particular in the event of a crisis over Taiwan or other 
major confrontation with the US”.327  Second, Russia is extrinsically a more reliable oil 
supplier than some important Middle-East countries living under the Nato- or US- sword of 
Damocles, e.g. Iran and Iraq. Disruptions of oil-supply to China could for instance occur in 
the event of a confrontation between Iran and the US, or the diffusion of Iraqi civil war to on 
the Iranian territory.328  Third, Russia has important oil reserves in Western and Eastern 
Siberia, which are still very much underexploited.329 Figure 18 shows that in 2007 only 2 
millions tonnes of crude oil were produced in these remote oilfields, whereas proved reserves 
amounted to 39,9 millions t, probable reserves to 97,6 millions t, and possible reserves 211 
millions t. Considering its estimated oil-demand, which compared to its 2006 level will rise 
by 89 millions t by 2010, 169 millions t by 2015 and 432 by 2020, China rightly views 
Siberian oil reserves as a strategic reserve for its own oil-supply development. 330 Siberian oil 
would certainly not be sufficient to cover China’s oil needs in the long-run, but it would be 
instrumental in decreasing China’s growing reliance on African and Middle Eastern more 
haphazard sources. However, exploitation of these Siberian oilfields and transport of crude oil 
through Siberia to Northern China are not an easy process that Beijing can implement alone: it 
needs Russia’s consent and involvement.  
 
                                                 
 
325 China cannot project power globally on seas. Its naval forces are ancient and barely sailed far from the 
mainland. The government, however, is investing massively in modernising China’s fleet, e.g. through 
purchasing Russian Kilo-class submarines, but faces Russia’s reluctance to provide military vessels, as such a 
fleet would increase China’s relative power projection. Gerhard Mangott (2008)  
326 According to “Chinese Ships Will Fight Pirates”, BBC News (18/12/2008), “four to five Chinese ships pass 
through the busy channel every day” [in the Gulf of Aden], mainly transporting oil and raw materials. Officially, 
in 2008, seven ships have been attacked by pirates, but the real figure may be much higher. In December 2008, 
the Zhenhua 4 was rescued thanks to the intervention of Malaysian naval forces. This vulnerability is an 
increasing concern for China, as the situation in Somalia and Puntland is unlikely to head for normalisation in 
the short-run, and even more unlikely to stabilise in the long-run.  
327 Kyrre Elvenes Braekhus and Indra Ǿverland (2007) 
328 China is also concerned by growing criticism against its involvement in some African countries providing it 
with oil, as Sudan. This creates a supplementary incentive to increase imports from Russia.  
329 Western Siberia oilfields are located in the regions of Tomsk, Timano-Pecora and Volga-Urals. Eastern 
Siberia reserves are located at Verkhnechonskoye, North of the Baikal Sea. See Rosneft, “Verkhnechonskoye”, 
<http://www.rosneft.com/Upstream/ProductionAndDevelopment/eastern_siberia/verkhnechonskneftegaz/> [25th 
March 2009] and West Siberian, “Oil Reserves and Production”, 
<http://www.westsiberian.com/index.php?p=operations&s=oilreserves&afw_lang=en> [25th March 2009] 
330 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2006 
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Figure 18: Siberian oil reserves 
 
Russia’s energy strategy is intertwined with foreign policy priorities, and its objectives 
are threefold: “maximisation of national wealth and private profit, recognition of Russia as a 
reliable energy supplier and power projection”.331 How China fits into this strategy, and to 
what extend did Sino-Russian collective identity develop in this respect, is unclear. The 
failure of Chinese participation in the Slavneft asset auction at the end of 2002,332 and the 
failure of Sino-Russian Stimul oil deal at the end of 2003,333 shows that Russian assets are not 
available for Chinese state-investors. This thwarts Beijing’s plans and strategy, which is to 
maximise the reliability of long-term oil-supply through control of equity stakes in the 
producing company from wellhead to terminal.334 By becoming a direct shareholder and tying 
equity investment to long-term supply contracts, China intends to shield itself against 
significant fluctuations of oil imports both in volumes and value. How China operates 
according to this strategy is best seen in Central Asia.335  This strategy of energy assets 
                                                 
 
331 Bobo Lo (2008), pp. 135-153 
332 Slavneft was privatised for US$ 1,86bn to the profit of Sibneft’s Chief Executive Eugene Shvidler. The pre-
selection process aimed at picking “acceptable” candidates for the auction excluded the Chinese National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), although the CNPC would have been ready to offer a better price (reserve price 
was US$ 1,7bn and market price would have been US$ 4bn according to JPMorgan). See Andrew Jack (2005), p. 
199-202.  
333 CNPC vainly attempted to acquire a controlling stake in Russia’s Stimul Oil company, in which Gazprom 
holds a 39% share. Thibaud Voita, “Gaining Abroad: The International Expansion of State Enterprises” 
(European Council on Foreign Relations: China Analysis No 21, 2009) 
334 See for instance Thibaud Voita ( 2009) 
335 In the late 2002, CNPC acquired a 50% share in Salyan oil, and in January 2003 a 31,41% share in the Azeri 
project “Canub-Qarb-Qobustan”. It also purchased a 60% stake in the Kazak Aktobemunaigaz in 1997, more 
importantly, it purchased Petrokaz (PetroKazakhstan) from its former Canadian owners in August 2005 for US$ 
4,18bn, which made the PetroKazakhstan deal the largest overseas acquisition by a Chinese company. This deal 
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acquisition, however, is not compatible with Russia’s threefold objectives. It collides in 
particular with Russia’s will to project power through energy policy. Moreover, China is in 
competition with other energy-buyers, which are ready to pay more for Siberian oil and gas, 
and in particular with Japan.336 This partly explains the ups and downs that characterised 
energy price negotiations between China and Russia, and Moscow’s constant wavering 
between China and Japan as key partner in the East. Last but not least, Russia is not willing to 
sacrifice a reliable consumer in the West, the EU, on the altar of neither China nor Japan.337 
This means that Russian investments in view of developing oil and gas extraction capacity 
will still be uppermost directed to oil and gas fields fuelling Europe, e.g. Stokman and Yamal-
Nenets gas-fields, and Astrakhan oilfield. The exploration of West Siberian, and a fortiori of 
East Siberian oilfields is likely to remain a lesser priority owing to the limited investment 
capital Russia can provide domestically, and its reluctance to involve Chinese companies as 
direct stakeholders.  
 
The most instructive illustration of Sino-Russian ambivalent relationship in the energy 
sector is the saga of the ESPO (East Siberian-Pacific Ocean) oil-pipeline. Annex 12 provides 
some technical features of related and unrelated pipeline projects that aimed at linking China 
with gas and oilfields located in Russia and Central Asia. In 1997, CNPC purchased a 
majority share in a Kazak company which was intended to be the “source for an oil and gas 
pipeline extending from Aktyubinsk in Aktobe province to Alashankou” in China’s Xinjinag 
province. 338  This project, however, encountered several difficulties, and was resisted in 
particular by Russia, which was afraid of losing its leverage on the region. In order to 
“deprive Kazakhstan of a potentially enormous market and force it into greater dependence 
upon Moscow”, the Russian company Yukos offered China a direct access to the Siberian oil 
and gas reserves. Accordingly, in February 1999, Premier Yevgeny Primakov and Premier 
Zhu Rongyi agreed to carry out three feasibility studies in view of linking Russia and China’s 
oil and gas markets. Two were dedicated to gas supply, and one of them envisaged crude oil 
exports from Angarsk to Daqing through a 20-30 millions-tonnes-per-year capacity 
pipeline. 339  In March 2003, a deal between Yukos and CNPC for proceeding with 
construction was struck, which planned the delivery of 700 millions tonnes of oil over 25 
years. However, the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovski in October 2003, the dismantlement of 
Yukos and a counter-offer by Japan for a very lucrative financial package involving a 80 mt/y 
capacity pipeline linking Angarsk to Nakhodka on Siberia’s Eastern coast sounded the knell 
of the 1999 Sino-Russian pipeline project. In 2004, the Japanese alternative, ESPO I, became 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
was concluded despite Russia’s harsh pressure. See Stephen Blank, “China, Kazakh Energy, and Russia: An 
Unlikely Ménage à Trois”, The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (Vol. 3, No.1, November 2005) 
336 Japan is also actively involved in the exploration and co-exploitation of Sakhalin’s gas reserves.  
337 Besides having a long-established energy relationship with Russia, the EU is also Russia’s first source of 
Foreign Direct Investments and is a more lucrative market.  
338 Stephen Blank (2005), p. 103 
339 Bobo Lo (2008), pp. 133-153 
 - 131 -
Moscow’s favourite, despite substantial technical and financial obstacles. Uncertainty on the 
capacity of Russia to fill the envisioned pipeline led to the emergence of the ESPOII project: 
the pipeline was to start further west from Taishet, go north via the East Siberian oilfields 
before re-linking with the initial ESPO I project at Skovorodino, and only then follow the 
BAM tracks until the harbour of Nakhoda (see the map in annex 13). The pipeline could thus 
be filled by West-Siberian (24mt/y) as well as East Siberian (56mt/y) crude oil, and Japan was 
to finance the project up to US$ 30bn. This thwarted China’s plan for enhanced energy 
security, as this scenario implied that it would have to purchase its oil from its long-aged rival, 
Japan. China reacted by re-forging its ties with Kazakhstan and accelerating the construction 
of the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline, which was to supply 10mt/y of oil by 2008 and 20mt/y by 
2011. Such an export capacity, however, was unlikely to be achieved through extraction in the 
Kumkol oilfields alone (in Central Asia), and required Russia as oil co-supplier (for an 
estimated 13mt/y) via the Omsk-Pavlodar pipeline linking Western Siberia to Kazakhstan.340 
On the Eastern front, China did not stop lobbing for the construction of a Sino-Russian 
pipeline, e.g. an ESPO II-branch linking Skovorodino to Daqing. And certain circumstances 
turned favourable to China, indeed. In December 2004, Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi irritated Moscow on the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands by declaring 
“Japan does not understand why Russia cannot return all four islands”;341 and pulled back on 
its financial deal later in 2005. Moreover, in 2008, Igor Sechin, the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of Rosneft, was given the energy portfolio in the Medvedev government. He was 
known to be a proponent of a Sino-Russian deal.342 China improved accordingly its package, 
and offered in 2008 a US$ 25bn deal. The deal included the lending of US$ 15bn to Rosneft, 
and US$ 10bn to Transneft “on the condition that Moscow guarantees completion of the 
pipeline and a shipment of 15mt to China by 2011”.343 It was also to give Beijing access to 
300mt of Russian oil over the 20 next years. In the mid-term, the Skovorodino-Daqing ESPO 
pipeline spur is of utmost importance for Beijing, as it would deliver 10% of China’s annual 
oil imports (2006-level), and double Russia’s oil exports to China. The agreement was signed 
in October 2008, although uncertainties on the loans rates were subsequently still debated. 
Provided the agreement is eventually implemented, this Sino-Russian oil-supply deal 
indicates a new step in Sino-Russian cooperation, as it would upgrade Russia among China’s 
top oil-suppliers with an estimated 44mt/y crude oil by 2011.344 In 2006, Russia accounted for 
11,0% of China’s crude oil imports (i.e. 16mt/y). For 2010, the IEA forecasts that China’s 
demand should rise to 417mt/y and its oil-import dependency shift from 44 to 55%. This 
would imply that Russia’s oil exports to China would no longer account for 11,0% of China’s 
                                                 
 
340 Stephen Blank (2005) 
341 Vladimir Putin had announced his readiness to return two of them, see “Koizumi Misunderstands Putin’s 
Position on the Kuril Islands”, Kommersant (24/12/2004) 
342 Bobo Lo (2008) 
343 Stephen Blank, “The Russo-Chinese Energy Follies”, China Brief (Vol. 8, Issue 23, December 2008) 
344 In addition to the 16mt/y previously delivered by train in 2006, 15mt/y would come from East and West 
Siberia to Daqing through the ESPO pipeline, and 13mt/y from Wst Siberia through Kazakhstan to Alashankou.  
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total oil-imports, but to 19,1%, a much higher share in oil-TPES.345 This could bring Russia to 
the 2nd rank of China’s oil-suppliers, just after Angola, whose production and exports to China 
soar at a quicker pace.  
 
Energy supply is a mixed-motive game for Russia and China in Central Asia. By 
providing oil to China, Russia increases its absolute utility by earning revenues and diversifies 
its consumer portfolio. But it also directly contributes to China’s economic rise and relative 
geo-economic empowerment. It is thus conducive to increase Russia’s external insecurity and 
jeopardise its survival. Precisely for these reasons, neorealists adhering to reductionist 
interpretation of their paradigm warn against the growth of Sino-Russian trade and energy 
interests-interdependence, which they structurally view as a weakness. They believe that 
Russia would not become China’s “junior partner”, and thus stress in their analysis the 
asymmetrical development of interest-interdependence and the discrepancy between actual 
cooperation and potential complementarities, which they attribute to Realpolitik thinking and 
zero-sum games schemes of interactions. Neoliberals, on the contrary, applaud rising trade 
and energy interdependence, as they believe that joint interests maximisation yield better 
results in the long-run, e.g. owing to the variable-sum game scheme of energy interactions in 
Central Asia. They suggest that relativistic assessment of positional gains, so far, led to 
suboptimal outcomes, which were detrimental to both players. For instance, by cancelling the 
Angarsk-Daqing pipeline project (officially for “environmental reasons”) in the beginning of 
the 2000s, Russia compelled China to seek for oil westwards Russia’s “near abroad”, i.e. 
Kazakhstan. This undermined Russia’s position in Central Asia, resulting in a double loss of 
utility (loss of revenues extracted from the pipeline and loss of regional power and control 
over Kazakhstan’s resources). Neoliberals do not really explain why such relativistic 
assessment of positional gains prevailed in the past. They merely blame “misunderstandings, 
miscommunications, and misrepresentations”. 346  Misperceptions, they argue, involve 
“inaccurately seeing the present”, which distorts the circumstances under which strategic 
choice is made. But this argumentation does not explain how misrepresentations are generated, 
and above all, how they disappear. In this respect, constructivism is very helpful. It has been 
seen that Russia holds a dominant strategy of defecting vis à vis China in energy policy. The 
failures of several pipeline projects illustrate this remark. Nevertheless, recent developments 
contributed to change Russia and China’s multilayered identities. In the beginning of the 
2000s, Russia and China supported the institutionalisation of Sino-Russian interest-
interdependence in Central Asia through the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation. By creating such regime, wherein strategic interactions are iterative and trans-
dimensionally interlinked, Russia and China set up the conditions under which cooperation 
can be implemented in order to Pareto-optimise the dyad’s utility. The Shanghai Cooperation 
                                                 
 
345 Own calculations  
346 Arthur A. Stein (1990), pp. 55-86 
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Organisation, is has been seen, is an example of what Sino-Russian support for the 
institutionalisation of regional security issues can bring about, including in enhancing joint 
energy security.347 In this framework, Russia and China were increasingly likely to accept 
eschewing relative gains for atomistic improvement of their joint utility. This implied, 
however, the formation of shared understandings and expectations, which were conducive to 
the formation of the community of security. As a result of this process, rising trade, and latter 
energy, interest-interdependence in Sino-Russian relationship can be interpreted as an 
important sign of growing horizontal density in collective identity formation.  
                                                 
 
347 The Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline was eventually negotiated between Kazakhstan, China and Russia under 
the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. See Yong Deng (2008) pp. 200-244  
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
Interstate cooperation is a challenge to international relations studies. Neorealist 
scholars view cooperation prospects as determined by the structural distribution of power in 
the world system. They argue that in a self-help system, cooperative behaviours entail 
insecurity, unless their purpose is to balance a greater threat, and re-establish equilibrium 
among great powers. Unlike neorealists, liberals believe in a greater scope of interest for 
cooperation in international politics. They do not necessarily view cooperative behaviours as 
short-term calculations. On the contrary, they suggest that states, having domestically 
constituted interests, determine their own behaviour vis à vis other states on the basis of 
choice and circumstances. This creates an important room for manoeuvre for cooperation 
prospects, as states may choose to cooperate. The driving forces they identify for such 
occurrence are manifold. Ideological preference is an example, but neoliberals rather stress 
that states’ choices are in fact not directed towards preferred outcomes, but rather towards 
preferred strategies. Whether cooperation in the end actually occurs, then, is also determined 
by the other states’ circumstantial preferences. The important implication of this dual 
determinant of states’ behaviour is that cooperation prospects can be substantially increased 
by a variety of factors: polity alignment, regime-institutionalisation, interest-
instrumentalisation, etc… Nevertheless, realist and liberal cooperation theories neglect an 
important dimension of cooperative behaviours. They assume the exogenous reality of 
interests and perfect rationality of the players involved in world politics. Thereby, they 
neglect the cognitive motives and implications of cooperation, and the endogenous driving 
forces thereof. Social constructivism makes in this respect an insightful contribution to the 
understanding of cooperation by seizing the “middle ground” in world politics. It argues that 
identities are multi-layered, intrinsic or relational, and issue-specific. More importantly, 
identities change through interactions. Cooperation prospects, thus, should be analysed 
through the lens of collective identity formation. By constructing shared understandings and 
mutual expectations, cooperative behaviours shape the collective identity of interacting states, 
and transform social reality accordingly. Collective identity formation is a three-dimensional 
process. Horizontally, it develops through the identification of a broader mutuality of interests, 
whereby states accept eschewing individualistic and relativistic gains in order to maximise 
absolute gains and joint interests. Transversally, it develops through the socio-cognitive 
development of shared normative understandings. Vertically, it develops through the 
internalisation of these understandings in states’ polities.  
 
In this thesis, I applied this theoretical framework to identify the underlying driving 
forces of Sino-Russian rapprochement since the end of the Sino-Russian split in 1986. I found 
that power-based theories, e.g. neorealism, do not provide conclusive interpretation of the 
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cooperative process launched in the 1990s across the Amur River. Therefore, I combined a 
social constructivist research approach, which best explains and interprets cognitive motives 
for cooperation, with liberal methodologies, which best measure behavioural phenomena. 
Accordingly, I researched the three-dimensionality of collective identity formation, and 
measure its three-dimensional density. My findings concur in suggesting that Sino-Russian 
collective identity formation dwindled in the beginning pf the 1990s, improved subsequently 
in the mid-1990s, and distinctively progressed in the 2000s, in each of the three dimensions 
(horizontal, vertical and transversal). This threefold process of collective identity formation 
explains convincingly Sino-Russian rapprochement these last twenty years, its irregularities, 
and sometimes ambiguities. More importantly, it yields better explanatory results than the 
alternative theories of interstate cooperation. Power-based theories, even though convincing 
in grasping balances of power at a given momentum, fail to explain the changing nature of 
interstate relations and their endogenous dynamics. Nor do they sufficiently explain why 
cooperation is sometimes limited to certain sectors of the economy and politics, while others 
remain out of the cooperation scope. Interest-based theories too have weaker explanatory and 
predictive power. Because they focus on specific and limited aspects of interstate relations, 
they are powerful instruments in explaining certain evolutions and developments, but they 
lack a more general framework that could explain where this interest for cooperation comes 
from. By designing my own theoretical framework, I could solve some of these issues, and 
address both generally and specifically the question of interstate cooperation. I provided a 
liberal-constructivist understanding of cooperation that included various approaches of social 
reality. Their combination offers a differentiated, sophisticated and multidimensional picture 
of interstate cooperation.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Russia’s sudden ideological subservience to 
Western economic and political values resulted in the beginning of the 1990s in the overnight 
transformation of Russia’s polity and economy. Democracy and market economy was to be 
imported and to replace the long-lived communist regime. In Beijing, indeed, the Chinese 
Communist Party, then confronted with similar although not identical needs for 
transformation, strengthened its authoritarian rule in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incidents. 
This revolutionary commitment by Russian elite to Western liberal democracies’ norms and 
values collided with Chinese normative understanding of the role of the state in world and 
domestic politics. Transversal collective identity formation shrunk accordingly during this 
period, and contacts between Russian and Chinese elites waned. As a result of withering 
transversal collective identity formation, vertical collective identity slackened, as both states 
chose diverging transformation paths. But in Russia, transformation translated rapidly into 
growing political instability and economic turmoil. Russia’s democracy became non-
functional in 1993, and state-nihilism amplified the dramatic collapse of Russian economy. 
China, on the other hand, reengaged in party-controlled reforms in the economy after Deng 
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, but owing to the poor performance of Russian economy 
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and polity, Sino-Russian collective identity ties suffered from shrinking horizontal density. 
Sino-Russian cooperation in the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s was thus overall 
very limited, e.g. to border dispute settlement.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Sino-Russian relationships improved. The failure of liberal-
style democracy in Russia nourished negative lesson-drawing in China, and prompted Russia 
to reassess its blind commitment to Western norms and values. Unfortunately, changes had 
gone too far into state-nihilism, and strategic guidance in Russian economy had already been 
captured by rent-seeking private interests. Russian polity was also badly struck, and 
constitutional reforms in 1993, imposed by a coup, did not prove sufficient to fully reverse the 
tendency. But these failures, to which Western spin doctors had contributed, induced Sino-
Russian rapprochement. Circumstances were all the more propitious, since China had been 
relatively isolated by Western liberal democracies following the Tiananmen Protests, and 
consequently needed mighty friends to pursue its quest for international status. Transversal 
collective identity formation in the 1990s, therefore had rather a reactive dynamics, which 
nevertheless translated, although to a limited extent, into growing similarities in domestic 
polity. During this period, Russia and China engaged in confidence-building measures, and 
multiplied high-ranked meetings, fostering elite socialisation, and the construction of shared 
understandings. Collective identity developed also horizontally from the mid- or end- 1990s 
onwards, especially through the instrumentalisation of mutual interest-interdependence. But 
the mutuality of interests that Russia and China could identify, and the degree of 
internalisation of shared norms that their polities could accept, remained limited by the 
cautious development of transversal collective identity: neither Russia, nor China was ready, 
capable or willing to sacrifice its bilateral ties with the US on the altar of a venturesome 
alliance. Sino-Russian cooperation throughout the 1990s, rested then on limited reactive 
ideational convergence, limited polity convergence and a limited scope of interest-
interdependence. It was therefore more tactical than strategic.  
 
From the end of the 1990s onwards, however, Sino-Russian collective identity 
formation not only grew three-dimensionally, but also reached a critical degree of density, 
which suggests that cooperation today is driven by strategic motives. First, Russia and China 
shifted their attention from opposing the normative hegemony of the US to redrawing 
principles upon which a new world order should be built. For this purpose, they constructed 
shared understandings of norms and values, which are of paramount importance for both, and 
delimited an intersubjective “we-ness”, which differs from the “selves” and the “other”. In the 
realm of this “we-ness”, they worked on the formation of a community of security, based on 
mutual support for enhanced socialisation in security matters and institutionalisation of global 
and regional security. They fuelled their transversal collective identity formation with 
normative understandings such as pluralism and multilateralism in world politics as a means 
to upgrade their international status, and equal sovereignty instead of interference in domestic 
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affairs as a means to secure regional and domestic stability. These mutual commitments 
served as a normative guideline for the conduct of Russia and China’s foreign policy, which 
oscillated between compliance with the existing world order and revisionism towards some 
norms and practices of international law that are emerging, but still lack opinion juris. For 
instance, state sovereignty is supported as jus cogens, i.e. peremptory norm, which shall not 
be derogated, e.g. through humanitarian intervention. Considering the degree of alignment in 
Russia and China’s foreign policy, and the high density of transversal identity formation with 
regards to international politics, it would be barely exaggerated to refer to the normative 
expression of the “we” in security issues as Sino-Russian collective foreign policy. In 
domestic politics, Vladimir Putin’s mandate, and his dedication to re-establish the state’s 
authority, even through radical means, paved the way to greater internalisation of the norms 
derived from transversal collective identity formation. Convergence in polity and economy 
organisation surged remarkably, indicating vertical densification of collective identity 
formation, and ultimately, transformation of polities tending towards isomorphism. Also very 
spectacular was the broadening scope of cooperation, which developed through distinctively 
growing economic and interest-interdependence, and the emergence of a mutuality of interests, 
including the sectors so far out of collective identity construction’s reach, i.e. energy geo-
economics. Through the institutionalisation of regional interest-interdependence, e.g. the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the instrumentalisation of bilateral economic 
interdependence, Sino-Russian collective identity has reached a degree of horizontal density, 
which is more than mildly significant. Combined with the other dimensions of collective 
identity formation, it indicates the growing strategic importance of Russia for China and vice 
versa, and more importantly, the densification of Sino-Russian strategic ties.  
 
All in all, the three-phase development of Sino-Russian relationship can be seen as a 
single process. Transformation of intrinsic identities in Russia and the Soviet Union in the end 
of the 1980s caused major changes Russian and Chinese multilayered identities, in particular 
in their relational and collective identities. Identities should be seen as permanently becoming 
rather than being. Therefore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sino-Russian 
collective identity had to be fully reshaped, e.g. through trust-building. This explains the first 
phase of the process underlying Sino-Russian rapprochement. As mutual expectations slowly 
emerged, the identification of a common fate, provoked by the gradual normative alignment 
of Russia and China against the US, which culminated in the end of the 1990s, nourished 
Sino-Russian collective identity formation. But domestic and external constraints limited the 
scope of cooperation to tactical purposes. Nevertheless, as collective identity formation 
proceeded, socialisation and interactions generated further intrinsic and relational identity-
changes, which ultimately paved the way to strategic convergence in the 2000s.  
 
Of course, arguments may be presented, that prima facie contradict this thesis. But in 
fact, they do not necessarily invalidate the conclusions, as strategic convergence does not 
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imply uniformity of policies, polities and values. It is the three-dimensional degree of 
collective identity density that orientates the conclusion on strategic convergence, and not the 
degree of final atrophy of Russia and China’s respective “self”-identities. Both states do 
defend interests shaped by intrinsic or relational identities that are not collective. Strategic 
convergence, understandingly, is not unlimited in the correspondence of the converging 
partners’ features. Precisely here does start integration studies, which examine the process 
leading to the extinction of “self”-identities in favour of an over-reaching sense of “we-ness”. 
Provided Russia and China maintain their dynamics of collective identity formation, it is not 
excluded that integration studies applied to Sino-Russian relationships will be required in the 
near future. The question of creating a Sino-Russian or Central Asian free trade area is 
already on the table.  
 
In this thesis, too little attention has been brought to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation in itself. The institutionalisation of regional interest-interdependence through 
such an international regime is nonetheless an exemplary argument illustrating Sino-Russian   
horizontal collective identity formation. Starting from confidence building measures, this 
organisation developed its Member States’ cooperation scope beyond traditional security 
issues. It now includes an interbank forum aimed at supporting cross-national investments, a 
financial instrument to foster economic policy coordination, and encompasses additionally 
non-traditional security issues (e.g. cross-border migrations and illegal trafficking). It is also 
an intense source of elite socialisation and social learning. Because the Shanghai Five process 
illustrates almost ideally the broadening of Sino-Russian cooperation scope, and because little 
effort would have been needed to demonstrate this horizontal trend of scope broadening, I 
rather chose a more ambivalent and challenging dimension, wherein Sino-Russian interests 
are more conflicting and ambivalent, i.e. in geoeconomics and energy. Thereby, I could better 
show the complexity and unevenness of horizontal collective identity formation. Furthermore, 
it is arguable that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has a partially normative rationale 
and an additional cognitive effect on its Member States’ identities. The Organisation echoes 
Russia and China’s stance towards the US and their engagement for a stable “near abroad”, 
which relates to transversal collective identity. It is a community of security that acquired the 
meaning of community of practice and knowledge. But an argument on Sino-Russian 
collective identity formation using the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
would be weakened by the fact that the organisation is a multilateral one, not an exclusively 
bilateral one. Even though it is obvious that Russia and China are the key players therein, the 
capacity of the other Central Asian countries to influence decisions and divide the two leading 
states cannot be easily swept away. Further research, therefore, would be needed to analyse 
the relationship between the Sino-Russian community as such and the Central-Asia one, 
inclusive of Russia and China. As suggested in the empirical research on geoeconomics, Sino-
Russian collective identity does not necessarily entail, nor correspond to, the formation of 
regional collective identities. This means that strategic convergence in world politics does not 
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necessarily preclude tactical moves or disguised rivalry in regional politics. Just as 
constructivists do not see identities as a sum, but as a constructed superposition of sometimes 
ambivalent or conflicting layers, cooperation should not be seen as a monolithic behaviour, 
but as multidimensional process based on complex cognitive mechanisms. Sino-Russian 
strategic convergence does not mean the extinction of conflicting interests between the two 
states. It rather refers to the underlying forces enabling them to enhance their joint relational 
utility. And in this peculiar game, a variety of collective identities overlap, merge and 
compete with each others. The US, Japan and the EU are also tied with Russia and China 
individually or collectively, which offers leverage when identities-derived interests conflict.     
 
What the thesis’s conclusions imply for western liberal democracies is first the 
continuation of history, pace Francis Fukuyama. Today, ideological rivalries have vanished, 
but they were replaced by normative misunderstandings and competing visions of the world 
order. The end of Eric Hobsbawn’s Age of Extremes is no dead-end on the sinuous road of 
history, but merely announces a transition towards new forms of rivalries. This does not mean 
that cooperation will lose its impetus in world politics, but perhaps will it less universal than 
expected. For instance, the strategic cooperative partnerships built with the US by Russia and 
China until the 2000s seem to be gradually supplanted by tactical relationships. Meanwhile, 
Sino-Russian strategic ties develop in a mutually-reinforcing dynamics. In Africa and in 
Central Asia, Russia and China’s soft power gains projection capabilities and an increasingly 
large audience. Norms and values that they convey are sometimes competing with those that 
are supported by Western liberal democracies sometimes beyond legalism. Acknowledging 
these developments is essential to construct inclusive social realities, so as to mitigate 
tensions, which increasingly arise from intersubjective misunderstandings. Inclusiveness does 
make cooperation more difficult in certain fields, but it makes it sustainable and more solid. 
This is the dilemma world politics will increasingly have to face in the future, and that 
deserves considerable attention. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Ups and downs in Sino-Soviet Cold-War “red” 
friendship 
 
Before the Sino-Soviet Split:  
 
“The Communist Party of the Soviet Union […] is the most advanced, the 
most experienced, and the most theoretically cultivated party in the world. 
This party has been our model in the past, it is our model at present, and it 
will be our model in the future”. 
Mao Zedong (1953)348 
After the Sino-Soviet Split:  
 
Poster349 in the Cultural Revolution (dated 1967): “Topple Soviet Revisionists! Smash 
Brezhnev’s dog-head; Smash Kosygin’s dog-head!”. (Kosygin was Soviet Union’s Premier 
between 1964 and 1980) 
 
 
                                                 
 
348 Zedong Mao, “The Greatest Friendship”, People’s Daily, 9 March 1953 
349 Picture taken from <http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c05s04.html> 
[17th March 2009].  
Ich habe mich bemüht, sämtliche Inhaber der Bildrechte ausfindig zu machen und 
ihre Zustimmung zur Verwendung der Bilder in dieser Arbeit eingeholt. Sollte 
dennoch eine Urheberrechtsverletzung bekannt werden, ersuche ich um Meldung 
bei mir  
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Annex 2: China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World 
Order350 
 
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Putin signed the Joint Statement of the 
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation Regarding the International Order of 
the 21st Century in Moscow on 1 July. The full text of the joint statement follows:  
 
Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation Regarding the 
International Order of the 21st Century:  
 
The PRC [People's republic of China] and the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as 
the "two sides" for short), taking the opportunity of the 60th anniversary of the victory in 
World War II and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations,  
 
Acting on the basis of the historical responsibility for world peace and development in their 
capacities as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,  
 
Strictly abiding by the propositions on building a multipolar world and a new international 
order as  
enunciated in the Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation Regarding Global Multipolarity and the Establishment of a New International 
Order of 23 April 1997,  
 
Confirming the strategic cooperative partnership between the two sides as reiterated in the 
Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendliness, and Cooperation of the People's Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation of 16 July 2001,  
 
Issue the following statement:  
 
1. The world today is undergoing historic changes. The process of building a new 
international order will be complicated and lengthy.  
 
Peace and development remain the main theme of the times. The phenomena of imbalance 
and conflict still exist in the course of development of global multipolarity and economic 
globalization, which are an important trend in the current stage of development of mankind. 
Relationships of interdependence among countries have been greatly strengthened.  
 
The central task for mankind in the 21st century is to safeguard peace, stability, and security 
for all of mankind and to achieve comprehensive and coordinated development under the 
conditions of equality, safeguarding sovereignty, mutual respect, mutual benefit, and ensuring 
                                                 
 
350 China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World, Xinhua News Agency (trans. Political Affairs), 
<http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/1455/1/108/> [7th April] 
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the development prospects of future generations.  
 
Mankind has opportunities to jointly achieve the aforementioned objectives and also is faced 
with numerous global challenges such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, the disparity between rich and poor, environmental degradation, 
infectious diseases, organized transnational crimes, and drug trafficking.  
 
2. The problems facing mankind can only be solved on the basis of universally recognized 
principles and norms of international law and in a fair and rational world order. Countries in 
the world should strictly observe the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  
 
The right of countries to choose their development paths in light of their own conditions, 
equally participate in international affairs, and seek development on an equal footing should 
be fully guaranteed. Differences and disputes must be settled peacefully without the adoption 
of unilateral action and coercive policy and without resort to the threat of force or the use of 
force.  
 
The peoples of all countries should be allowed to decide the affairs of their own countries, and 
world affairs should be decided through dialogue and consultation on a multilateral and 
collective basis. The international community should thoroughly renounce the mentality of 
confrontation and alignment, should not pursue the right to monopolize or dominate world 
affairs, and should not divide countries into a leading camp and a subordinate camp.  
 
3. The United Nations is the world's most universal, representative, and authoritative 
international organization, and its role and functions are irreplaceable. The United Nations 
should play a leading role in international affairs and serve as the core for establishing and 
executing the basic norms of international law. UN peacekeeping operations should be in 
compliance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. Relevant resolutions 
of the Security Council must be strictly observed, and cooperation between the United 
Nations on the one hand and regional and sub-regional organizations on the other should be 
carried out. The United Nations should play a greater role in the study of global economic and 
development issues.  
 
Reforms of the United Nations should be aimed at strengthening its leading role in 
international affairs, improving its efficiency, and enhancing its potential for dealing with new 
challenges and threats. Reforms should be based on the principle of achieving consensus 
through consultation and should fully embody the common interests of the vast numbers of 
member-countries.  
 
4. The positive significance of the process of globalization lies in drawing on unprecedented 
vibrant economic and trade relations and exceptionally broad access to open information to 
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promote global economic development. On the other hand, the development of globalization 
is greatly uneven, and the gap between developed countries and regions on the one hand and 
other countries and regions in the world on the other is widening. To ensure the sound 
development of the process of globalization, coordination and mutually beneficial cooperation 
among countries and regions should be strengthened; all discrimination in economic relations 
should be eliminated; the gap between rich and poor should be narrowed; and common 
prosperity should be promoted through expanding and deepening economic, trade, and 
scientific and technological exchanges.  
 
The international community should establish an economic and trade regime that is 
comprehensive and widely accepted and that operates through the means of holding 
negotiations on an equal footing, discarding the practice of applying pressure and sanctions to 
coerce unilateral economic concessions, and bringing into play the roles of global and 
regional multilateral organizations and mechanisms.  
 
5. Developing countries, which account for the majority of the world's population, are an 
important force in safeguarding world peace and development. The international community 
should pay close attention to the issue of eliminating the gap in the development levels of 
developing countries and developed countries. The way to resolve the issue is, first and 
foremost, to ensure that all members of the international community can equally take 
advantage of the social, economic, scientific and technological, informational, cultural, and 
other opportunities stemming from globalization to strengthen mutually beneficial North-
South and South-South cooperation and to achieve common development. The countries 
concerned should discharge the relevant duties that they shoulder in the United Nations and 
within other multilateral frameworks.  
 
6. Human rights are universal. Countries should respect the human rights and basic freedoms 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promote efforts to guarantee and 
safeguard human rights in light of their own conditions and traditions, and settle their 
differences through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect. 
International human rights protections should be based on the principles of firmly 
safeguarding the sovereign equality of all countries and not interfering in each other's internal 
affairs.  
 
7. The histories and traditions of multi-ethnic countries must be respected, and so must their 
efforts to promote harmonious coexistence and common development for various ethnic 
groups and to safeguard national unity. Any actions that are aimed at dividing sovereign 
countries and inciting hatred among ethnic groups are unacceptable. No social and political 
systems and models should be imposed from the outside without regard for the objective 
process of social development in sovereign countries.  
 
8. The diversity of cultures and civilizations in the world should become the basis for mutual 
enrichment rather than mutual conflict. The main trend of the world today is not towards a 
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"clash of civilizations"; rather, it underscores the imperative of engaging in global cooperation. 
The diversity of civilizations in the world and the diversification of development models 
should be respected and safeguarded. Differences in the historical backgrounds, cultural 
traditions, social and political systems, value concepts, and development paths of countries 
should not become an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Different 
civilizations should conduct dialogue, exchange experiences, draw on each other's 
experiences, learn from each other's strong points to make up for their own shortcomings, and 
seek common progress on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance. Cultural exchanges 
should be increased in order to establish relations of friendship and trust among countries.  
 
9. The two sides call on the international community to make joint efforts to establish a new 
security framework on the basis of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. 
The framework should have the universally recognized norms of international relations as its 
political foundation and mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity as its 
economic foundation, and should be built on the basis of respecting the equal security rights 
of all countries. Dialogue, consultation, and negotiation on an equal footing should become 
the means for settling conflicts and safeguarding peace.  
 
The two sides support the preservation and consolidation of global strategic stability, as well 
as the legal system and the multilateral process of arms control, disarmament, and 
nonproliferation. The two sides are in favour of facilitating the entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible and of promoting efforts to 
strengthen the universality and effectiveness of such arms control and nonproliferation treaties 
as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition 
of Biological Weapons, and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The 
two sides call for the peaceful use of outer space and for the prevention of the deployment of 
weapons and an arm race in outer space. Relevant international legal documents should be 
drawn up for this purpose.  
 
The two sides believe that in the face of new threats and challenges, further effective 
measures should be taken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery carriers, and relevant materials. The two sides are determined to cooperate closely 
within the framework of relevant international organizations and forums and to expand 
cooperation with other countries. The issue of proliferation should be resolved through 
political, diplomatic, and international cooperation within the framework of international law.  
 
The two sides will promote the implementation of the initiative to establish a UN-led global 
system to deal with new threats and challenges on the basis of the United Nations Charter and 
other relevant norms of international law. International cooperation should be strengthened 
within the new security framework in a joint effort to explore ways to cut off the sources of 
financing and social foundations for terrorism and to eradicate terrorist and extremist ideas - 
namely, the trends of thought of violence and ethnic, national, and religious hatred. No double 
standards should be adopted on this issue. All members of the international community should 
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resolutely condemn the gross violations of human rights by terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. Terrorist organizations must be prevented from acquiring and using weapons of 
mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.  
 
10. Regional integration is an important characteristic of the development of the current 
international situation. The two sides pointed out that multilateral regional organizations 
established on the basis of regional openness, cooperation on an equal footing, and non-
targeting of other countries are playing a positive role in the process of shaping a new 
international order. In the economic sphere, regional initiatives should promote greater 
openness and effectiveness in trade communities. In the sphere of regional security, the 
establishment of security cooperation mechanisms that take into account the interests of all 
parties, are open, and are not directed at other countries has fundamental significance. The 
two sides support organizations of regional integration in their efforts to establish lateral ties 
and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation.  
 
11. The new type of state-to-state relationship between China and Russia is making a major 
contribution to building a new international order. The practice of Sino-Russian relations 
attests to the vitality of the principles enunciated in this statement. At the same time, it shows 
that good-neighbourly, friendly, and cooperative relations can be effectively developed and 
various problems solved on this basis.  
 
The two countries are determined to make unremitting joint efforts with other countries 
concerned to build a world that is developed and harmonious and to become important 
constructive forces in a secure global system.  
 
12. Building a rational and fair international order in the 21st century is a process of 
constantly seeking positions and decisions that are acceptable to all. A new international order 
can become truly universal only if all members of the international community endorse its 
aims and norms.  
 
The two sides call on countries in the world to engage in extensive dialogue on the issue of 
the international order of the 21st century. To a great extent, the future of the world, the 
progress of mankind, and the ability to deal with challenges and threats depend on the 
outcome of this dialogue.  
 
Hu Jintao  
President of the People's Republic of China  
 
Vladimir Putin  
President of the Russian Federation  
1 July 2005, in Moscow  
 
From Xinhua News Agency 
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Annex 3: Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly 
Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation351 
 
On July l6, 2001, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China and President 
Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation signed the “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and 
Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation” in 
Moscow. Full text of the Treaty is as follows:  
 
Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People's Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation  
 
The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation (hereafter known as the 
“contracting parties”),  
 
In view of the historical tradition of good-neighborliness and friendship between the people of 
China and Russia,  
 
Hold that the Sino-Russian Joint Declarations and Statements signed and adopted by the 
heads of states of the two countries from 1992 to 2000 which are of great significance to the 
development of bilateral relations,  
 
Firmly believe that to consolidate the friendly and good neighborly ties and mutual 
cooperation in all fields between the two countries is in conformity with the fundamental 
interests of the peoples of the two countries and conducive to the maintenance of peace, 
security and stability in Asia and the world,  
 
Reiterate the obligations committed by each party in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and other international treaties of which it is a signatory,  
 
With the hope of promoting and establishing a just and fair new world order based on 
universally recognized principles and norms of international laws,  
 
Endeavor to enhance relations between the two countries to a completely new level, 
Determined to develop the friendship between the people of the two countries from generation 
to generation,  
 
Have reached agreement as follows:  
Article. 1  
                                                 
 
351 Treaty for Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm> [18th March 2009] 
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In accordance with universally recognized principles and norms of international laws and on 
the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, the contracting parties shall develops the strategic 
cooperative partnership of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation and equality and 
trust between the two countries from a long-term view and in a comprehensive manner.  
Article 2  
 
In handling their mutual relations, the contracting parties will neither resort to the use of 
force ;or the threat of force nor take economic and other means to bring pressure to bear 
against the other. The contracting parties will only solve their differences through peaceful 
means by adhering to the provisions of the "United Nations Charter" and the principles and 
norms of universally recognized international laws.  
 
The contracting parties reaffirm their commitment that they will not be the first to use nuclear 
weapons against each other nor target strategic nuclear missiles against each other.  
Article 3  
 
The contracting parties respect each other's choice for the course of political, economic, social 
and cultural development in line with their nation's actual conditions so as to ensure a long-
term and stable development of relations between the two countries.  
Article 4  
 
The Chinese side supports the Russian side in its policies on the issue of defending the 
national unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.  
 
The Russian side supports the Chinese side in its policies on the issue of defending the 
national unity and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China.  
Article 5  
 
The Russian side reaffirms that the principled stand on the Taiwan issue as expounded in the 
political documents signed and adopted by the heads of states of the two countries from 1992 
to 2000 remain unchanged. The Russian side acknowledges that there is only one China in the 
world, that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole 
of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian side opposes any form 
of Taiwan's independence.  
Article 6  
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The contracting parties point out with satisfaction that each has no territorial claim on the 
other and both are resolved to make active efforts in building the border between the two 
countries into one where ever-lasting peace and friendship prevail. The contracting parties 
will adhere to the principles of non-encroachment upon territories and national boundaries as 
stipulated in international laws and strictly observe the national boundary between the two 
countries.  
 
The contracting parties shall continue to hold talks on the pending boundary alignment of the 
sectors which China and Russia have not yet arrived at an agreement through consultations. 
Prior to the settlement of these issues, the two sides will maintain the status quo in such 
boundary sectors.  
Article 7  
 
In accordance with the current agreements, the contracting parties shall adopt measures to 
increase trust between their militaries and reduce military forces in the border areas. The 
contracting parties shall expand and deepen confidence building measures in the military field 
so as to consolidate each other’s security and strengthen regional and international stability.  
 
The contracting parties shall make efforts to ensure its own national security in accordance 
with the principle of maintaining reasonable and adequate weapons and armed forces.  
 
The military and military technology cooperation of the contracting parties carried out in 
accordance with the relevant agreements are not directed at third countries.  
Article 8  
 
The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc nor shall they 
embark on any such action, including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which 
compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party. 
Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used by a third country to 
jeopardize the national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting 
party.  
 
Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow the setting up of organizations or gangs on 
its own soil which shall impair the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other 
contrasting party and their activities should be prohibited.  
Article 9  
 
When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being 
threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with 
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the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and 
consultations in order to eliminate such threats.  
Article 10  
 
The contracting parties shall employ and perfect the mechanism for regular meetings at all 
levels, above all the summit and high-level meetings, to conduct periodic exchanges of views 
and co-ordinate their stand on bilateral ties and on important and urgent international issues of 
common concern so as to reinforce the strategic cooperative partnership of equality and trust.  
Article 11  
 
The contracting parties stand for the strict observation of universally acknowledged principles 
and norms of international laws and oppose any action of resorting to the use of force to bring 
pressure to bear on others or interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state under all 
sorts of pretexts and both are ready to make positive efforts to strengthen peace, stability, 
development and cooperation throughout the world.  
 
The contracting parties are against any action which may constitute a threat to international 
stability, security and peace and will conduct mutual co-ordination with regard to the 
prevention of international conflicts and bringing about their political settlement.  
Article 12  
 
The contracting parties shall work together for the maintenance of global strategic balance 
and stability and make great efforts in promoting the observation of the basic agreements 
relevant to the safeguard and maintenance of strategic stability.  
 
The contracting parties shall actively promote the process of nuclear disarmament and the 
reduction of chemical weapons, promote and strengthen the regimes on the prohibition of 
biological weapons and take measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, their means of delivery and their related technology.  
Article 13  
 
The contracting parties shall strengthen their cooperation in the United Nations and its 
Security Council as well as other United Nations Special Agencies. The contracting parties 
shall work to reinforce the central role of the United Nations as the most authoritative and 
most universal world organization composed of sovereign states in handling international 
affairs, particularly in the realm of peace and development and guarantee the major 
responsibility of the UN Security Council in the area of maintaining international peace and 
security.  
Article l4  
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The contracting parties shall energetically promote the consolidation of stability of the 
surrounding areas of the two countries, create an atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust 
and cooperation, and promote efforts aimed at setting up a multi-lateral co-ordination 
mechanism which complies with the actual situation of the above-mentioned areas on issues 
of security and cooperation.  
Article 15  
 
In accordance with the two countries' inter-governmental agreements concerned and other 
documents relating to the handling of creditor's rights and liabilities, each side of the 
contracting parties recognizes the lawful right of ownership of the assets and other properties 
which belong to the other side and which are located within the territory of the other 
contracting party.  
Article l6  
 
On the basis of mutual benefit, the contracting parties shall conduct cooperation in such areas 
as economy and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, 
transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and aviation, information technology and other 
areas of common interest. They shall promote economic and trade cooperation in border areas 
and local regions between the two countries and create necessary and favorable conditions in 
this regard in accordance with the laws of each country.  
 
The contracting parties shall energetically enhance and develop exchanges and cooperation in 
culture, education, health, information, tourism, sports and legal matters.  
 
In accordance with their national laws and international treaties of which they are a party, the 
contracting parties shall protect and maintain intellectual property rights, including copyright 
and other relevant rights.  
Article I7  
 
The contracting parties shall conduct cooperation in world financial institutions, economic 
organizations and forums, and in line with the rules and regulations of the above-mentioned 
institutions, organizations and forums, make efforts to promote the participation of a 
contracting party in the above-mentioned institutions of which the other contracting party is 
already a member (or member state).  
Article l8  
 
The contracting parties shall cooperate in promoting the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedom in accordance with the international obligations each is committed and 
the national laws of each country.  
 - 152 -
 
In line with the international obligations each of the contracting parties is committed and the 
laws and regulations of each country, the contracting party shall take effective measures to 
guarantee the legal rights and interests of legal persons and natural persons of the other 
contracting party who reside within its territory, and provide the necessary legal assistance 
over civil and criminal matters.  
 
The departments concerned of the contracting parties, in accordance with relevant laws, shall 
conduct investigation and seek a solution to the problems and disputes arising from the 
process of carrying out cooperation and business activities by the legal persons and natural 
persons within the territory of the other side of the contracting parties.  
Article 19  
 
The contracting parties shall carry out cooperation in the protection and improvement of the 
environment, prevention of cross-border pollution, the fair and rational use of water resources 
along the border areas and the use of biological resources in the northern Pacific and 
boundary river areas; make joint efforts in protecting rare floras, faunas and the natural 
ecosystem, and conduct cooperation in preventing the outbreak of major accidents arising 
from natural disasters or due to technical reasons and eliminating their after--effects .  
Article 20  
 
The contracting parties, in accordance with the laws of each country and the international 
obligation each has committed, shall actively cooperate in cracking down terrorists, splittists 
and extremists, and in taking strong measures against criminal activities of organized crimes, 
illegal trafficking of drugs, psychotropic substances and weapons. The contracting parties 
shall conduct cooperation to crack down on illegal immigration, including the crack down on 
illegal transportation of natural persons via its territory.  
Article 21  
 
The contracting parties attach great importance to the exchanges and cooperation between the 
central (federal) legislative organs and law enforcement agencies of the two countries.  
 
The contracting parties shall promote with great efforts the exchanges and cooperation 
between the judicial organs of the two countries.  
Article 22  
 
This Treaty neither affects the rights and obligations of the contracting parties in other 
international treaties of which they are a party to it, nor is it directed against any third country.  
Article 23  
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To implement the present Treaty, the contracting parties shall actively promote the signing of 
accords in specific realms which are of interests to both sides.  
Article 24  
 
This Treaty needs to be ratified and shall come into force from the date of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place in 
Beijing.  
Article 25  
 
The term of validity of the present treaty is twenty years. If neither side of the contracting 
parties notify the other in writing of its desire to terminate the treaty one year before the treaty 
expires, the treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years and shall thereafter 
be continued in force in accordance with this provision.  
 
Done in Moscow on July 16, 2001 in two copies, each in the Chinese and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic.  
 
Representative of the People’s Representative of the  
 
Republic of China Russian Federation  
 
Jiang Zemin Vladimir Putin 
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Annex 4: Compared Voting behaviour of relevant dyads in the UN 
General Assembly 
 
Voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly 
  
Total 
votes Russia & China Russia & US China & US 
  recorded 
similar 
votes 
Percentage 
consensus 
similar 
votes 
Percentage 
consensus 
similar 
votes 
Percentage 
consensus 
1986 155 119 76,8% 21 13,5% 25 16,1%
1987 142 117 82,4% 14 9,9% 18 12,7%
1988 139 119 85,6% 11 7,9% 12 8,6%
1989 117 103 88,0% 10 8,5% 11 9,4%
1990 86 75 87,2% 14 16,3% 14 16,3%
1991 74 37 50,0% 19 25,7% 7 9,5%
1992 75 31 41,3% 26 34,7% 9 12,0%
1993 65 25 38,5% 24 36,9% 6 9,2%
1994 68 31 45,6% 23 33,8% 13 19,1%
1995 81 36 44,4% 29 35,8% 10 12,3%
1996 74 43 58,1% 28 37,8% 15 20,3%
1997 70 42 60,0% 23 32,9% 12 17,1%
1998 62 38 61,3% 17 27,4% 8 12,9%
1999 68 43 63,2% 19 27,9% 7 10,3%
2000 67 51 76,1% 17 25,4% 10 14,9%
2001 67 51 76,1% 15 22,4% 7 10,4%
2002 73 54 74,0% 14 19,2% 8 11,0%
2003 74 54 73,0% 18 24,3% 8 10,8%
2004 72 55 76,4% 10 13,9% 5 6,9%
2005 74 54 73,0% 10 13,5% 5 6,8%
2006 87 70 80,5% 8 9,2% 8 9,2%
2007 77 60 77,9% 8 10,4% 5 6,5%
2008 77 59 76,6% 8 10,4% 7 9,1%
Total 
number 
of votes 
recorded 1944 1367 70,3% 386 19,9% 230 11,8%
Source: own calculations; data recompiled from Erik Voeten Dataverse and UN Documentation Library (resolutions from 
diverse years) 
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Annex 5: Russia and China’s vetoes in the UN Security Council 
(1986-2008) 
 
Russian and Chinese Vetoes in the UN Security Council  
 Vetoing MS SC Official Record 
Draft Text 
No Subject 
1993 Russia S/PV.3211 S/25693 PKO financing in Cyprus  
1994 Russia S/PV.3475 S/1994/1358
on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(Transport of goods between the 
former Yugoslavia and Bosnia) 
1997 China S/PV.3730 S/1997/18 
Authorization for 155 observers 
for the purposes of verification of 
the agreement on the definite 
ceasefire in Guatemala 
1999 China S/PV.3982 S/1999/201 
on the extension of UNPREDEP 
in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
2004 Russia S/PV.4947 S/2004/313 
on the termination of the 
mandate of the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP)'s mandate and 
replacing it with the UN 
Settlement Implementation 
Mission in Cyprus (UNSIMIC). 
2007 China, Russia S/PV.5619 S/2007/14  on condemnation of Human Rights abuses in Myanmar 
2008 China, Russia S/PV.5933 S/2008/447  
condemning the violence by the 
government of Zimbabwe 
against civilians after the 
elections of June 27 and 
demanding an immediate cease 
of attacks against and 
intimidation of opposition 
members and supporters. 
Source: Global Policy Forum   
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Annex 6:Sino-Russian Bilateral Trade 
 
 
BILATERAL TRADE        
US$ million 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Russian exports to 
China 3526 4987 3495 3799 5152 4086 3640 
Chinese exports to 
Russia 2336 2692 1581 1665 1693 2033 1840 
Total bilateral trade 5862 7679 5076 5464 6845 6119 5480 
Inflation, average 
consumer index 
(2000=100) 81,484 83,904 86,081 88,496 91,095 93,225 94,667 
Total bilateral trade 
(deflated) 7194 9152 5897 6174 7514 6564 5789 
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
4223 5770 7959 8407 9728 12127 15890
1497 2233 2710 3521 6030 9098 13211
5720 8003 10669 11928 15758 21225 29101
96,743 100
102,81
7
104,45
7
106,85
8
109,70
8 113,41
5913 8003 10377 11419 14747 19347 25660
 
2006 2007
17554 19677
15832 28488
33386 48165
117,069 120,415
28518 39999
 
Source: own calculations, IMF Database, China Statistical Yearbook (various years), Bobo Lo (2008) 
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Annex 7: Russia and China’s main trade partners 
 
    
China's Main Trade 
Partners 2006 2007 %change  
volume in 10000 US$    
EU27 28725633 35619785 24,0% 
United States 26265946 30205838 15,0% 
Japan 20729525 23610929 13,9% 
Hong Kong 16608883 19731353 18,8% 
South Korea 13424635 15988740 19,1% 
Taiwan, China 10783172 12443780 15,4% 
Russia 3338681 4817717 44,3% 
Singapore 4085791 4715003 15,4% 
Malaysia 3710951 4638689 25,0% 
Others 48366430 65637130  
Total 176039647 217408964 23,5% 
    
source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006-2007; US China Business Council 
 
 
Russia's Main Trade 
Partners 2006 2007 %change 
million US$    
EU 222711 266020 19,4%
China 28668 40294 40,6%
Ukraine 24221 29646 22,4%
Belarus 19944 26074 30,7%
Turkey 17043 22512 32,1%
Japan 12244 20095 64,1%
US 15043 17473 16,2%
Kazakhstan 12807 16576 29,4%
South Korea 9516 14986 57,5%
Others 76854 98505  
Total 439051 552181 25,8%
Source: Russian Federal State Statistic Service 
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Annex 8: Calculating the Trade Interdependence variable 
 
Studies Measures 
 
Barbieri (2002) 
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Oneal & Russet 
(1997) 
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Where subscript ij denotes a dyadic variable, subscripts i and j denote states i or j, such that i 
≠ j  
Source: Adapted from Erik Gartzke and Quan Li (2003) 
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Annex 9: Sino-Russian trade interdependence 
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Annex 10: Trade interdependence of relevant dyads 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
GDP (PPP US$ bn)       
China 3701,095 4157,822 4697,901 5314,372 6121,904 7034,838
Russia 1284,652 1407,759 1548,717 1697,957 1882,354 2089,607
US 10469,6 10960,75 11685,925 12421,875 13178,35 13807,55
Germany 2278,426 2321,522 2415,679 2513,215 2671,448 2812,255
Total Trade (US$ bn)       
China 620,8 851 1154,6 1421,9 1760,7 2173,8
Russia 205,4 255,4 334,5 433,1 543,8 676,5
US 2372,0 2531,0 2928,0 3278,0 3667,0 3991,7
Germany 1243,4 1286,5 1428,4 1583,4 1872,3 2017,4
Bilateral Trade (US$ 
bn)       
China-Russia 11,9 15,8 21,2 29,1 33,4 48,2
China-US 147,3 180,8 231,4 285,3 343,0 386,7
Russia-Germany 14,7 18,5 23,9 33,0 43,0 52,9
SINO-US Trade 
Barbieri Method (2002) 
Trade Share in China 23,7% 21,2% 20,0% 20,1% 19,5% 17,8%
Trade Share in US 6,2% 7,1% 7,9% 8,7% 9,4% 9,7%
Trade Salience 12,14% 12,32% 12,59% 13,21% 13,50% 13,13%
Trade Asymmetry 17,52% 14,10% 12,14% 11,36% 10,13% 8,10%
Trade 
Interdependence 2,13% 1,74% 1,53% 1,50% 1,37% 1,06%
Oneal & Russet Method (1997) 
Trade Dependence  
China-US 3,980% 4,348% 4,926% 5,368% 5,603% 5,497%
Trade Dependence  
US-China 1,407% 1,650% 1,980% 2,297% 2,603% 2,801%
Trade 
Interdependence 1,407% 1,650% 1,980% 2,297% 2,603% 2,801%
Trade Asymmetry  3,980% 4,348% 4,926% 5,368% 5,603% 5,497%
RUSSO-GERMAN Trade 
Barbieri Method (2002) 
Trade Share in Russia 7,1% 7,3% 7,1% 7,6% 7,9% 7,8%
Trade Share in 
Germany 1,2% 1,4% 1,7% 2,1% 2,3% 2,6%
Trade Salience 2,90% 3,23% 3,45% 3,99% 4,26% 4,52%
Trade Asymmetry 5,96% 5,82% 5,46% 5,54% 5,61% 5,19%
Trade 
Interdependence 0,17% 0,19% 0,19% 0,22% 0,24% 0,24%
Oneal & Russet Method (1997) 
Trade Dependence  
Russia-Germany 1,141% 1,316% 1,541% 1,944% 2,282% 2,530%
Trade Dependence  
Germany-Russia 0,643% 0,798% 0,988% 1,313% 1,608% 1,880%
Trade 
Interdependence 0,643% 0,798% 0,988% 1,313% 1,608% 1,880%
Trade Asymmetry  1,141% 1,316% 1,541% 1,944% 2,282% 2,530%
Source:IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008); China National Bureau of Statistics, Russia Central Bank, Lo 
Bobo (2008), own calculations; US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division; German Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology
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Annex 11: China’s Civil Nuclear Sector 
 
China's Nuclear Energy Supply 
Mainland Nuclear Power 
Reactors 
Net 
capacity 
(each) 
(Mwe) 
Commercial 
operation 
Design & 
Technology 
Daya Bay 1 & 2 944 1994 France (EDF) 
Qinshan 1 279 1994
China (SNERDI), 
Japan (Mitsubishi) 
Qinshan 2 & 3 610 2002, 2004 China (SNERDI), Canada (AECL) 
Lingao 1 & 2 935 2002, 2003
France 
(Framatome) 
Qinshan 4 & 5 665 2002, 2004
China (SNERDI), 
Canada (AECL) 
Tianwan 1 & 2 1060 2007 China & Russia (Atomstroyexport) 
    
Domestic Uranium Resources
70 000 
tU   
Domestic Production 840 t/y   
Imports 
ca. 800 
t/y   
from: kazakh, Russia, Namibia, Australia   
Source: WNA (World Nuclear Association);NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative)  
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Annex 12: Relevant Pipeline Projects 
 
Pipeline Geopolitics 
Projects length (km) 
capacity  
(mt/y or 
bn 
cm/y) 
investment   
(US$ bn) Operator 
Feasibilit
y study completion 
Russian Oil Pipeline Projects in Siberia 
Angarsk-Daqing 2400 20-30 2,5 Yukos-CNPC Feb 99 "environmental problems"*
Angarsk-Nakhodka 
(ESPO I) 3885 50
construction
: 5,8 
exploration: 
7,5
Transneft 2003 x 
Taishet-Skovorodino- 
Nakhodka (ESPO II) 4700 
 
50-
(80)** 
30 Transneft 2004-2005 
2009 
(phase1) 
2015-2017
Taishet Skovorodino-
Daqing ESPO II-
branch 
930 15-30
15 
(Rosneft);  
10 
(Transneft)
Transneft-
CNPC  2011?
Chinese Oil Pipeline Projects in Central Asia 
Atasu-Alashankou 988 10-20*** 0,7
KasTransOil-
CNPC  2008-2010-?
Sino-Russian Gas Pipeline Project 
Kovykta-Manzhouli 
pipeline 660 2,8 1,1
Rusia 
Petroleum 
(TNK-BP)
Feb 99 2010?
Kovykta-Nakhodka 
gas pipeline to ROC    TNK-BP    
Chinese Oil Pipeline Project in Central Asia 
Central Asia-China 
pipeline 1818 30 7,3
Gazprom-
Uzbekneftgas-
KazMunayGas
-CNPC
2003 2009-2011
* Khodorkovski's arrest       
** 24 from West Sib.; 56 from East Sib.     
*** 7 from Kumkol (export potential); i.e. 13 from Russia?    
         
Source: hydrocarbons-technology.com; China.org.cn (01/2003; 09/2003); Helmer (2005); Sukhanov (2005); TNK-BP 
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Annex 13: The ESPO oil-pipeline 
 
 
Ich habe mich bemüht, sämtliche Inhaber der Bildrechte ausfindig zu 
machen und ihre Zustimmung zur Verwendung der Bilder in dieser Arbeit 
eingeholt. Sollte dennoch eine Urheberrechtsverletzung bekannt werden, 
ersuche ich um Meldung bei mir  
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• Elaborated audit planning memorandums assessing the quality of controlling 
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 Chinese & Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian: conversational 
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with civil society leaders, and conducted in-depth research on security issues, 
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